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ABSTRACT 
This project examines the safety management of civil aircraft accident 
investigation authorities in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
Member States, with particular emphasis on the independence of the 
investigations. The research aims to establish the current level of resources and 
methodology adopted by Member States’ accident investigation authorities. The 
output of this work not only identifies the current situation but informs initiatives 
for some of the States in the process of establishing their investigation 
capability.  
ICAO Annex 13 was analysed and found to be based on the principle of 
independent accident investigations. Also, a four dimensional measuring index 
(4DMI) has been developed to measure the independence of accident 
investigations in ICAO Member States. Data were collected from 45 States and 
are presented in the thesis. As a result of applying the 4DMI to the collected 
data, the States were ranked according to their scores, and divided into four 
categories of independence. Analysis of the four categories and the scores from 
the four dimensions revealed that States approach the concept of investigation 
independence in different ways; however, there are several practices that are 
common within the highest independence category and several other practices 
that are common within the lowest independence category.  
The research recommends that States should work towards improving their 
overall investigation independence by implementing the seven identified 
practices in the High-Independence category and distance themselves from the 
five practices identified as common in the Low-Independence category. 
 
Keywords: Aviation Safety, 4DMI, Measuring Index, Criminalisation, 
Investigation Authority, Just Culture, ICAO Annex 13, ICAO USOAP, Accident 
Investigation 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Thesis Statement 
A methodology can be developed to measure the independence of accident 
investigation authorities in ICAO Member States. The effect of different dimensions 
(functional, financial, structural, and operational) on the overall measured score of 
each participating State can also be examined to learn how to improve the 
independence of that State in accident investigation. Moreover, guidance can be 
given to other States which are interested in building their own independent accident 
investigation authority. 
1.2 Motivation 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had a particularly bad experience with accident 
investigations in 1996 when a Saudi Arabian airliner was involved in the worst mid-
air collision in the history of aviation. The Indian authority, which is the State of 
Occurrence here, led the investigation into the accident. The details of this accident 
are discussed in section ‎1.2.1 of this thesis.  
Recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to establish an independent 
accident and incident investigations office. There are several reasons behind this 
decision. First, the number of air operators has increased after certifying new 
operators in Saudi Arabia, such as SAMA and NAS AIR. Moreover, Saudi Arabian 
Airlines has been adding more aircraft to its fleet to meet the increasing seats 
demand. Second, the Saudi Government is opening its airspace to other carriers to 
operate within Saudi airspace. Third, ICAO has strengthened its requirements for 
independent accident investigation authorities in ICAO Member States and the Saudi 
Government intends to comply with the new requirements. This is discussed in detail 
later in this thesis.  
Additionally, the aviation industry has seen an increase in the criminalisation of 
human error. This threat to the advancement of aviation safety needs to be 
countered by increasing the credibility of air accident investigation authorities by 
ensuring their independence from judicial authorities and any other pressure, which 
will ensure the continued sharing of information from the industry without the fear of 
being criminalised.  
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In addition to the above, the importance of looking at the issue of investigation 
independence at this particular time has been highlighted by the recent changes in 
ICAO Annex 13 (10th edition) and the latest EU Regulation 996/2010, which 
strengthen the requirements for independent investigations. These changes will be 
discussed in more detail later in the thesis. 
The work to establish an independent accident investigation office in Saudi Arabia 
has started but it is not progressing as fast as initially expected, due to lack of both 
experience and guidance. The guidance available in this regard is ICAO documents, 
which have the minimum requirements needed to bring an ICAO Member State to 
compliance with the requirements. ICAO requires the investigation authority to be 
“functionally” independent from the regulator according to the 9th edition of Annex 13 
and its supporting documents. Recently, however, the 10th edition of Annex 13 has 
strengthened these requirements to include structural independence. 
There are many countries around the world that have had independent accident 
investigation authorities for many years now. However, their experiences are 
inadequately documented and the details of the concept of investigation 
independence remain vague. For the above reasons, this study has been designed 
from the beginning to explore and understand what really works and what does not. 
The data were collected by using a questionnaire to ask professionals who have 
done this before, and by interviewing some of the experts to learn from their 
experiences. The data were also collected from different countries around the world 
in order to understand the similarities and differences in how it is done in real life, not 
just in theory. 
Today, there is a real need to establish independent accident investigation 
capabilities in countries where this either did not exist before, or did not exist in the 
new required form. Understanding how this crucial part of investigation 
independence works is very important and will help these countries to accomplish 
this task. 
1.2.1 Saudi Arabian Airline Mid-Air Collision 1996 
On November 12, 1996 a mid-air collision involving Saudi Arabian Airlines flight 763 
and Kazakhstan Airlines flight 1907 occurred over the village of Charkhi Dadri, 
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Haryana, India. Everyone on-board both flights (349 people) was killed. The crash 
was described as the worst mid-air collision in aviation history (Holman, 1996; Daffa, 
2002; Havely, 2002; Burns, 1996; Lahoti, 1997). 
During the investigation of this accident, the Saudi Arabian government pointed out 
to the Lahoti court of inquiry that neither the Saudi nor the Kazakhstan governments 
were represented in the investigations of this collision. Captain Omar Barayan, on 
behalf of the Saudi government, argued before Justice Lahotia that according to 
ICAO Annex 13, the Saudi and Kazakhstan governments must be involved in the 
investigation process. Captain Barayan said that “there could have been better 
participation by the three governments concerned.” (Rediff On The Net, 1997). 
There were several theories at the time trying to explain what happened and who 
was responsible. Saudi Airlines’ counsel Lalit Bhasin blamed the ATC for failing to 
inform both aircraft about the “instructions passed to any of the flights”, because the 
controller did not give any traffic advisory information to the Saudi aircraft. Bhasin 
also indicated that the absence of modern technology at the airport was a 
contributory factor, which was disputed by the Indian Airport Authority counsel Air 
Commodore N. Sarma (retired). Sarma stated that the lack of modern technology at 
the airport is known to all operators coming into this airport and they should take this 
into consideration when operating to India. Bhasin, however, indicated that the 
Airport Authority of India had bought a highly sophisticated radar for Delhi airport, but 
did not install it before the accident, which meant there was a clear indication of the 
need for it. 
Kazakh Airlines said that its pilot descended because of bad weather. It also blamed 
the Delhi airport’s ATC for not providing information about the Saudi flight. 
1.2.1.1 Interviewing the Head of the Saudi Investigation Team 
The researcher interviewed the head of the Saudi investigation team that was sent to 
India to participate in the Indian investigation. The Saudi team was composed of 
representatives of the Saudi civil aviation authority, the Presidency of Civil Aviation – 
Aviation Standards and Safety Department (PCA-ASSD), and the Saudi Arabian 
Airlines’ Safety Department. Captain Omar Barayan, Vice President PCA-ASSD at 
the time, was the head of the investigation team. 
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The researcher asked Captain Barayan the following questions with regard to the 
Saudi Arabian Airline mid-air collision over India in 1996: 
1- Was there an official representation for the Saudi team from the civil aviation 
authority, for example as accredited representative according to ICAO Annex 
13? 
2- What could have changed if the KSA had had an independent accident 
investigation office at the time? 
Captain Barayan explained that the right of participation in accident investigations is 
granted to ICAO contracting States regardless of their internal set up of accident 
investigation.  
Barayan also believes that the dispute with the Judge over reading the FDR in India 
was a matter of national pride and that the Judge obviously under-estimated the 
complexity of the task with partially damaged recorders. He thought that India being 
an advanced country with space technology should be able to perform this 
comparatively simple task.  However, the Judge was finally convinced that the two 
recorders would have to be sent to Russia and the UK for the readout under the 
supervision of the whole investigation team. 
In answering the second question, Barayan thinks that nothing would have changed 
if Saudi Arabia had had an independent accident investigation office at the time. 
According to Barayan the Saudi investigation team would not have benefited any 
more by the existence of the independent office then, as the success of any 
participating team depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of those team 
members. 
The researcher asked for more clarification from Captain Barayan with regard to the 
benefits of having an independent accident investigation authority.  
Barayan explained that based on his experience the success of any aircraft accident 
investigation efforts depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of each 
participating member of the team, rather than how their organisation is internally 
structured. Since Saudi Arabia was the State of Registration and the State of 
Operator, full participation in the investigation of the Delhi mid-air collision would 
have been granted, even if we were non-Saudis, as long as the team members were 
officially delegated by the Saudi Government. 
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Therefore, according to Barayan, the matter lies upon the individual credentials and 
work ethics, rather than where the investigation teams come from or how they are 
organised. Barayan further explain that he still thinks that in order to better serve 
impartiality countries should try to designate an independent body for aircraft 
accident investigations whenever and wherever possible. 
1.3 Research Outlines 
The idea and scope of this research can be illustrated through the following 
questions and research goal. 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
Reviewing the literature led to the following observations that in turn led to the 
formulation of the research problem: 
 ICAO requires its Member States to have independent aircraft accident and 
incident investigation authority (10th Ed.)  
 Accident investigation independence is not clearly defined by ICAO. 
 The literature does not clearly define investigation independence. 
 Even those who have tried to define investigation independence did not agree 
on one definition or description and their definitions are vague. 
 Almost every piece of literature that discussed accident investigation 
independence stated that it is very important. 
 If a State wants to have a truly independent investigation authority, it is not 
clear how can it achieve this. There is not enough clear guidance. 
 There is conflict even in the way authors have looked at examples of 
investigation independence. Some authors, for example, discussed having a 
safety board to accentuate the independence of the authority; however, others 
say a safety board could allow political interference and therefore is a sign of 
lack of independence. 
 The threat to investigation independence may lead to criminalisation, as one 
outcome of the investigation. 
The research tries to establish an answer to the following question: 
Is it possible to measure the independence of air accident investigation in 
ICAO Member States? 
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While trying to answer the above main question, these questions also need to be 
answered: 
 What is independence? Is it relative or is it well defined in the context of 
accident investigation?  
 Do all Contracting States to the Chicago Convention have the same 
understanding of accident investigation independence? 
 What are the conditions that need to be satisfied in order to ensure the 
independence of the investigation? 
 Why is the independence of aviation accident investigation important? What 
are the benefits and what are the challenges? 
1.3.2 Research Objectives 
This research work is intended to achieve the following objectives: 
 Study current measures of independence that exist in aviation and other 
disciplines such as the Economy, Legal, and Political Science. 
 Develop a methodology to measure the formal and informal (de jure and de 
facto) independence of air accident investigation in ICAO Member States. 
 Use the developed methodology to expose the gaps that need to be filled to 
bring an ICAO Member State accident investigation to the desired level of 
independence. 
 Analyse the results from applying the developed measuring index to a sample 
of ICAO Member States. 
1.4 Benefits of Independent Accident Investigation 
Guo Fu (2011) claims that there are elements that are considered to be the basic 
requirements for ensuring an objective investigation such as law, organisation, and 
investigator’s behaviour. Relevant regulation or law can both dominate and protect 
the investigative process and investigators, and guarantee the independence of the 
investigation. In Guo Fu’s opinion, the investigators who perform the investigation 
are the decisive factor in how authentic the investigation is. Their personal 
behaviours have a great influence over the investigation (Guo Fu, 2011). Mr. Guo Fu 
is the deputy director of the Aviation Safety Office of East China Regional 
Administration of Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), which is part of the 
CAAC but functionally independent from it. 
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Independence is the basic guarantee to find the root causes without outside 
manipulation. Absolute independence is hard to attain because different countries 
have different traditions. Having laws or regulations in position to provide a legal 
framework is the most important element to protect independent investigations (Guo 
Fu, 2011). 
Guo Fu highlighted four basic principles, in addition to Annex 13, that must be 
implemented, according to China’s regulation, when an investigation is conducted:  
 Independent: the investigation shall be conducted independently; no other 
organisation or individual is allowed to interfere. 
 Objective: the investigation shall be fact driven, objective, fair, and scientific 
and cannot have any intent of subjectivity. 
 Detailed: the investigation shall analyse and determine the causes of the 
accident or incident and contributing factors, including any defect concerning 
aircraft design, manufacture, operation, maintenance, personnel training, 
company’s management policies, and regulator’s rules and regulations and 
their implementation. 
 Thorough: the investigation shall not only analyse and determine the cause of 
the accident and contributing factors, but also analyse and determine factors 
that are not directly related to the accident but that have a potential impact on 
flight safety and related issues. 
In road safety, according to (Jähi et al., 2006): 
1. Accident investigation should identify the factors leading to accidents 
including: 
a. physical/psychological (e.g. driver fatigue) 
b. social (e.g. acceptability of speeding) 
c. political (lack of will for more effective road safety enforcement) 
d. economic (incentives to take risks in the road transport industry) 
e. engineering (road infrastructure and vehicle design issues) 
2. Accident investigation should lead to the design and implementation of an 
effective plan for change. 
3. The results of investigations should be used to challenge social attitudes to 
long-known dangers. For example, by identifying and working to remove 
inducements to take risks. 
4. The lessons from accident investigations should not be lost, so that future 
accidents could be prevented. 
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1.5 Contributions 
The independence of air accident investigations is a required characteristic that 
ensures the credibility of investigation authorities and allows stakeholders to trust 
them and voluntarily provide sensitive and valuable information that could ensure the 
safety of air transport. Although a fundamental principle, very few studies have 
attempted to understand and measure the concept of independence, such as the 
studies concerned with the independence of Central Banks, independence in 
transportation in general, and the independence of Regulatory Agencies. However, 
there are no in-depth studies in this area specific to aircraft accident investigations. 
In addition, the development of a comprehensive measuring index for the 
independence of aircraft accident investigations in ICAO Member States has not 
been done before. This research fills this gap by introducing a comprehensive four 
dimensional measuring index (4DMI) that is specifically developed for measuring the 
independence of aircraft accident investigation authorities in ICAO Member States. 
This research also presents the analysis and results of applying the 4DMI index to 
45 ICAO Member States.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chicago Convention and ICAO 
On 7 December 1944 the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago 
Convention) was signed by 52 States and the Provisional International Civil Aviation 
Organization (PICAO) was established pending ratification of the Convention by 26 
States. PICAO was functioning from 6 June 1945 until 4 April 1947 when ICAO came 
into being after the 26th ratification was received on 5 March 1947. Six months later, 
ICAO became part of the United Nations as a specialized agency linked to the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (ICAO, 2006; Wood and Sweginnis, 1995; 
Smart, 2004). 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation set forth the purpose of ICAO in its 
preamble that was signed in Chicago on 7 December, 1944: 
"WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to 
create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of 
the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and  
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that co-operation between 
nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;  
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles 
and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a 
safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be 
established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and 
economically;  
Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end." (ICAO, 2006). 
Article 26 of the “Measures to Facilitate Air Navigation” chapter of the Chicago 
Convention is the base for ICAO Annex 13 titled “Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation.”  This article sets down two main rules: accidents shall be investigated 
when they occur, and the country where the accident took place shall be the one that 
carries out the investigation (ICAO, 2006; Com. Oritz and Dr. Capaldo, 2004; Tench, 
1985). 
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2.2 ICAO Annex 13 
The Council adopted the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for 
Aircraft Accident Inquiries on 11 April 1951. These SARPs were designated as 
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention (ICAO, 2001). Aircraft accidents’ investigations 
are very often international events because of the involvements of the State of 
Operator, State of Design, State of Registry, State of Occurrence, and State of 
Manufacture. ICAO Annex 13 was put together as a reference for all people involved 
in an aircraft accident or incident investigation to prevent conflicts between States 
during the investigation. The Annex defines which States can participate and their 
level of involvement. Compliance with the standards of ICAO Annex 13 is a 
requirement of all contracting States (ICAO, 2009; Stoop and Kahan, 2005; Tench, 
1985; Stoop and Roed-Larsen, 2009). 
The ninth edition of Annex 13 consists of eight chapters, four attachments and an 
appendix. Definitions, applicability and general information are covered in the first 
three chapters. Protection of evidence and the State of Occurrence responsibility 
with regard to the custody and removal of the aircraft are stated in Chapter 3 of the 
Annex (ICAO, 2001). The latest, 10th edition, of ICAO Annex 13 is discussed in 
section 2.3. 
The responsibilities for conducting an investigation and the procedures for 
notification of all stakeholders are detailed in Chapter 4. The investigation process 
itself is contained in Chapter 5. Flight recorders, investigator-in-charge, autopsy, 
coordination with judicial authorities, disclosure of records, informing aviation 
security authorities, and re-opening of an investigation, are also discussed in 
Chapter 5 (ICAO, 2001).  
The investigation final report SARPs are defined in Chapter 6. Details of the 
recommended final report format can be found in the Appendix to the Annex. 
Chapter 7 contains the requirements of ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting 
(ADREP) system. Chapter 8 describes processes that form a part of a safety 
management system (SMS) which aims to reduce the number of occurrences 
worldwide. Mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, safety information 
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databases, and analyses of the safety data are also contained in Chapter 8 (ICAO, 
2001). 
Annex 13 states that the objective of accident and incident investigation is 
prevention. In order to prevent repeated occurrences, accidents and serious 
incidents, as a minimum, must be investigated to identify the causes (ICAO, 2009). 
The Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines accident as (Merriam-Webster, 
2010): 
 an unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance 
 lack of intention or necessity 
 an unfortunate event resulting especially from carelessness or ignorance 
 an unexpected and medically important bodily event especially when injurious 
 an unexpected happening causing loss or injury which is not due to any fault 
or misconduct on the part of the person injured but for which legal relief may 
be sought  
The dictionary definitions are very general and cannot be used to identify aircraft 
accidents, especially when there is an obligation to investigate them. Because of 
this, Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines aircraft 
accidents in a more specific manner. Its definition is the one recognised 
internationally which will be used throughout this research. 
Annex 13 defines an aircraft accident as (ICAO, 2001): 
An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such 
time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: 
a) A person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: 
- being in the aircraft, or 
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become 
detached from the aircraft, or 
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- direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-
inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding 
outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or 
b) The aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: 
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the 
aircraft, and 
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, 
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its 
cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, 
tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or 
c) The aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. 
Note that the 10th edition of Annex 13 revised the definition above to accommodate 
unmanned aircraft (ICAO, 2010). 
Contracting states are also required to investigate serious incidents. ICAO Annex 13 
defines aircraft incident as (ICAO, 2001): 
“An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which affects or could affect the safety of operation.” 
ICAO Annex 13 uses the prefix “Recommendation” to indicate Recommended 
Practices and considers the compliance with that recommendation as “desirable in 
the interests of safety, regularity or efficiency of international air navigation...” 
On the other hand, standards are considered necessary for the safety or regularity of 
international air navigation. Compliance with a standard is compulsory under Article 
38 of the Chicago Convention. 
Chapter 5, section 5.4 of the Annex states that (ICAO, 2001): 
“The accident investigation authority shall have independence in the conduct of the 
investigation and have unrestricted authority over its conduct, consistent with the 
provisions of this Annex.” 
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This section makes the independence of accident investigation a requirement on all 
contracting States. However, the Annex does not define what independence is.  
Section 5.4.1 makes an ICAO recommendation that “Any judicial or administrative 
proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be separate from any investigation 
conducted under the provisions of this Annex.” This section was later upgraded to a 
standard in the 10th edition of Annex 13. 
The upgrade of this section from recommendations to standards in Annex 13 the 
10th edition is a major step to support the independence of safety investigations.  
These standards when implemented correctly help increase the flow of safety-critical 
information and the chances to learn from accidents. Flight data recorders (FDRs), 
ATC reports, Pilots reports, witnesses’ statements, and safety data can be better 
protected from being used in judicial and administrative proceedings in ICAO-
Member States because of the strengthening of the safety investigation 
independence. 
Independence of safety investigations ensures the trust and confidence of the people 
who are involved in the aviation accident, which encourages them to provide vital 
information to the investigations without being afraid that they might be prosecuted 
or blamed for their mistakes. This in turn will ensure that the safety investigation can 
achieve its goals, which are: to understand what happened, why it happened, and 
how to prevent the reoccurrence of similar events. 
Also, with this upgrade the perception of independence is strengthened. It is very 
important that the public, safety personnel, manufacturers, operators, and the 
aviation industry in general perceive the accident investigation body as being 
independent. Otherwise, without this perception of independence there can be no 
trust in the investigation process or its results. Moreover, the persons that are 
involved in the accident that is being investigated would be reluctant to provide any 
voluntary information. 
Annex 13 section 5.4.1 improves the perception of independence of the investigation 
body by mandating the establishment of an independent body that is separated from 
the regulator and other interested parties. This independent body is tasked only with 
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the sole function of impartially investigating aviation accidents and incidents to 
improve safety and prevent similar events from reoccurring. 
One problem with the implementation of this is that some ICAO-Member States 
cannot afford setting up a separately funded investigation body. The answer to this is 
to share resources with other neighbour States by means of regional organizations 
such as RAIOs. If a RAIO is setup correctly and its independence is ensured it could 
be a very effective way to manage resources and at the same time conduct high 
quality and impartial investigations. Moreover, the States involved in the regional 
organization setup will be in compliance with ICAO Annex 13 SARPs.  
The emphasis put by the international community represented by ICAO on the 
concept on independence, of both the investigation process and the investigating 
body, is a clear indication of its importance. By upgrading the recommendations to 
standards ICAO is “forcing”, as oppose to “encouraging”, Member States to be part 
of this international effort to ultimately ensure the advancement of aviation safety. 
Because sections 5.4 and 5.4.1 are standards, ICAO-Member States have one of 
two choices to make; either comply with the new standards or file a difference. Filing 
a difference will put the Member State under the spotlight, which will, hopefully, 
encourage the State to seek compliance status as soon as possible.  
Moreover, to encourage “implementation uniformity”, in 2000 ICAO issued the first 
edition of Doc 9756 titled “Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation”. 
Paragraph 2.1.2 in Part I of this ICAO document discusses what ICAO means by 
independent aircraft accident investigation. The paragraph states that “the 
investigation authority must be strictly objective and totally impartial and must also 
be perceived to be so.” The document also encourages States to set up an 
independent investigation body that is separate from the CAA. In the same 
document ICAO acknowledges that “in many States it may not be practical to 
establish a permanent accident investigation authority.” As an alternative, ICAO 
mentioned the appointment of a separate commission to do the investigation. This 
commission must report directly to a ministerial level of government (ICAO, 2000). 
This makes it clear that the independence required and described by ICAO 
documents is functional independence. 
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2.2.1 Is Functional Independence Enough? 
There has been a recent occasion where the establishment of a separate, 
structurally independent investigation body was proved to be crucial. In Australia, the 
accident investigation body has been functionally and structurally separate from the 
regulator. The multi-mode Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), formerly 
known as the single-mode Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI), has enjoyed a 
strong independent position which allowed it to criticise the regulator. The Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), which is the Australian regulator, has been under 
scrutiny from the Australian Government for several years now, especially after the 
Lockhart River air disaster in 2005. CASA has been accused, amongst other 
accusations, of being too close to the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holders and that 
it has been “captured” by the industry. The regulator was also heavily criticised for its 
lack of oversight (Australian ABC News, 2010; The Canberra Times, 2008). 
The independence, functionally and structurally, of the investigation body in Australia 
has been the key factor that helped in pointing out the deficiencies in the way the 
regulator (CASA) conducts its business.  
ICAO Annex 13 requirement with regard to structural independence has changed 
with the new 10th edition of Annex 13. The requirement used to be for functional 
independence only and structural separation used to be desired. Now, however, 
section 5.4 of Annex 13 makes structural separation a Standard and therefore a 
requirement (ICAO, 2000; ICAO, 2001; ICAO, 2010). 
2.3 Strengthening Investigation Independence Related Regulations 
in ICAO Annex 13 10th Edition 
A new edition of ICAO Annex 13 came out in July 2010. The new edition strengthens 
the requirements for independent accident investigations in ICAO Member States. 
The new amendments strengthen some of the issues related to the independence of 
air accident investigations.  
The first thing to notice is the upgrade of section 5.4.1 from a recommendation to a 
standard. The section now requires the separation of Annex 13 investigations from 
judicial and administrative proceedings that are set up to apportion blame or liability. 
This upgrade was presented by the Secretariat in the Accident Investigation and 
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Prevention (AIG) Divisional Meeting in 2008. In its Working Paper 04, the Secretariat 
recognises the need for other types of investigations that might apportion blame or 
liability to fulfil “other needs.” However, it recognises the purpose of Annex 13 
investigations and the need for them to be separated from other investigations. The 
recommendation was introduced in Annex 13 fourteen years before (i.e. in 1994) and 
it is time for it to be fully aligned with the spirit of Annex 13 by upgrading it to a 
Standard (AIG Secretariat, 2008b, d; ICAO, 2010). 
It is also worth noting that the international community suggested the replacement of 
the term “separate from” with the term “independent of” as mentioned in ICAO 
WP79. In addition, the international community at the meeting suggested a standard 
should be made to give priority to safety investigations over judicial and 
administrative investigations. The first suggestion was rejected by the meeting and 
the second was felt to be a recommendation rather than a standard (AIG Secretariat, 
2008d). 
Another important change in this edition of Annex 13 is the removal of any reference 
to the pilot’s name who reports an accident or major incident. Moreover, there is now 
a provision to protect the names of the persons involved in accidents and incidents 
from being disclosed. Also, the changes addressed the disclosure of records to 
include the image recordings in cockpits and their transcripts (AIG Secretariat, 
2008d; ICAO, 2010). 
Several definitions were revised in this 10th edition of Annex 13 including the 
definition of accident (now includes unmanned aircraft systems), serious incident, 
investigation, safety recommendation, and accredited representative (ICAO, 2010). 
The 10th edition of ICAO Annex13 now allows for delegating the investigations to 
regional accident investigation organisations. In addition, the participation of States 
“which suffered fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens” provision has been revised 
(ICAO, 2010). 
There is also a new provision with regard to the development of documented policies 
and procedures for investigations. Also, the provision that the final report needs to be 
made publicly available has been revised (ICAO, 2010). 
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In addition, two more new provisions were introduced in this edition; a provision to 
ensure that judicial investigations or administrative investigations are not impeding 
annex 13 investigations, and a provision on the control of safety recommendations’ 
responses and the monitoring of the actions taken (ICAO, 2010). 
2.4 USOAP – Measure of Compliance 
Because of the network nature of the industry, the level of safety of one country 
could be very high but it will not help when its citizens are flying under much lower 
safety levels in another county. Both countries must be in an acceptable level of 
safety when it comes to air transportation in order to protect the citizens of both 
countries. In the absence of appropriate international agreement, or the enforcement 
of it, one country with an inadequate safety structure will impact, not only on the 
safety of its own traffic, but also on the safety of other countries to which it flies 
(Button et al., 2004). 
The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP) was launched by ICAO in 
1999. Its management is the responsibility of the Safety Oversight Audit (SOA) 
Section of the ICAO Safety and Security Audits (SSA) Branch. The SOA Section is 
responsible for developing and maintaining the standard safety oversight auditing 
procedures and tools. It is also responsible for the quality of the audit process and 
products. Moreover, it is responsible for training and approval of the auditors (ICAO, 
2009). 
ICAO USOAP is intended to audit States’ compliance with their own regulations and 
with the Chicago Convention. States’ conformance with the ICAO SARPs, guidance 
material, related procedures, and relevant industrial practices in general use, are 
also audited. Eight critical elements for a State’s safety oversight system have been 
defined by ICAO to ensure the effective implementation of that system. The eight 
critical elements are (ICAO, 2009, 2010): 
1. Primary aviation legislation 
2. Specific operating regulations 
3. State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions 
4. Technical personnel qualification and training 
5. Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information 
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6. Licensing, certification, authorization and approval obligations 
7. Surveillance obligations 
8. Resolution of safety concerns 
With regard to Annex 13, the ICAO USOP is not a measure of the “effectiveness” of 
the accident investigation itself; it is a measure of compliance with ICAO SARPs 
regardless of the process or outcome of the investigation. 
2.4.1 USOAP Results and Transparency 
In the 32nd Assembly Resolution A32-11, the voluntary and confidential assessment 
programme called the Safety Oversight Assessment Program (SOAP) was changed 
to become the mandatory and transparent audit programme known as the Universal 
Safety Oversight Audit Program (USOAP). All Contracting States were urged “to 
ensure that the results of the audits be used for safety-related purposes only.” The 
scope and degree of transparency and disclosure of information in the release of 
audit results were not discussed (ICAO Assembly, 1998). 
In the 163rd Session of the ICAO Council “Summary of the Minutes of the 10th 
Meeting”, it was agreed to post the analysis of the audit findings at global and 
regional levels and that the posting would be on a password protected ICAO Safety 
oversight webpage. However, in the 33rd Assembly, it was proposed that ICAO 
should publish a non-confidential audit summary report for each complete audit. 
Sufficient information would need to be contained in the summary report to enable 
Contracting States to form an opinion of the safety oversight status of the Audited 
State. Moreover, it was proposed that improvements made by the State, if any, 
should be included in the summary report. States were asked to upload their own 
improvements on the ICAO website and then these improvements were verified by 
ICAO through a follow-up mission or an on-site audit. No resolution was made with 
regard to Transparency and Disclosure, despite the fact that they were discussed 
extensively during the 33rd Assembly, except for a request from the Secretary 
General to solicit information from States to publish the results of their successful 
achievement in resolving major deficiencies so that others could learn from the 
experience. During the ICAO Council’s 165th session, however, the Council decided 
to share non-confidential and safety-enhancing information (ICAO Assembly, 2001). 
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In the 35th Assembly, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) presented 
their views on the proposed ICAO “unified strategy” to resolve safety-related 
deficiencies. The ECAC discussed the need for transparency and disclosure of 
USOAP audit results. ICAO unified strategy involved different elements including the 
aforementioned transparency and disclosure of results, such as: enhancement of 
safety oversight performance; mutual recognition of airworthiness certificates and 
licences issued in accordance with the adopted SARPs; cooperation, assistance and 
partnerships between ICAO, Contracting States, airspace users and air navigation 
services providers; and uniform implementation of SARPs.  
Two actions came out of this Assembly targeting transparency and disclosure: a 
generic mandate for greater transparency in the release of audit results; and the 
identification of non-compliant States. The aim of exposing non-compliant States, 
even after trying to assist them, is to give a chance to other States to protect their 
interests from aviation safety risks. ICAO Contracting States were informed by the 
Secretary General that all audit summary reports were to be published and 
distributed by 31 October 2004 (ICAO Assembly, 2004). 
A Working Paper concerning, inter alia, the transparency and sharing of safety 
information was presented by Austria, on behalf of the European Community and its 
Member States, other State Members of the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC), and by EUROCONTROL in the Directors General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) 
Conference on a Global Strategy for Aviation Safety in Montreal in March 2006. The 
paper has several proposals for further improvement of worldwide aviation safety. 
One of the proposals made was that ICAO should allow all Contracting States to 
have access to all reports of USOAP and should also make them available to the 
general public (EC et al., 2006). 
The DGCA conference agreed on the following recommendations with regard to 
Transparency and public access to information (ICAO DGCA, 2006): 
 Consent should be given to ICAO to publish the results on the public website 
as soon as possible. 
 States sharing their audit information should have the opportunity to provide 
their comments on the ICAO website where the audit information is posted. 
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 Consent should be given to ICAO to publish the safety oversight audit 
information conducted under the comprehensive systems approach. 
 All contracting States should give their consent to ICAO to publish the 
relevant information before 23 March 2008. 
 ICAO would make public the name of any State that does not give consent by 
the date mentioned. 
 ICAO should set up a system to enable the quick resolution of major safety 
concerns identified by a USOAP audit. 
ICAO released the names of six States that had not given their consent for the 
release of audit information in the 28 March 2008: Iran, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Sierra 
Leon, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Apparently this technique worked in putting 
pressure on these six States to give their consent. A news release from ICAO on 16 
July 2008, about four months from the first release, confirmed that all Member States 
that have been audited have given their consent to release the audit results 
(Blumenkron, 2009). 
2.4.2 Deficiencies Identified by ICAO-USOAP 
In the ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) divisional meeting in 
October 2008 the Secretariat presented a summary of the deficiencies identified by 
ICAO USOAP in the accident and incident investigation area. The Secretariat 
summarised the results of the some 80 ICAO Member States that had been audited 
since December 2007 until the time of this meeting in October 2008. Several areas 
of deficiency were identified and discussed in this Working Paper (AIG Secretariat, 
2008a). 
Legislation and regulations were discussed as being insufficient for correct and 
effective implementation of ICAO Annex 13 SARPs in some countries. There were 
insufficient or missing provisions with regard to: 
 Conduct of serious incident investigations 
 Independence of the investigation or its separation from administrative and 
judicial proceedings 
 Immediate notification to the State’s authorities of all accidents and serious 
incidents 
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 Empowerments of investigators 
 Protection and custody of evidence 
 Non-disclosure of records listed in paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13 
 The participation of accredited representatives from relevant States 
The USOAP also found a lack of some States’ legislation and regulations with regard 
to the use of materials from Annex 13 investigations in judicial proceedings without 
consideration for the adverse effects of this practice and the fact that it violates 
paragraph 5.12 of ICAO Annex 13 (AIG Secretariat, 2008a). 
USOAP results also showed that with regard to accident and incident investigation 
authorities, Member States can be grouped into three different groups in general. 
Some States have established a permanent investigations authority separate from 
the CAAs, others have established a permanent investigation office within the CAA, 
and others have not established any permanent authority or office to be in charge of 
accident and incident investigations. Moreover, there are several States that do not 
have the capability to establish an investigation system on their own, and do not 
have guidance on how to cooperate with other States in this matter. The audit also 
showed that some States were having problems regarding the training of 
investigators and problems related to the funding of investigations and the 
accessibility to adequate equipment, transportation and communication means. 
Other problems concerning the notification procedures, investigation procedures, 
and the non-compliance with ICAO guidance with regard to final reports and safety 
recommendations have also been discussed in this Working Paper (AIG Secretariat, 
2008a, e, f, g). 
The final recommendation was that “...ICAO to conduct a study to prioritize Annex 
13-related deficiencies identified during USOAP audits in order to resolve them in the 
most efficient way possible” (AIG Secretariat, 2008a). 
2.5 Definition of Independence in Literature 
In the civil aviation world, ICAO is the ultimate authority for “universal” definitions and 
requirements. The independence of aircraft accident investigation is an ICAO 
requirement that is required through ICAO Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention. 
ICAO, however, does not indicate a clear definition of independence but it does 
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indicate that the Annex defines terms used in the SARPs “...which are not self-
explanatory in that they do not have accepted dictionary meanings” (ICAO, 2001). 
Therefore, since Annex 13 does not define a specific meaning for independence, the 
general dictionary meaning is acceptable to ICAO.  
The Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (Merriam-Webster, 2010) defines 
“independent” in different ways as: 
 not subject to control by others: self-governing  
o not affiliated with a larger controlling unit  
 not requiring or relying on something else: not contingent  
o not looking to others for one's opinions or for guidance in conduct 
o not bound by or committed to a political party 
 not requiring or relying on others (as for care or livelihood)  
o being enough to free one from the necessity of working for a living  
The Road Strategy for Accident in Transport (ROSAT) is a Working Group within the 
Group of Experts to advise the Commission of the European Communities on a 
Strategy to Deal with Accidents in the Transport Sector. In their report, ROSAT 
benefited from three different definitions of “independence” in the context of in-depth 
accident investigations to form their own understanding (Monclus et al., 2006): 
1. The Methodology Working Group, another group within the Group of Experts 
to advise the Commission on a Strategy to Deal with Accidents in the 
Transport Sector, understand it as:  
“The accident investigation authority shall be set up permanently and carry 
out its tasks impartially. Its functional, financial and legal independence from 
any other public bodies or third parties shall be guaranteed, and in particular 
from any national authorities responsible for the establishment or the 
enforcement of safety requirements imposed on the transport sector. The 
independence and impartiality of all safety investigators need to be assured. 
Appropriate measures shall apply to the accident investigation authority’s 
workforce.” 
2. Professor Dietmar Otte from the Medical University of Hannover, Germany 
believes that in this context independence means the “...freedom to: decide 
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what to investigate, choose how to investigate, and publish the results of the 
investigation.” 
3. In the framework used by the SafetyNet Integrated Working Package 4 
“Independent Accident Investigation”, that was presented to the ROSAT 
group, three different domains are identified to understand independence of 
accident investigation (Jähi et al., 2005): 
a. Structural independence (independence from authorities and protection 
from a clear legal status). 
b. Financial independence (to conduct investigations). 
c. Functional independence (liberty to investigate, access to evidence 
and witnesses, publication on findings...). 
Based on these definitions, the ROSAT Group came up with their own understanding 
of the ‘independence’ of accident investigation: “the structural (separation from 
authorities and clear legal status) and financial (yearly stability of funds) ability to 
decide what and how to investigate, and to publish the results of the investigations” 
(Monclus et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, Dechy et al. (2012) argue that the concept of independence is 
relative and not absolute. The authors define the “practical aspect” of investigation 
independence as “...the evaluation and assessment of facts and findings without 
direct interference from governmental agencies and authorities, or vested industrial 
interests, leaving the drafting of recommendations and reporting to the discretion of 
the investigation agency” (Dechy et al., 2012).  
The above described “practical aspect” of accident investigation independence can 
be illustrated with the following example. On 1 June 2009, Airbus A330-203 aircraft 
operated by Air France Flight AF447, scheduled to fly from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to 
Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris, France, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean killing all 
228 onboard. It took the French BEA close to 2 years to locate and recover the 
wreckage. The black boxes were located and recovered in May 2011. The BEA 
issued first interim report in July 2011, and the final report was released in July 2012 
(BEA, 2011). 
The BEA’s interim report caused a big controversy because of some criticism of the 
Manufacturer (Airbus) was removed from the report at the last moment before its 
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release. The interim report had a recommendation from the BEA to replace or 
improve the stall warning system in the A330 aircraft. The confirmed removal of this 
recommendation caused the largest Air France pilots’ union walk away from the 
investigation indicating that the investigation had turned into a “one-sided” 
prosecution of the aircraft crew. The BEA was accused of “protecting” the 
Manufacturer and focusing on blaming the accident on pilots’ error. Moreover, an 
association of French victims’ families protested against the BEA’s “alleged” 
persistence to blame the 3 dead pilots for the accident. The association’s president 
expressed strong feelings against the removal of criticism against Airbus from the 
report before its release and said that it “…definitively discredits the investigation” 
(Lichfield, 2011). 
This example in particular shows the “perceived” influence of the Manufacturer on 
the safety accident investigation. The “alleged” relationship between the BEA 
investigators and the Manufacturer (Airbus) has already deterred the pilots’ union 
from providing support to the investigation. Regardless if the BEA investigators were 
trying to protect the Manufacturer interest or not, such perception of lack of 
independence of the BEA investigation from an interested party (the manufacturer in 
this case) can harm the credibility of the investigation author (BEA), and eventually 
hamper the flow of safety information which may result in missing safety lessons to 
prevent reoccurrences. 
In addition, Baxter (1995) did not give a direct definition for the meaning of 
independence of accident investigation; however, he discussed its effect and 
mentioned some the benefits of having it. Baxter listed two main reasons for the 
need for independent agency; to avoid conflicts of interest, and eliminate any real or 
imagined influence when the agency investigates itself. The independent 
investigation agency would be able to do in-depth investigations and freely make 
recommendations, according to Baxter. The outcome of being independent, as 
explained by Baxter, is that the general public and policy makers would see the 
credibility of the investigation (Baxter, 1995). 
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2.6 Strengthening Investigation Independence in the European 
Union (EU) 
EU Directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 1994 was introduced to establish the 
fundamental principles governing the investigation of accidents and incidents in civil 
aviation. The Directive has been revoked and was replaced by EU Regulation 
996/2010 in October 2010. In addition to upgrading the directive to a regulation 
which is legally stronger and more binding, the new regulation focuses more on the 
separation of safety investigations from judicial proceedings. The Regulation aims to 
prevent pressure from regulators and other authorities to influence safety 
investigations. Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation 996/2010 require, inter alia, each 
EU Member State to have a permanent, functionally independent body to 
investigation accidents and serious incidents in civil aviation. Article 5 of the 
Regulation implies that the sole purpose of the investigation is to prevent future 
accidents and not to apportion blame or liability. Article 5 (5) states that “...they shall 
be independent of, separate from and without prejudice to any judicial or 
administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability” (European Union, October, 
2010). 
The Regulation also protects statements taken from witnesses from being used for 
any purposes other than safety investigations, unless the authority competent to 
decide on the disclosure of records according to national law or administration of 
justice decides that disclosure of the records “...outweigh(s) the adverse domestic 
and international impact that such action may have on that or any future safety 
investigation” (European Union, October, 2010). 
Another thing that came out of the EU Regulation 996/2010 is the establishment of 
the European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities (ENCASIA). 
ENCASIA’s goal “consists of further improving the quality of investigations conducted 
by safety investigation authorities and to strengthen their independence.” In its first 
year, ENCASIA created four Working Groups: Working Group 1 (WG1) “Network 
Communication and Internet Presence”; Working Group 2 (WG2) “Inventory of best 
practices of investigation in Europe”; Working Group 3 (WG3) “Procedures for asking 
and providing help”; and Working Group 4 (WG4) “Training of investigators” 
(European Union, October, 2010; ENCASIA, 2011). 
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After the approval of EU 996/2010, the European Parliament commented on the 
Regulation saying “this will ensure the people can testify without fear to the safety 
investigators.” The European Commission stated that the passing of the legislation 
will emphasise that accident investigations’ sole objective is to prevent future 
accidents. The European Commission adds “while the regulation will not affect the 
prerogatives of the national courts and competent judicial authorities of member 
states, it will ensure that accident investigators have immediate access to evidence 
material and information which may be relevant for the improvement of aviation 
safety” (Kaminski-Morrow, 21 Sept 2010). 
2.7 The Effect of Independence on the Success of Accident 
Investigation  
Without adequate levels of independence, accident investigation bodies cannot 
perform their intended functions. Accident investigation commissions have the 
following main functions (Kjellén, 2000; Hovden et al., 2011):  
 Improve the understanding and knowledge of how accidents happened  
 Inform the public about the causes of accidents  
 Establish trust and confidence  
 Suggest measures to prevent similar accidents  
 Disclose safety policies’ weaknesses and violations. 
Since the ICAO Annex 13 first draft, it was successfully agreed that technical 
investigations must be kept separate and independent from judicial investigation 
(Stoop and Kahan, 2005). In order to realise the benefits of accident investigations, 
the accident investigation body itself must be independent. The “independence” 
factor of accident investigation has a profound effect on the investigation. This factor 
supports “the impartiality, the integrity, the objectivity, the credibility, the 
transparency, and the confidence of the stakeholders”. Legal rights were put in place 
in many countries to encourage free speech, protect witnesses, and prevent the use 
of published accident investigation reports from being used in court. On the other 
hand, the investigation board credibility and access to information can be 
jeopardised if it is totally independent. The safety board could come up with 
unrealistic recommendations because of its total independence from the industry and 
operational practices. Investigators are part of the political and cultural system and it 
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is not possible for them to be totally independent from these systems. Investigation 
independence must not lead to the isolation of investigators from the industry. The 
aim should be for a balanced independence where being independent does not 
mean isolation. The target should be to achieve the benefits that are expected from 
this implementation of the concept of investigation independence (Dechy et al., 
2012). 
In its White Paper on “European transport policy for 2010: time to decide” in 2001, 
the European Commission emphasises that there is a “need” for independent 
technical accident investigations that are concerned with finding the causes of 
accidents and how to improve the law (European Commission, 2001). 
The European Union bases its approach to accident investigations on the principle of 
“independence”. This EU approach is to ensure that the conduct of the accident 
investigation itself, its results and final recommendations should not aim to apportion 
blame or liability. Several criteria are identified for the “needed” type of accident 
investigation (Marinho de Bastos, 2004): 
 Designed to find the real, root and technical causes 
 Separated from other investigations to apportion blame or determine 
compensation for damages 
 Conducted autonomously and impartially (functionally independent) 
 Independent from judicial authorities, industry, insurance companies, 
regulators and operators and any entity that may have an interest that could 
conflict with the goals of the investigation 
 Make safety recommendations and follow-up on them 
In the USA, the American Congress noted the importance of accident investigation 
independence for appropriately carrying out of the responsibilities assigned to the 
NTSB when passing the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974. Congress stated 
that “No Federal agency can properly perform such functions unless it is totally 
separate and independent from any other... agency of the United States.” (Baxter, 
1995). 
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Independent investigators should conduct an investigation in order to raise the 
quality of the investigation process. The independence of the accident investigators 
ensures the objectivity of the investigation (Baxter, 1995; Lindberg et al., 2010).  
Objectivity in the context of accident investigations, however, is sometimes 
misunderstood. Some people believe that the investigator should not have any 
preconceived ideas about the accident. This is not true because the investigator is 
consulted or hired for his experience and he should make use of it. The real meaning 
of objectivity is to approach the accident with an open mind. Lack of objectivity 
occurs when evidence says that a certain part of the aircraft was functioning 
correctly, but the investigator does not accept this evidence because it does not fit 
his preconceived ideas (Wood and Sweginnis, 1995). 
2.8 Lessons from Financial Systems and the Financial Crisis 
The financial auditing profession suffered a big hit after the fall of Enron and the 
Arthur Andersen accounting giant firm, which caused the public to start to lose 
confidence in auditors’ independence in the financial industry. 
Gevurtz (2010) claims that Citigroup’s financial crisis was not caused by bad luck 
after the “taking of reasonable business risks”, but that there was a “lack of 
independence” of the risk managers from the executives who are supposedly 
monitored by those managers. This lack of independence was the result of two 
reasons (Gevurtz, 2010):  
1. Personal connections between the risk managers and the executives 
2. Risk managers’ lines of authority where they reported to the person with an 
interest in promoting the activities they were monitoring. 
According to (Moorthy et al., 2010), in order to help an organisation achieve its goals 
and objectives by evaluating and improving the control, effectiveness, and 
governance processes of risk management, an independent internal auditing activity 
is needed. The authors argue that public confidence in the audit’s effectiveness must 
be restored before any attempt is made to reposition the auditor’s role in society. The 
social usefulness of the audit is lost if public confidence is shattered. “The theory of 
inspired confidence (Limperg Institute 1985) says that there is a dynamic theory that 
connects society’s need for reliable financial information to the ability of auditing 
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methods to meet that need. The theory explains that changes in the needs of society 
and changes in auditing methods interact to bring about changes in the auditors’ 
function.” 
According to Moorthy et al. (2010), a separate function is created in any production 
process when there is a more efficient way of effecting that production. The creation 
of a separate function of auditing, therefore, was a result of differentiation in 
production. In public accounting, however, efficiency in the production process was 
not the only factor for the development of the separate function of auditing. 
Independent auditors are considered as a community’s “confidential agent” and a 
society’s “agent of confidence”. It is these authors’ opinion that reinstating the 
public’s perception of the auditing profession is the most difficult. There need to be 
“reforms and changes” in the auditing profession, and “education” of the public. Also, 
the public needs to be “convinced” about the reforms in order to restore the 
profession’s position as an admirable and respectable profession. Their study 
concluded that although the “once glorious and noble” profession has been 
“demised” as a result of a “grave mistake” by one of the greatest audit firms, there 
have been tremendous efforts to inspire changes in the auditing profession to restore 
the confidence of people. New regulations and guidelines have been put in place to 
allow for a new way of auditing and auditors. Now auditors must have social 
sciences and information technology knowledge, in addition to their accounting 
knowledge, to be able to face the fast pace of the world. The most important thing is 
to follow the “ethical code” of the profession in “its true spirit and in action” (Moorthy 
et al., 2010). 
The United Kingdom Financial Investment Ltd. (UKFI) is a Companies Act company 
owned solely by HM Treasury. It manages the Government’s investments in the RBS 
(Royal Bank of Scotland), Lloyds (Lloyds Banking Group), and UKAR (UK Asset 
Resolution Ltd) (UKFI, 2012). 
UKFI has been established to operate as an institutional shareholder, rather than to 
enforce the Government’s will with respect to banks. It was set up to operate 
commercially at “arm’s length” from the Treasury. According to the report, it is the UK 
Government’s belief that banks should be run commercially by proper independent 
 30 
boards. UKFI’s role is not running the banks – its role is to manage the 
shareholdings (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009). 
There are several issues affecting the independence of the UKFI from the Treasury. 
For example, the UKFI offices are located within HM Treasury’s building. Also, the 
UKFI and the Treasury share some of their support services in order to keep costs 
down. In addition, many of UKFI staff are “secondees” from the Treasury, including 
the Chief Executive. This situation exists because of the fear that “...if UKFI had 
spent more money on offices and staff then it would be criticised for not achieving 
potential economies of scale with the Treasury.” 
Moreover, although the UKFI was originally set up to be at “arm’s length” from the 
Treasury, the Framework Document for the UKFI gives the Treasury the power to 
give directions to the UKFI and states that the UKFI’s board “will comply with such 
directions or resign”. The Chief Executive of UKFI, however, stated “I would see 
directions as being an extremely unusual event.” (House of Commons Treasury 
Committee, 2009) 
The report states that although it is important to maintain this “arm’s length” 
philosophy, it is equally important to clearly define what is meant by “arm’s length” in 
this instance. The committee thinks that despite the cost saving that might result 
from placing the UKFI in HM Treasury building, “the effectiveness and independence 
of UKFI should not be compromised for the sake of relatively inconsequential sums 
of money”. The Committee recommended that UKFI considers moving out of the 
Treasury building. 
In addition, the Committee sees that the existence of the power in the hands of the 
Treasury to direct the UKFI, even if it is a “nuclear option”, undermines the 
independence of the UKFI. The Committee further recommended that the Treasury 
defines clearly the “precise circumstances in which it envisages this power being 
used.” 
Moreover, the Committee recommended that the UKFI should be established on a 
proper statutory basis. The Committee believes that UKFI cannot have real 
operational independence under the current ad hoc administrative arrangements 
(House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009). 
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There are several causes behind the financial crisis and there is no simple remedy to 
fix it (Jickling, 2006). Jickling argues that the crisis is not yet fully understood and it is 
likely that “the causes of the current crisis will be debated for decades to come.” A 
summary table was presented summarising a number of factors that have been 
identified as causes of the financial crisis. Table ‎2-1 shows some of the identified 
causes, arguments, and rejoinders that are related to this research. Jickling also 
identified several causes for the financial crisis that are related to the independence 
of the auditors, or lack of it, such as: lack of transparency and accountability in 
Mortgage Finance, conflicts of interest and lack of effective regulation, deregulatory 
legislation (unregulated risky transactions), mortgage lending moved out of banks 
into unregulated institutions (unsupervised risk-taking), and fragmented regulation 
(as a result, no agency is well-positioned to monitor emerging system-wide 
problems.) 
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Table ‎2-1 Causes of the Financial Crisis (partially reproduced from (Jickling, 2006)) 
Cause Argument Rejoinder 
Lack of Transparency and 
Accountability in Mortgage 
Finance 
“Throughout the housing finance value chain, many participants contributed 
to the creation of bad mortgages and the selling of bad securities, apparently 
feeling secure that they would not be held accountable for their actions. A 
lender could sell exotic mortgages to home-owners, apparently without fear 
of repercussions if those mortgages failed. Similarly, a trader could sell toxic 
securities to investors, apparently without fear of personal responsibility if 
those contracts failed. And so it was for brokers, realtors, individuals in rating 
agencies, and other market participants, each maximizing his or her own 
gain and passing problems on down the line until the system itself collapsed. 
Because of the lack of participant accountability, the originate-to distribute 
model of mortgage finance, with its once great promise of managing risk, 
became itself a massive generator of risk.” 
Many contractual arrangements did provide 
recourse against sellers or issuers of bad 
mortgages or related securities. Many non-bank 
mortgage lenders failed because they were forced 
to take back loans that defaulted, and many 
lawsuits have been filed against MBS issuers and 
others. 
Rating Agencies 
The credit rating agencies gave AAA ratings to numerous issues of subprime 
mortgage-backed securities, many of which were subsequently downgraded 
to junk status. Critics cite poor economic models, conflicts of interest, and 
lack of effective regulation as reasons for the rating agencies’ failure. Another 
factor is the market’s excessive reliance on ratings, which has been 
reinforced by numerous laws and regulations that use ratings as a criterion 
for permissible investments or as a factor in required capital levels. 
All market participants underestimated risk, not just 
the rating agencies. Purchasers of MBS were 
mainly sophisticated institutional investors, who 
should have done their own due diligence 
investigations into the quality of the instruments. 
Fragmented Regulation 
U.S. financial regulation is dispersed among many agencies, each with 
responsibility for a particular class of financial institution. As a result, no 
agency is well-positioned to monitor emerging system-wide problems. 
Countries with unified regulatory structures, such 
as Japan and the UK, have not avoided the crisis. 
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Cause Argument Rejoinder 
No Systemic Risk 
Regulator 
No regulator had comprehensive jurisdiction over all systemically-important 
financial institutions. (The Fed had the role of systemic risk regulator by 
default, but lacked authority to oversee investment banks, hedge funds, 
nonbank derivatives dealers, etc.) 
Some question whether the problem was lack of 
authority or failure to use existing regulatory 
powers effectively. 
Black Swan Theory 
This crisis is a once-in-a-century event, caused by a confluence of factors so 
rare that it is impractical to think of erecting regulatory barriers against 
recurrences. According to Alan Greenspan, such regulation would be “so 
onerous as to basically suppress the growth rate of the economy and ... 
[U.S.] standards of living.” Testimony before the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee, Oct. 23, 2008. 
“Some might be tempted to see recent events in 
the financial markets as just such black swans. But 
this would be quite wrong, in our view. Many of the 
flaws that have led to current turbulent conditions 
have not ridden on the back of a black swan. 
Instead, they are the result of weaknesses and 
failings in the interpretation of risk analysis and the 
process of oversight.” (Booth and Mazzawi) 
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2.9 Learning from Accident Investigations 
A recent study was published about the multilevel learning from accident 
investigations focusing on accident investigations in the Norwegian 
transportation sector (Hovden et al., 2011). The study identified a set of learning 
criteria as a result of analysing accident investigation reports with investigation 
related documents, and organisational learning literature. The identified criteria 
are based on: 
 The accident investigation process 
 The follow-up efforts 
 Contextual aspects 
The study is based only on the analysis of three Norwegian transportation 
accidents (air, marine, and rail) namely: the Twin Otter air crash near Namoss 
27 October 1993; the high-speed craft MS Sleipner accident 26 November 
1999; and the railway accident at Asta 4 January 2000. These specific cases 
were selected because they are “the most discussed, investigated, and 
frequently referred to accidents within each transport sector in the last 20 years” 
(Hovden et al., 2011). 
The results are grouped in tablesTable ‎2-2, Table ‎2-3 and Table ‎2-4 (table 
Table ‎2-4 is of particular interest with regard to independent investigation): 
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Table ‎2-2 Key points-group discussions regarding the investigation process adapted from (Hovden et al., 2011) 
Investigation process The Namsos air crash The Sleipner high-speed craft 
accident 
The Asta train crash 
Competence and 
resources 
Permanent investigation commission with 
support from research institute 
Governmental accident 
investigation commission 
Governmental accident 
investigation commission 
Methodological 
approach 
Among the first in Europe with new 
approach to root cause analysis in 
aviation (ICAO Annex 13) 
Part of the accident investigation 
was directed by administrative 
regulations; several graphical 
methods applied (STEP, FTA, 
etc.) 
The investigation was guided by 
a working model; but no 
graphical representation of the 
accident sequence 
Focus A multilevel, socio-technical approach A multilevel, socio-technical 
approach 
A multilevel, socio-technical 
approach 
Other comments Report issued 3 years after the accident Report issued within 1 year Report issued within 1 year 
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Table ‎2-3 Key points-group discussions regarding follow-up effortsa adapted from (Hovden et al., 2011) 
Follow-up of the 
investigation report 
The Namsos air crash The Sleipner high-speed craft 
accident 
The Asta train crash 
Authorities New requirements on safety 
standards on small airports (STOL b 
port) 
The high-speed craft code was 
changed (regarding raking damage, 
life saving system, etc.) 
Strengthening the Norwegian 
Railway Inspectorate, revision of 
safety regulations 
Sector/trade Procedures for ‘‘black hole” effects 
and for in-flight (approach) 
Ship-owners have become more 
autonomous regarding compliance to 
regulations; turn-out time for Search 
and rescue helicopters reduced to 15 
min 
Massive changes in Norwegian 
rail services, risk based safety 
management 
Company 
management 
All recommendations closed within 6 
years; safety responsibilities of top 
management and company board of 
directors emphasised 
Several organizational changes 
implemented 
New management regime; 
safety expressed as a line 
management responsibility 
Individual/personal Intensive pilot training for new 
aircrafts, intensified crew selection 
Intensified crew selection and training 
introduced 
Intensive training and education 
(incl. simulation training) 
Technology New aircrafts introduced (decided 
before the accident) 
Electronic navigation system, 
electronic chart display and 
information system (ECDIS) 
implemented 
Acoustic alarm in rail traffic 
control centres, GSM (global 
systems for mobile) train radio 
system, upgrading signalling 
systems and rolling stock 
a  Data about actual results such as fewer accidents, near misses, errors, etc. have not been collected. 
b STOL ~ short take-off and landing. 
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Table ‎2-4 Key points-group discussions regarding the contextual aspects adapted from (Hovden et al., 2011) 
Contextual aspects The Namsos air crash The Sleipner high-speed craft 
accident 
The Asta train crash 
Mandate Look for causes and remedial 
actions, not liability 
Look for causes and remedial actions, 
as well as grounds for liability 
Look for causes and remedial 
actions, not  liability 
Media coverage A surviving journalist onboard; 
intense, but constructive dialogue, 
conscious media policy 
Intense, but useful media pressure 
during the investigation 
Intense media pressure during the 
investigation 
Pressure groups Active group of relatives, but with 
trust to the commission and their 
findings 
Trade unions were rather inactive Spontaneous organization of 
survivors and relatives (for dialogue 
with the train operator) 
Conflicts The commission wanted to deny 
police access to the cockpit voice 
recorder (CVR); the court decided 
that police access would require a 
court decision in each case 
Approved life jackets proved not 
satisfactory for Norwegian sea 
conditions 
Systems approach vs. scapegoats 
(train engine drivers) 
Juridical and court 
trial 
Indictment against the company 
withdrawn due to passed time limit; 
as a result, the Air Navigation Act 
has been changed 
Ship-owner and captain accused of 
negligence; captain was sentenced to 
6 months jail (suspended sentence); 
ship owner was acquitted 
The Norwegian Rail Administration 
accepted a corporate penalty (10 
mill. NOK) 
Other comments  What actually caused the navigation 
error was never revealed 
The mandate was extended to 
include the investigation of another 
rail accident; gas leak at Lillestrom 
station 
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The participants in this study were asked to choose “the most significant for 
learning” statements from about 30 different statements. The following were 
considered the most important (Hovden et al., 2011): 
1. The investigation should be independent. 
2. The mandate should give a broad scope for looking at causal factors at 
all levels from the operational sharp end, to the responsible company, 
and to the role of regulatory authorities. 
3. The investigation team should both hold factual knowledge about the 
activity and technology involved, and knowledge and experience in 
systematic investigation methodology. 
4. The mandate should exclude questions about liability and blame. 
The results of this study show that participants believe the independence of the 
investigation is one of the most important factors in learning from accidents.  
The participants also recommend establishing an independent accident 
investigation board to investigate accidents outside the transportation sector in 
Norway (Hovden et al., 2011). 
2.9.1 Lessons from Australia 
Two accident investigations in Australia that have many lessons to illustrate the 
importance of the independence of accident investigations are reviewed. Note 
that the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) became part of the multi-
modal Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in 1999. 
2.9.1.1 BASI Findings on the VH-INH Accident  
The aircraft departed Sydney, Australia for a flight to Osaka, Japan. After about 
one hour the crew had an indication of an oil leak in engine number one and 
shut it down. They returned to Sydney and started the approach process. A 
warning horn started to sound when the crew tried to lower the landing gear. 
The crew decided to continue their landing despite the warning, as they could 
not understand why it had sounded. The aircraft landed with the nose landing 
 39 
gear retracted. There was no fire and no emergency evacuation ordered by the 
Captain (BASI, September 1996). 
The investigation into this accident identified many contributing factors involving 
the operator (Ansett) and the regulator CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) 
such as (BASI, September 1996): 
 Inadequate waivers from the regulator that allowed the same crew to 
complete the flight in another aircraft. 
 Management and supervision of the CAA’s role in Ansett’s B747 
introduction to service was inadequate. 
 The air operator certificate was issued by CAA’s project manager to 
Ansett before the company met all the regulated requirements. 
 Inadequate CAA’s staff training in the procedures for issuing an air 
operator’s certificate. 
 CAA’s organisational climate was biased towards commercial 
considerations rather than compliance and safety. 
 CAA staff did not take sufficient action to ensure that concerns raised 
during inspections and surveillance were addressed. 
 Real or imagined pressure probably influenced some of the actions taken 
by CAA staff. 
2.9.1.2 ATSB Findings on Lockhart River Air Accident (VH-TFU, 2005) 
A Fairchild aircraft SA227-DC Metro 23 aircraft operated by Transair crashed on 
7 May 2005 close to Lockhart River aerodrome in Australia when 13 
passengers and two crew members were killed. According to the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), formerly known as BASI, the accident was a 
result of a “controlled flight into terrain.” (ATSB, 2007). 
The final report was issued by the ATSB on 4 April, 2007. The ATSB report 
identified many safety problems with Transair operations that contributed to the 
accident. Soon after the accident, on 4 December 2006, Transair surrendered 
its Air Operator’s Certificate and stopped its operations. Because of this, no 
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recommendations were issued with regard to the serious safety problems the 
Operator had. 
The ATSB report identified several contributing factors related to the way the 
Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) conducts its business. In 
addition, several safety-related shortcomings from CASA, which do not fit the 
“contributing factors” category, were identified in the ATSB report.  
The “contributing safety factors” are defined as (ATSB, 2007): 
“Factor that, if it had not occurred or existed at the relevant time, then either: 
The occurrence would probably not have occurred; the adverse consequences 
associated with the occurrence would probably not have occurred or have been 
as serious; or another contributing safety factor would probably not have 
occurred or existed. 
In this context, the term ‘probably’ is defined as meaning a likelihood of more 
than 66 per cent.” 
The identified contributing safety factors relating to CASA were (ATSB, 2007): 
 CASA Inspectors were not able to “effectively and consistently” evaluate 
operator management systems because of insufficient guidance from 
CASA.  
 CASA did not require operators to conduct structured and/or 
comprehensive risk assessments, or conduct them itself, for the initial 
issue or changes of Air Operator Certificates. 
Moreover, the ATSB report specified the following safety factors, which did not 
fit the definition of contributing factors related to regulatory requirements and 
guidance (ATSB, 2007):  
 Although CASA released a discussion paper in 2000, and further 
development had occurred since then, there was no regulatory 
requirement for initial or recurrent crew resource management training 
for RPT operators. (Safety Issue) 
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 There was no regulatory requirement for flight crew undergoing a type 
rating on a multi-crew aircraft to be trained in procedures for crew 
incapacitation and crew coordination, including allocation of pilot tasks, 
crew cooperation and use of checklists. This was required by ICAO 
Annex 1 to which Australia had notified a difference. (Safety Issue) 
 The regulatory requirements concerning crew qualifications during the 
conduct of instrument approaches in a multi-crew RPT operation were 
potentially ambiguous as to whether all crew members were required to 
be qualified to conduct the type of approach being carried out. (Safety 
Issue) 
 CASA’s guidance material provided to operators about the structure and 
content of an operations manual was not as comprehensive as that 
provided by ICAO in areas such as multi-crew procedures and stabilised 
approach criteria. (Safety Issue) 
 Although CASA released a discussion paper in 2000, and further 
development and publicity had occurred since then, there was no 
regulatory requirement for RPT operators to have a safety management 
system. (Safety Issue) 
 There was no regulatory requirement for instrument approach charts to 
include coloured contours to depict terrain. This was required by a 
standard in ICAO Annex 4 in certain situations. Australia had not notified 
a difference to the standard. (Safety Issue) 
 There was no regulatory requirement for multi-crew RPT aircraft to be 
fitted with a serviceable autopilot. (Safety Issue) 
Moreover, the ATSB identified the following factors relating to CASA processes 
(ATSB, 2007): 
 CASA’s oversight of Transair, in relation to the approval of Air Operator’s 
Certificate variations and the conduct of surveillance, was sometimes 
inconsistent with CASA’s policies, procedures and guidelines. 
 CASA did not have a systematic process for determining the relative risk 
levels of airline operators. (Safety Issue) 
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 CASA’s process for evaluating an operations manual did not consider the 
usability of the manual, particularly manuals in electronic format. (Safety 
Issue) 
 CASA’s process for accepting an instrument approach did not involve a 
systematic risk assessment of pilot workload and other potential hazards, 
including activation of a ground proximity warning system. (Safety Issue) 
At the end of the report, ATSB evaluated CASA’s replies to some of these 
issues and issued safety recommendations against the items that ATSB 
believed were not addressed adequately. The ATSB also issued several other 
recommendations to address safety issues that CASA had not yet 
accomplished (ATSB, 2007). 
2.9.1.3 Coroner’s Inquest into the Lockhart River Crash 
On 17 August 2007, an inquest into the Aircraft Crash at Lockhart River was 
conducted by Michael Barnes from the Office of the State Coroner in Brisbane. 
The inquest is “not a trial between opposing parties but an inquiry into the 
death”, and “... the function of an inquest is to seek out and record as many of 
the facts concerning the death as the public interest requires” (Barnes, 2007). 
In his report, Coroner Barnes blamed the pilot for the accident. He also 
indicated that Transair also share the blame. The Coroner also highlighted 
deficiencies in CASA’s surveillance and audit of Transair, but made it clear this 
did not mean CASA was to blame for the crash.  
The Coroner also criticised the relationship between CASA and the ATSB. The 
report described this relationship as having “... a degree of animosity that is 
contrary to the productive and collaborative focus on air safety in Australia.” The 
Coroner recommended that the Federal Minister for Transport should consider 
an external consultant to assess whether a high-level intervention is warranted 
(Barnes, 2007). 
The relatives of those killed were not happy and expressed disappointment with 
the Coroner’s findings (Australian ABC News, 2007). 
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Shane Urquhart, the father of Constable Sally Urquhart who died in the crash, 
succeeded, after strong lobbying, in convincing the Australian Senate’s Rural 
and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee to conduct an inquiry into 
CASA’s operations and other matters (Australian ABC News, 2008; The 
Australian, 2008; Cricky, 2008). 
2.9.1.4 Senate’s Inquiry into CASA’s Operations and Other Matters 
In his submission to the inquiry, Mr. Urquhart accused CASA personnel of 
hiding information and having a “shift-the-information-into-undiscoverable-
places” culture. Mr. Urquhart also rejected the results of the Miller Review. The 
Miller Review was a result of the Coroner’s Inquest recommendation to the 
Federal Minister of Transport to have an external consultant assess the 
relationship between CASA and the ATSB and whether a high-level intervention 
was warranted. Mr. Urquhart indicated that the Review was conducted by “a 
person with strong ties to CASA through their preferred Law firm.” Mr. Urquhart 
called Miller’s recommendation that CASA and the ATSB get closer in their 
roles “absolutely ludicrous.” (Urquhart, 2008). 
A former senior legal counsel to CASA told the inquiry that the authority (CASA) 
had been captured by the industry, which made it hesitant to deal decisively 
with non-complying air operators. CASA’s decision to move operational staff 
from Canberra to Brisbane was criticised by Qantas, who explained that it had 
led to “a growing perception in industry that senior CASA executives have 
undertaken little direct consultation with industry” (The Canberra Times, 2008). 
The Senate inquiry issued the following three recommendations (Sterle, 2008): 
1. The committee recommends the Australian Government strengthen 
CASA's governance framework and administrative capability by:  
a. introducing a small board of up to five members to provide 
enhanced oversight and strategic direction for CASA; and  
b. undertaking a review of CASA's funding arrangements to ensure 
CASA is equipped to deal with new regulatory challenges.  
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2. The committee recommends, in accordance with the findings of the 
Hawke Taskforce, that CASA's Regulatory Reform Programme be 
brought to a conclusion as quickly as possible to provide certainty to 
industry and to ensure CASA and industry are ready to address future 
safety challenges.  
3. The committee recommends that the Australian National Audit Office 
audit CASA's implementation and administration of its Safety 
Management Systems approach. 
The families of the crash victims were satisfied with the outcome of the inquiry 
and its recommendations. Urquhart stated “we were very happy with the 
outcome of that inquiry.” He also mentioned that he likes “... the last 
recommendation about the Australian Audit Bureau having a good hard look at 
CASA’s operations and how they do business...” (Australian ABC News, 2010). 
The effect and benefits of ATSB functional and structural independence from 
the regulator (CASA) made it possible for the ATSB to freely criticise CASA, 
which would have been very difficult otherwise.  
2.9.2 Lessons from the United Kingdom 
2.9.2.1 The Ladbroke Grove Rail Accident Inquiry 
Another inquiry into, this time, a rail accident ended with the recommendation of 
establishing an independent Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) in the 
UK to improve railway safety. The Ladbroke Grove or Paddington train accident 
occurred on 5 October 1999 in London, England. A total of 31 people were 
killed in the accident and 227 were injured. A public inquiry led by Lord Cullen 
into the crash has led to the creation of the independent Rail Safety and 
Standards Board (RSSB) and the above-mentioned RAIB. 
The RSSB is an independent company (not for profit) owned by the rail industry 
stakeholders. Its primary objective is “to facilitate the railway industry’s work to 
achieve continuous improvement in the health and safety performance of the 
railways in Great Britain, and thus to facilitate the reduction of risk to 
passengers, employees and the affected public.” (RSSB, 2010). 
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The RAIB is a government agency similar to the, already proved to be, 
successful independent accident investigation branches: the Air Accident 
Investigation Branch (AAIB) and the Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
(MAIB). The RAIB is charged with finding the facts of the event under 
investigation and evaluating causes, but without apportioning blame or 
establishing liability. In addition, the RAIB does not enforce safety law or 
conduct prosecutions (RAIB, 2010). 
Lord Cullen proposed an independent RAIB that would investigate rail accidents 
and serious incidents while other incidents would be investigated by the 
industry. The report considered carrying out accident investigations by the 
regulator as “inappropriate” because there might be a chance that the safety 
regulator’s decisions needed to be examined and criticised. In addition, the 
proposed activities of such an independent investigation body would provide 
feedback on the safety regulator functions (Lord Cullen, 2001). 
The Cullen report stated a number of criticisms of the rail investigation system 
used by Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) before the establishment of 
the RAIB (Lord Cullen, 2001): 
 Low number of investigators 
 Unpublished reports 
 Lack of transparency 
 Unpublished recommendations and progress of their implementation 
 Not keeping the families informed throughout the investigation and 
briefing them about any report before it was published  
The report stated a number of benefits of having a separate investigation 
function from an enforcement one: 
 Lessons can be learned without apportioning blame. 
 A greater chance to make the investigation process more efficient and 
improve investigation skills. 
 Enhancement in the dissemination of the lessons learned and 
recommendations. 
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 Freedom of the independent investigation body to criticise the regulatory 
decisions and describe their contribution to the accident. 
According to the Cullen Report, other countries such as the US, Canada, and 
New Zealand had positive experiences with independent accident investigation 
setups. The report also rejects a setup where the investigators and regulators 
co-exist in a single regulator even if there is an arrangement where a “Chinese 
wall” between the investigators and the regulators is set, which would not work 
because it won’t “inspire confidence among the industry or the public” (Lord 
Cullen, 2001). 
2.9.2.2 Arguments against an Independent RAIB 
As a counter argument to the need for establishing an independent investigation 
body, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Counsel argued that (Lord 
Cullen, 2001): 
 There was no evidence of actual conflict between its regulatory and 
investigatory roles. 
 Inspection techniques and investigation techniques benefit from each 
other. 
 There is a danger that investigators get out of touch because of their 
isolation from “day to day operations”. 
 There are numerous occasions for “cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
experiences” when auditors and investigators are in the same 
organisation. 
 Forensic and technical support is readily available for investigators. 
 It was possible for the HSE to investigate and prosecute and that the 
aviation model (AAIB) is not comparable. 
Moreover, the Transport Safety Review (TSR) team argued that by setting up a 
separate investigation body the recruiting process will be fierce and HM Railway 
Inspectorate (HMRI) experts might be lost in the process. In addition, Mr. 
Waldram, former President of the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health 
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(IOSH) argued that good accident investigators are good auditors and therefore 
they should be in a single organisation. 
2.9.2.3 Conclusions from the Ladbroke Inquiry 
Lord Cullen concluded in his report that (Lord Cullen, 2001): 
 HMRI criticisms against establishing an independent investigation body 
are related to performance which can be corrected. 
 The stronger argument is in favour of establishing an investigation body 
with real and perceived independence. 
 The aviation system in the UK and the transportation systems in other 
countries demonstrated the effectiveness and success of such a setup. 
 Having an independent investigation body can bring the benefit of 
focusing on the lessons learned and recommendations to improve safety. 
 As a disadvantage of having an independent investigation body, there 
might be a danger of losing direct contact between the investigators and 
the operation. 
 Stronger arguments are demonstrated in favour of establishing an 
independent accident investigation and, therefore, it is recommended by 
the report. 
2.9.3 Independent Accident Investigation in Military Aviation 
On the 2nd of September 2006 a UK Royal Air Force Nimrod XV230 caught fire 
while airborne over Afghanistan which led to an explosion and total loss of the 
aircraft and every one of the 14 Service Personnel on board. Because of the 
location of the crash it was not possible to recover the wreckage. It was, 
however, possible to identify a fuel leakage as the most probable physical 
cause of the fire. 
Charles Haddon-Cave QC was appointed by the Secretary of State on 13 
December, 2007 to conduct a review into the wider issues of the loss of Nimrod 
XV230. 
In his report, Haddon-Cave identified several “missed opportunities” that could 
have been utilised to prevent the accident (Haddon-Cave, 2009): 
 48 
 The risk of an airborne fire from misaligned FRS couplings: Harrier 
XW921 (1988) 
 The potential for leaks from fuel couplings to migrate: Nimrod XV249 
(1999) 
 The risks from split fuel seals: Nimrod XV245 (2000) 
 The fire risks from fuel coupling leaking onto a hot duct: Nimrod XV229 
(2000) 
 The risks of a fuel coupling leak being ignited by a hot duct despite 
insulation: Tornado ZA599 (2002) 
 The risks of the rupture of bleed-air ducting destroying adjacent fuel 
seals: Nimrod XV227 (2004) 
 The potential increase in risk following a second bleed-air duct failure: 
Nimrod XV229 (2005) 
A safety review was carried out by BAE Systems, Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
and an independent advisor (QinetiQ) between 2001 and 2005. The review did 
not discover the design problems, and “the best opportunity” to avoid the 
accident was missed. The review is described as “lamentable job from start to 
finish” and “... a story of incompetence, complacency and cynicism” (Haddon-
Cave, 2009). 
Haddon-Cave describes the lack of independence of the regulatory system of 
the MoD as a “fundamental weakness”. The following two aspects are 
considered to be the results of the absence of regulatory independence: 
 Lack of independent regulatory oversight 
 Presence of people that represent two conflicting functions: 
Airworthiness and Output duties. 
The Nimrod report explains in detail the UK’s MoD airworthiness system 
deficiency. The report attributes this deficiency to many reasons some of which 
are: the dilution of airworthiness as a discipline, lack of independence and 
transparency, lack of “ownership” of airworthiness, complex regulations, no 
training in airworthiness regulations, as well as other reasons. As a result, 
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Haddon-Cave has identified the following set of key principles necessary for an 
effective safety and airworthiness system:  
 Leadership  
 Independence 
 People (not just processes and paper) 
 Simplicity.  
To overcome these deficiencies, Haddon-Cave proposes a “new military 
airworthiness regime”. In the centre of the specified aims of this proposed new 
regime is that “accident investigations will be independent, competent and 
effective.” 
Military air accident investigations were formerly based in Boards of Inquiry 
(BOI) assembled by the Aircraft Operating Authority (AOA). The civil AAIB is 
usually called to help in an investigation when possible. Haddon-Cave 
recommends a new and independent Military Air Accident Investigation Branch 
(MAAIB) to investigate military accidents. The findings for this subject are 
summarised in five areas: 
 The Service Inquiry (SI) is not independent 
 There is no joint military accident technical investigation team trained to 
investigate all military aircraft types 
 There is no proper system in place for learning lessons from 
investigations 
 There is a lack of experience on aircraft type 
 There is a need for more cooperation between the military and the AAIB 
The Haddon-Cave Report is not the first report to criticise MOD air accident 
investigations. In 1986, the UK’s Chief Air Accident Inspector, Mr William 
Tench, was commissioned to “review the procedures pertaining to Service 
Boards of Inquiry”. The Tench Report identified two main problems with the 
MOD accident investigation system: low standards and lack of independence. 
Tench emphasised the need for independent military accident investigations 
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and declared BOI to be obsolete. The recommendations of the Tench Report 
were not implemented (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
To resolve the deficiencies in the area of military investigations, Haddon-Cave 
put forward several recommendations: 
1. The Military Aviation Authority (MAA) shall be the single convening 
authority for Service Inquiries (SI) for all aircraft accidents involving 
military aircraft and/or military personnel. 
2. The MAA shall establish a Joint Service MAAIB which shall comprise a 
permanent team of specialists to carry out investigations into the 
immediate causes of air accidents. 
3. The investigation shall focus on two key areas: first, a 
technical/operational investigation into the immediate causes of the 
accident; second, a detailed investigation into the wider aspects and 
implications of the accident. 
4. Presidents and members of SI should have proper administrative, 
secretarial and legal support. 
5. The President and members of SI should retain residual responsibility 
following the delivery of their Report to confirm to the Head of the MAA in 
due course whether their Recommendations have been enacted 
correctly, adequately and in a timely fashion. 
6. In any case where an SI has to investigate the decisions or activities of 
the Regulator itself, the President of the SI shall report directly to the 2nd 
Permanent Under-Secretary. 
7. The MAAIB should maintain a close liaison with other international 
organisations, both military and civil, entrusted with the investigation of 
air accidents. 
2.9.3.1 Organisational Factors 
Personality and “group culture” can affect individuals and their perception of 
safety and risk taking (Braithwaite, 2001). This effect of group culture was 
present in the Nimrod accident. According to Haddon-Cave (2009), there was a 
shift in organisational culture from safety to financial targets within the UK MoD 
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between 1998 and 2006. Internal promotions were based on budget 
improvements, not safety improvements. As a result, business became the first 
priority, not safety.  
A similar cultural effect was noticed before in other accident investigations. For 
example, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) that was formed by 
NASA to investigate the Space Shuttle Columbia accident that occurred on 1 
February 2003, brought attention to what are called “organizational causes” or 
failures in their final report (CAIB, 2003). 
One of the recommendations in the CAIB report that was released on 26 August 
of the same year was to establish an “Independent Technical Engineering 
Authority” responsible for technical requirements and waivers of technical 
requirements amongst other functions. It was also recommended in the report 
that NASA, should “prepare a detailed plan for defining, establishing, 
transitioning, and implementing an independent safety program” (CAIB, 2003). 
One of the lessons that the Haddon-Cave Report highlighted was that the 
organisational failures in this accident were similar to those of other accidents 
and particularly in the Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia accidents 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009). In both cases, the independence of the safety 
programme has been put forward as a solution to mitigate these organisational 
risk factors. 
2.9.4 United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent multi-
mode federal agency that is concerned with finding the causes of accidents and 
promoting safety. Other than accident investigations, the NTSB also 
“...conducts safety studies, evaluates the effectiveness of other governmental 
agencies’ programs for preventing transportation accidents, and reviews the 
appeals of enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates 
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG), as well as the appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA” 
(NTSB, 2010). 
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The most important product of the NTSB, and any safety board, is its 
recommendations. They are the vehicle to improve safety. The NTSB’s mission 
as stated on their website is to promote transportation safety by: 
 Maintaining our congressionally mandated independence and objectivity; 
 Conducting objective, precise accident investigations and safety studies; 
 Performing fair and objective airman and mariner certification appeals; 
and  
 Advocating and promoting safety recommendations, and to assist victims 
of transportation accidents and their families.  
In 1929, the Air Commerce Act gave the responsibility of investigating aircraft 
accidents to the U.S. Department of Commerce. In 1940, this responsibility was 
transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Board’s Bureau of Aviation Safety. In 1967, 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) was created and the independent 
NTSB was established within the Department. In 1974, the NTSB was 
separated from the Department of Transportation, to ensure the NTSB’s 
independence for proper oversight, after Congress passed the Independent 
Safety Board Act of 1974 (NTSB, 2010). 
What emphasises the NTSB’s independence is its total separation from other 
transportation industry’s stakeholders. The travelling public is the most 
important stakeholder in the NTSB, and “promoting transportation safety for the 
travelling public” is their only objective (NTSB, 2010). 
The first safety board to implement both independence and multi-mode 
concepts is the NTSB, which was established in 1967 (Stoop and Roed-Larsen, 
2009). Terry Baxter, who was working for the American NTSB at the time of 
publishing his article, states that setting up a council that is responsible for 
investigating accidents in all modes of transportation is the best way to ensure 
independent investigation. According to him, the American NTSB reached its 
current level of effectiveness “not only from its independence, but also from its 
mandate to investigate accidents in all areas of transportation.” Baxter also 
states that the independence of the safety board was found to be essential in 
order to stay away from any conflict of interest during any investigation and 
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such a safety board would have a single mission – to improve public safety 
(Baxter, 1995). 
The American Congress wanted the Government to focus on safety and that is 
why the NTSB was created with no other function assigned to it. Congress also 
wanted to form an independent body with no distracting or proprietary 
influences present, which are often seen when the investigating body is part of 
the operator or the regulator. By not giving other tasks that demand time and 
attention to those involved in safety, the NTSB developed a very high degree of 
expertise amongst its employees. To ensure the independence of the NTSB, 
the Congress passed the Independent Safety Board Act in 1974 which severed 
the NTSB ties to the Department of Transportation and gave increased authority 
to the NTSB in accident investigation (Baxter, 1995). 
Pieter van Vollenhoven claims that the NTSB was the only truly independent 
accident investigation board for many years. It was set up to investigate 
accidents in all modes of transportation from the beginning. Its independence 
was planned from start since it was set up as a permanent, autonomous 
organisation. It is the success of the experience of the NTSB that led to greater 
development in the field of accident investigation. Because of the NTSB’s 
success in investigating accidents in all modes, that Sweden, Finland, Canada, 
New Zealand, the Netherlands, Australia, Indonesia and other countries 
decided to set up multi-modal transport safety boards of their own (van 
Vollenhoven, 2001). Van Vollenhoven was the chairman of the Dutch Safety 
Board (DSB) at the time, the only multi-sector investigation body in the world. 
Sweedler (1995) claims that the American NTSB achieved a good record as a 
result of saving “thousands of lives” and preventing “many accidents” because 
of its independence.  
The credibility of the independent NTSB makes the recipients of the 
recommendations more willing to implement them. The investigators’ 
competency and high technical qualifications add to the credibility of the NTSB 
and with this growing credibility, the recommendations’ acceptance rate also 
grows (Sweedler, 1995). 
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2.9.5 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) 
The UK AAIB emerged from military aviation. Air investigation started in the 
Royal Flying Corps in 1915. In 1920, the Air Navigation Act came out and made 
it possible to make regulations for investigating air accidents (Stoop and Kahan, 
2005). 
The second factor, considered by Smart (2004) is the independence of the 
investigation body. Three government aircraft accident investigation reviews in 
the UK are claimed to have had a major effect on the issue of independence. 
The three reports are: the “Shelmerdine committee” report in 1945, the “Newton 
Committee” review, and the “Cairns Report”. All three reviews emphasised the 
importance of the independence of the accident investigation body. 
The Shelmerdine Committee was a departmental committee that was selected 
in 1943 to consider what amendments were essential to the Accident 
Regulations to meet post-war circumstances. The report was finished in 1945 
but was not published; however, it was referred to by other reports. One of its 
recommendations was to standardize the Inspector’s Investigation Report 
format which has since been done (Newton, 1948; Cairns, 1961). 
The Newton Committee looked at the history of accident investigation and 
legislations relevant to it in the UK. In November 1948 the Committee issued its 
final report and concluded that the fact that the Chief Inspector reports to the 
Minister of Aviation is not acceptable and recommended complete separation of 
the accidents investigation branch from the Ministry of Aviation. It also 
recommended the establishment of an independent Civil Air Accident Board. 
The Minister, however, did not accept these recommendations and criticised 
them in his memorandum which is attached to the report (Newton, 1948). 
In 1959 a “committee in civil aircraft accident investigation and licence control” 
was appointed by the Ministry of Aviation “to inquire into the law and practice” of 
civil aircraft accident investigations and the licensing of civil aviation personnel 
in the UK. The committee’s report, also known as the Cairns Report, concluded 
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with important recommendations with regard to the independence of air 
accident investigations (Cairns, 1961). 
The Cairns Report criticised the accident investigation system that was in effect 
at the time. The Report also criticised several aspects of the regulations some 
of which are (Cairns, 1961): 
 Under the regulations at the time, when it is clear that someone is going 
to be blamed for the accident, it is the responsibility of the Inspector to 
notify that person that he may be blamed and give him a chance to make 
a statement. 
 Not all reports are published. 
 Although the Chief Inspector can independently decide which accidents 
to investigate, he is responsible to, and reports to the Minister of 
Aviation. 
The Cairns Committee received strong recommendations to completely 
separate the Chief Inspector and his branch from the Ministry of Aviation and 
move them to another Government Department. The main reason why people 
think the accident investigation branch should be separated from the Ministry of 
Aviation is that the Ministry both own and staff facilities that directly affect the 
safe operation of aircraft, such as ATC, landing systems, and  
telecommunications and radio aids to navigation. The Ministry, because of 
these activities, is likely to be involved in the accident investigation. Such an 
arrangement makes it difficult for the Ministry employee, the Inspector 
investigating the event, to be unbiased in his investigation. Moreover, the 
Minister may have to answer to Parliament for both his staff that may be 
investigated and for the Inspector who is investigating.  
On the other hand, the Minister of Aviation and other government departments 
believe that it is not suitable to separate the accident investigation branch from 
the Ministry of Aviation for several reasons: several other governmental and 
non-governmental bodies are against this separation and believe it will not help 
the investigation; the branch would lose contact with the aviation industry and 
would not be updated on what is going on within the industry; the separation 
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would not be real because technical advice from the Ministry of Aviation would 
still be needed (Newton, 1948; Cairns, 1961). 
Justice Cairns (1961) studied the possibility of applying the laws and practices 
of accident investigations used in railway and marine modes (at that time) to the 
air mode. It was concluded that the railway and marine modes accident 
investigations would not be sufficient for finding the causes of aircraft accidents 
and would not be suitable to apply them to the civil aviation for several reasons: 
 Aircraft field investigations are usually more complex and longer-lasting  
 The number of people that need to be questioned are far greater in air 
investigations 
 More experiments and tests are usually done in air investigations 
The Cairns Report made several recommendations to the Ministry of Aviation 
concerning the independence of aircraft accident investigations (Cairns, 1961): 
 The regulations should explicitly state the purpose of aircraft accident 
investigation and that is; “...to determine the cause, or causes, of an 
accident so that appropriate action, based on the findings, may be taken 
to avoid further accidents.” 
 The branch of accident investigation should not be separated from the 
Ministry of Aviation because the “real protection for the public lies in the 
independence of the investigation rather than the formal separation.” 
 The Directorate of Aviation Safety and the Accident Investigation Branch 
would work better in disseminating safety information and in the follow-up 
of the implementation if they report to the same senior officer. Therefore, 
the Chief Inspector should continue to report to the Minister directly. 
 All accident reports should be available to the public. 
 Accident reports should be more detailed to deal with immediate causes 
as well as contributory causes. 
 Accident investigations should not attribute blame to anybody. 
One more review led to the Council Directive 94/56/EC entitled “Establishing the 
Fundamental Principles Governing the Investigation of Civil Aviation Accidents 
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and Incidents” which was introduced in 1994. The review was the result of two 
reports by Mr. Geoffrey Wilkinson and Professor Lucian Rapp. 
Smart (2004), who was the Chief Inspector of the UK AAIB at the time, claims 
that the public and industry trust in the capability of the AAIB in the UK 
encouraged other modes of transportation to use this model. The author claims 
that the public and the industry seem to be confident that the AAIB does a 
thorough job investigating air accidents and keeping the bereaved families 
updated while the investigation is ongoing. 
Smart (2004) mentioned four factors which he considered necessary to 
establish “trust”: 
 Investigation framework 
 Actual and perceived independence 
 Safety culture 
 Qualities of investigators and their liaison with bereaved families 
Several forces, all related to the safety culture, were behind the established 
trust in the aviation industry in the UK. These “cultural” forces are: the effect of 
having a “just” culture for reporting; the perception of high risk in the industry; 
the dynamic nature of the aviation industry; the benefit that major safety 
developments are done internationally; and the fact that most people in the 
industry are well paid (Smart, 2004). 
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3 CRIMINALISATION AND JUST CULTURE 
Criminalisation is the main threat to the independence of accident investigations. The 
improvement of flight safety is hindered when the persons involved in an aviation 
accident are criminally prosecuted for their mistakes, or when the safety data 
gathered in safety investigations is used to apportion blame or liability. Flight safety 
improvement depends highly on the data gathered voluntarily from individuals 
involved in an aviation accident. However, no one will volunteer to give any 
information, even if it is vital for aviation safety, knowing that this information might 
be used in other proceedings to impose judicial or administrative punishment and 
could lead to self-incrimination 
The upgrade of section 5.4.1 in the 10th edition of Annex 13 to a standard enhances 
the independence of safety investigations which in turn improves the protection of 
safety information and those who provide the safety information. It also obligates 
States to enhance the regulations safeguarding the independence of the safety 
investigations, and the coordination between safety investigations and other parallel 
investigations. This kind of coordination when adopted by an ICAO-Member State 
would actually enhance the effectiveness of both safety investigations and 
administrative/judicial proceedings. 
Although ICAO Annex 13 standards, such as section 5.4.1, emphasis the 
independence of safety investigations (which may involve other States) from the 
local judicial proceedings, it is important to understand that the sovereignty of each 
State is not degraded.  
In addition, the independence of the accident investigation authority from the 
Regulator allows for impartial judgment of the role of the Regulator in providing a 
safe operational environment. This independence also helps the quick dissemination 
of safety lessons learned from independent investigations to the international 
community. 
Usually, there are administrative or judicial investigations going on in parallel with the 
safety investigations because aviation accidents are high profile accidents and often 
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get a lot of media attention. ICAO framework gives higher priority to safety 
investigations to prevent other investigations from interfering. 
By ensuring an adequate level of independence and coordination, the accident 
investigation authority can have immediate and unrestricted access to the accident 
site, the wreckage, flight recorders, and witnesses without interference from other 
authorities. The investigation authority can also perform necessary destructive 
testing on evidence when needed without interference from the judicial authorities. 
3.1 Protection of Records 
The independence of accident investigations is directly related to the protection of 
records such as the FDR, CVR, and witness identity. Also, protecting the identity of 
the witness is necessary to keep the flow of information coming to the accident 
investigation authority. Otherwise, the authority’s integrity and public’s trust may be 
lost. The focus of the investigation authority should be on safety advancement not on 
apportioning blame or liability.  
ICAO Annex 13 10th ed. paragraph 5.12 states: 
“5.12 The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall not 
make the following records available for purposes other than accident or incident 
investigation, unless the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that 
State determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and 
international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations: 
a. all statements taken from persons by the investigation authorities in the 
course of their investigation; 
b. all communications between persons having been involved in the operation of 
the aircraft; 
c. medical or private information regarding persons involved in the accident or 
incident; 
d. cockpit voice recordings and transcripts from such recordings; 
e. recordings and transcriptions of recordings from air traffic control units; 
f. cockpit airborne image recordings and any part or transcripts from such 
recordings; and 
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g. opinions expressed in the analysis of information, including flight recorder 
information. 
“5.12.1 These records shall be included in the final report or its appendices only 
when pertinent to the analysis of the accident or incident. Parts of the records not 
relevant to the analysis shall not be disclosed. 
“Note 1.— Information contained in the records listed above, which includes information 
given voluntarily by persons interviewed during the investigation of an accident or incident, 
could be utilized inappropriately for subsequent disciplinary, civil, administrative and 
criminal proceedings. If such information is distributed, it may, in the future, no longer be 
openly disclosed to investigators. Lack of access to such information would impede the 
investigation process and seriously affect flight safety. 
“Note 2.— Attachment E contains legal guidance for the protection of information from 
safety data collection and processing systems. 
“5.12.2 The names of the persons involved in the accident or incident shall not be 
disclosed to the public by the accident investigation authority.” 
However, complying with paragraph 5.12 has proved to be difficult in some 
countries. A paper presented by the Secretariat of the ICAO Accident Investigation 
Group (AIG) during the AIG divisional meeting in October 2008 in Montreal, Canada 
revealed that there are problems in some countries’ legal systems with regard to the 
protection of safety information (AIG Secretariat, 2008c). 
The ICAO 35th Assembly acknowledged the necessity and need for protecting safety 
information from inappropriate use, which might prevent the availability of this 
information in the future. The Assembly noted that “existing national laws and 
regulations in many States may not adequately address the manner in which safety 
information is protected from inappropriate use.” Due to the importance of the issue 
and the need to have a balance between the “proper administration of justice” and 
the protection of safety information, the 35th Assembly instructed the Council to 
develop guidance for this issue. A legal guidance for the protection of information 
from Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems (SDCPS) was developed to 
assist States to enact laws and regulations to protect this information and at the 
 61 
 
same time allow for proper administration of justice. The guidance was added as 
Attachment E to Annex 13 (AIG Secretariat, 2008c; ICAO Assembly, 2004). 
The Secretariat sent out a State letter requesting States to comment on the “level of 
implementation” of Attachment E. A total of 53 States replied. Many ICAO-States 
benefited from the guidance of Attachment E. Some of them mentioned that 
Attachment E was or will be “used as the basis from which relevant legislation was 
drafted.” There were 12 States, however, that mentioned that they did not benefit 
from the guidance in Attachment E. Analysis of these 12 States showed that five of 
the State’s laws and regulations in force did not allow for the implementation of the 
guidance material in Attachment E, and two of the 12 States had no provision in their 
legislation to protect accident and incident records. The Secretariat concluded that 
Attachment E is reaching its goal and that there was no need for its reassessment at 
this point in time (AIG Secretariat, 2008c). 
According to the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) website, there was a listening 
session held by the ICAO Safety Information Protection Task Force (SIP TF) in 
Washington DC, USA on the 5th of December, 2012. The SIP TF aims to 
“understand the needs and perspectives of interested groups and individuals,” and to 
“identify a sound basis on which to consider approaches to balancing the protection 
of safety information with the administration of justice, safety-related regulatory 
action, and the public’s right to know.” (FSF, 2012) 
3.2 Just Culture 
On April 27, 2010 a conference was held by the Air Law Group of the Royal 
Aeronautical Society (RAeS) in London, UK to discuss the proposed EU regulation 
on Air Accident Investigation. The conference was titled; “The Criminalisation of Air 
Accidents and the Just Culture”. 
The speakers emphasised the importance of the safety investigation’s independence 
and that such investigations must not be concerned with apportioning blame or 
liability. 
Conference attendees were from different organisations within the Aviation and 
related industries, including EASA, AAIB, IATA, Law firms, Insurance, Department of 
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Transportation, European Commission, EUROCONTROL, Swiss Air Navigation 
Services, CAA, Airlines, Universities, and others. The diversity presented within the 
background of the attendees gives a good indication of how important this subject is 
and how many industries it touches directly and indirectly. 
Haddon-Cave in his keynote speech to the conference identified several dangers 
associated with the “Criminalisation of the investigation”: people will refuse to come 
forward; self-preservation within management; engineers will be scared to take 
decisions; delegation will be blurred; and the danger of promiscuous procedures 
(Haddon-Cave, 2010). 
The speaker also emphasised that there should be protection for data/evidence, 
protection for witnesses, and assurance that published safety reports can only be 
used for their purpose. All speeches revolved around the concept of “Just Culture”.  
Just Culture aims to achieve a delicate balance between encouraging crucial safety 
information flow for the purpose of improving aviation safety, and acknowledging the 
judicial system and the need to prosecute criminal acts (Trogeler, 2011). 
There are several attempts to define Just Culture. For example, Eurocontrol defines 
it as “…culture where front line operators or others are not punished for actions, 
omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience 
and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are 
not tolerated”(EUROCONTROL, 2008). 
Also, James Reason provides the following definition: 
“… atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged for providing essential 
safety-related information, but in which they are also clear about where the line must 
be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour” (Reason, 1997). 
The USA based Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) of the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System called Just Culture a “healthy alternative” to 
blaming culture, and defines it as “… Just Culture is one in which employees are 
held accountable for deliberate violations of the rules but are encouraged and 
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rewarded for providing essential safety-related information. A Just Culture does not 
tolerate reckless behaviour or deliberate malfeasance” (JPDO, 2010).  
Correct implementation of Just Culture is not an easy task because of the various 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of this concept.  
The JPDO (2010) listed three core principles in Just culture, which need to be 
incorporated in regulatory framework to provide legal certainty: 
1. Identification of appropriate safeguards to ensure witnesses participation in 
safety investigations will not be punished 
2. This protection shall not be granted to those who conduct gross negligence or 
wilful misconduct 
3. To improve aviation safety, full contribution to aviation safety should be 
encouraged. 
Learning from mistakes can be attained when a Just Culture is implemented. In 
general, there are three main benefits of having a Just Culture (GAIN, 2004): 
 Increased reporting 
 Trust building 
 More effective safety management. 
Various groups, within a state or an organisation, with different, sometimes 
conflicting, goals can work together to improve safety if the concept of Just Culture is 
implemented correctly because of the trust it brings with its implementation. This 
would improve the effectiveness of safety management and improve the sharing of 
safety information.  
Just Culture encourages speaking out, is based on trust, and is not blame free. 
Neither a blame culture nor blame-free culture should be favoured. Balance in 
accident investigation between the two cultures should be promoted. 
3.3 Blame and Blame-Free Culture 
The purpose of accident investigations is to find and document all relevant facts, 
establish their relationship to the accident and identify their causes in order to 
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prevent a similar accident from happening again. The purpose is not to find the 
person or persons responsible for causing the accident (Tench, 1985). 
When the purpose of the accident investigation is to allocate accountability for the 
sake of taking disciplinary action, the search for the real causes will be influenced. 
Investigations with such a purpose will also restrict “the range of viable remedial 
actions.” Because of the blame feeling, involved personnel will try to protect 
themselves and may hide or alter information. In addition, people will be reluctant to 
report accidents or near-accidents to avoid guilt and blame. Accident investigations 
with legal or disciplinary agenda should be avoided if possible or at least be clearly 
separated from safety investigations (Kjellén, 2000). 
The independence of accident investigations is an essential prerequisite to reach the 
desired transparent, blame-free safety culture. It must be noted that a blame-free 
safety culture does not mean ignorant management or that personnel can get away 
with their “crimes”.  The promoted blame-free culture is all about the people who 
tried hard to do their job correctly, but things went wrong. This culture is promoted to 
encourage people to come forward and tell their story to help safety investigators 
understand what exactly happened and why. It is crucial to learn every possible 
lesson from an accident to prevent similar accidents from happening in the future 
(Haddon-Cave, 2010). 
Lord Cullen (2001) referred to a report by the National Economic Research 
Associates (NERA) on Safety Regulations and Standards for European Railways. 
The NERA report identified that in order for an investigation board to focus on finding 
systemic safety shortcomings without apportioning blame, several requirements 
must be satisfied: the board must be independent; the board must be able to call on 
expertise as needed; and there must be protection from court proceedings against 
blame and punishment. 
3.4 Criminalisation in Aviation and Healthcare 
The EUROCONTROL’s Performance Review Unit (PRU) conducted a safety survey 
in 2001-2002 on penalty-free ATM safety occurrence reporting in Europe. They 
found out that many States had legal obstacles that prevented the correct 
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implementation of non-punitive ATM safety occurrence reporting. Because of these 
constraints, and especially in States that have “Freedom of Information” legislation in 
effect and where safety reports are not protected from the application of this 
legislation, many staff felt restrained from reporting. The survey analysis noted that 
there was poor communication between Air Navigation Service Providers and the 
“people on the ground”. Safety regulators were regarded in many States as being 
weak and without a defined role (EUROCONTROL, 2002).  
The report points out that Directive 94/56 (Article 8) protects only the names of 
persons involved in incidents. There is no protection for persons involved in 
accidents (EUROCONTROL, 2002). Directive 94/56 was later cancelled and 
replaced with EU Regulation 996/2010 in 2010.  
EUROCONTROL (2002) reported that most of the time, national laws are not clear 
about the protection of the names of those who report safety occurrences. Moreover, 
in most of the States, the judicial or administrative authorities have access to ATM-
related accident or serious incident information gathered during a technical 
investigation. When it comes to complying with international requirements, the 
survey showed that “the majority of States has not formally adopted Annex 13, but 
apply it in practice.” Also, many States do not have paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13, 
regarding disclosure of flight recorder information, as part of their national law and, 
despite Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, half of them did not file difference with 
ICAO. 
Criminal prosecution is seen as a threat to employees’ safety and to safety-critical 
systems in many industries such as aviation and the healthcare industry. The issue 
of criminal prosecution has seen recent increases; however, no effective 
programmes exist to stop this increase (Dekker, 2011; Michaelides-Mateou and 
Mateou, 2010). 
Aviation professionals have been prosecuted in the Netherlands, England, Spain, 
France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, USA, Taiwan, and other countries (Brothers and 
Maynard, 2008; Dekker, 2011; Esler, 2009; Learmount and Modola, 2004; 
Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou, 2010; PSEKA, 2009). 
 66 
 
“Under the Swiss law the CAA is obliged to report any occurrence considered as a 
concrete endangerment of life in public transport to the prosecutor. ATCOs in that 
State feel that they are therefore under constant threat of criminal proceedings if they 
report an occurrence. Consequently, there is a strong reluctance to report safety 
occurrences; this results in a lack of visibility of potential problems.” 
(EUROCONTROL, 2002) 
Dekker (2011) claims that healthcare, shipping, construction, and chemical 
processing industries have also seen an increase in criminalisation recently. There is 
a specific criminal category of causing air disasters in some countries, such as Italy. 
The author discussed the social causes and organisational consequences of this 
phenomenon.  
Criminalising professional mistakes is a concern for several reasons (Dekker, 2011); 
first, it interferes with independent safety investigations and with safety reporting and 
disclosure of errors (Berlinger, 2005; Brous, 2008). 
The second reason is the inevitability of mistakes. Professional mistakes in aviation 
or healthcare cannot be prevented through sanctions. Chapman (2009) explained, 
when describing mistakes in the drug industry “dispensing mistakes happen. And 
even with the introduction of robots and Standard Operating Procedures, the Utopian 
ideal of a world without errors is closer to fantasy than reality.”  
The third reason is that prosecuting individuals is taking precedent over pursuing 
system improvements. Bodies such as accident investigation authorities in aviation 
and medical discipline committees in medicine are in a better place to deal with the 
failures of their safety-critical systems (FSF, 2006). 
The fourth reason for concern is the thin line between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour (Morrill et al., 1997). Who draws the line? This line is not an agreed upon 
and clearly defined line. It is a “judgement that could be influenced by politics, power, 
and populism” (ibid.) 
This is another reason why the independence of accident investigations must be 
ensured to prevent the influence of politics, power and other factors.  
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An example from aviation that shows the negative effect of criminalisation on “safety 
culture” is the Ansett de Havilland Dash 8 crash in June 1995 in New Zealand. Four 
people died in the aircraft accident, but the pilots survived. The cockpit voice 
recorder (CVR) was turned over to criminal prosecutors, who charged the pilots with 
manslaughter. In order to stop the police from using the CVR in court, pilots in New 
Zealand sued the police claiming that recorders should only be used for safety and 
educational purposes. However, the prosecutors succeeded and regained access to 
the CVR. Soon after that, pilots started disabling CVRs on their flights. Finally, 
officials agreed that police would be permitted to use CVR in future cases only when 
New Zealand’s High Court believed it to be necessary (McKenna, 1999).  
Another problem concern is that professionals will start hiding errors because they 
are afraid of prosecution (Chapman, 2009). Another issue is the practice of 
“defensive medicine,” which requires unnecessary tests that will increase the cost of 
healthcare (Sharpe, 2004).  
In addition, there is a worry that employees could incriminate themselves by 
disclosing information about violations or incidents, which could be used later in a 
criminal prosecution. All of these issues could reduce or even destroy the balance 
between accountability and learning, and affect the openness in safety cultures 
(Dekker, 2007; FSF, 2006; ISMP, 2007; Michaels, 2008). 
There is a lack of research into the social causes leading to the increase in 
criminalisation. The biggest concern with judicial investigations, which are designed 
to apportion blame, following aviation or healthcare accidents and incidents, is that 
they demolish people’s trust in the system and cause them to stop voluntarily 
reporting mistakes, and this interferes with independent safety investigations 
(Berlinger, 2005; Brous, 2008; Chapman, 2009; Dekker, 2007; 2011;  FSF, 2006).  
Tunisian charter pilots crash-landed off the coast of Sicily, Italy in 2005. As a result 
of the crash, 16 people died and the pilots were later sentenced to 10 years in 
prison. An investigation showed that a fuel gauge that was designed for an older and 
smaller version of the aircraft malfunctioned on the ATR 72 turbo prop aircraft. 
Because of the fuel gauge reading the pilots believed they had enough fuel for their 
trip, which they did not. Although the pilots requested emergency services from the 
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ATC, they decided to crash-land the plane instead of attempting to reach Palermo 
airport. The prosecution also included the Director-General of the company and the 
company’s Technical Director in addition to three other people. They were sentenced 
to between eight and nine years in jail by the court (RTE, 2009).  
In October 2006, the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), the Royal Aeronautical Society 
in England (RAeS), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), and the 
Academie Nationale de L’Air et de L’Espace (ANAE) issued a resolution condemning 
the increasing attempts of judicial authorities and law enforcement to criminalise 
human errors in aviation accidents, despite its adverse effect on aviation safety 
(FSF, 2006).  
Voss, FSF President and CEO, stated that governments are increasingly focusing on 
conducting criminal investigations in the wake of accidents. Governments should 
ensure the safe and free flow of information, instead of punishment, to allow the 
understanding of what exactly happened and why, and to stop similar accidents from 
happening again.  
Alexander ter Kuile, Secretary General of CANSO called the prosecution of basic 
human error a “grave mistake”. According to him, the aviation industry is the most 
labour-intensive safety operation in the world and, therefore, human error is 
inevitable. Punishment is for those who break the law not for honest mistakes. 
Mans, RAeS President explained that pilots, mechanics, ATC, engineers, safety 
regulatory officials, and others should be encouraged by authorities to speak up and 
admit any mistakes without fear of punishment. The focus should be on “gathering all 
the facts and evidence from those involved.” 
Several high profile examples of criminalisation of human error have been referred to 
by safety organisations, such as; the Embraer-Gol mid-air collision in Brazil; the 
French Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the dismissal of criminal charges growing 
from the Air France Concorde crash in 2000; the criminal trial in the wake of the Air 
Inter crash in Strasbourg, France in 1992; and the pursuit of criminal manslaughter 
charges against managers of Skyguide and air traffic controllers in Switzerland 
related to the mid-air collision of DHL-Bashkirian in 2002 over Germany. 
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Moreover, in France, an Air France (Air Inter at the time) Airbus A320 crashed on its 
landing approach killing 87 people in 1992. In 2006, six French aviation officials were 
acquitted on manslaughter charges. In Japan, two Japan Airlines planes almost 
collided because of the confusion from the ATCs. The controllers were sentenced to 
prison terms on charges of negligence, with suspension, in 2008. In Indonesia, a 
Garuda Boeing 737 crashed on landing killing 21 people in 2007. Prosecutors 
charged the pilot with manslaughter (Michaels, 2008).  
Five main points were made by Michaels (2008). The author: 
1. Declares that the paramount consideration in an investigation should be to 
determine the probable cause of the accident and contributing factors, not to 
criminally punish individuals. 
2. Declares that, in absent acts of sabotage and wilful or particularly egregious 
reckless conduct, criminalisation of an accident is not an effective deterrent or 
in the public’s best interest. 
3. Urges States to exercise far greater restraint and adopt stricter guidelines 
before officials initiate investigations or bring criminal prosecutions in the 
wake of aviation disasters. 
4. Urges States to safeguard the safety investigation report and probable 
cause/contributing factors conclusions from premature disclosure and direct 
use in civil and criminal proceedings. It also criticised prosecutorial use of 
relatively untrained and inexperienced “experts,” which can lead to 
“technically flawed analyses, a miscarriage of justice, and interference with 
official accident inquiries.” 
5. Urges accident investigating authorities to assert strong control over the 
investigation, free from undue interference from law enforcement, invite 
international cooperation in the investigation, conduct investigations 
deliberately and avoid a “rush to judgment,” ensure the free flow of essential 
safety information, and address swiftly any acts or omissions in violation of 
aviation standards. 
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3.5 Case Studies 
3.5.1 The French Criminal Law and the Napoleonic Code 
In France, criminal investigations have supremacy over safety investigations 
because of the French criminal law system. In the event of an aircraft accident, 
French law gives the right to the judicial authority to seize the evidence including the 
FDR and CVR. The French BEA can make a copy of the FDR and CVR but only 
under the supervision of the police. Moreover, the BEA needs judicial consent to 
remove any evidence from the wreckage for examination, provided that this should 
not lead to the alteration or destruction of the evidence. The French criminal 
procedure law also applies the Napoleonic Code, which specifies that fatal accidents 
must be investigated with the intention of establishing blame (Trogeler, 2011). 
French judicial investigations did not always have supremacy over aircraft accident 
investigations. There was close cooperation between the judicial investigators and 
the BEA investigators. The joint ministerial instructions of 3 January 1953 laid down 
the aspects for the cooperation and coordination of both authorities. However, on 26 
June 1988 an Airbus A320 crashed during a demonstration flight at an air show near 
Mulhouse when the pilot flew at a low speed below 100 feet and crashed in the 
forest at the end of the runway. The crash killed three passengers. The BEA seized 
the flight recorders. However, the recorders were missing the few seconds prior to 
the aircraft crash when they were returned to the judicial authorities. The BEA was 
accused of allegedly tampering with the recorders to conceal problems with the 
aircraft. This event was discussed for years and led to public mistrust, which led to 
BEA losing the status of taking precedence over criminal proceedings related to 
aircraft accidents (Trogeler, 2011). 
3.5.2 The Concorde Case 
Air France flight 4590 was destined for New York’s JFK airport from Charles de 
Gaulle Airport on 25 July 2000. The aircraft ran over a metal strip that had fallen from 
a Continental Airlines aircraft that had departed a few minutes earlier. The metal strip 
caused one of the Concorde’s tires to burst and chunks of the burst tyre impacted 
the aircraft’s wing resulting in a rupture in tank 5 and major fuel leak. The leaking fuel 
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was ignited causing a huge fire under the left wing. The aircraft took off from the 
runway, however, the crew shut down engine 2 after the engine fire alarm sound. 
After about one minute of flight the landing gear could not be retracted and the 
aircraft was unable to gain speed or height. Then, engine 1 lost thrust and the 
aircraft crashed onto a hotel killing all 109 passengers and crew, and 4 people on the 
ground (BEA, 2004). 
The French civil aviation accident and incidents investigation authority (Le Bureau 
d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses - BEA) investigated the accident and published the final 
report on January 2002. The investigators reached the following conclusions: 
1. The crew were qualified and the aircraft was airworthy.  
2. There was no plan for dealing with the simultaneous failure of two engines on 
the runway because it was considered highly unlikely. 
3. The aircraft was 810 kg above the maximum takeoff weight; however the 
effect on takeoff performance from this excess weight was negligible. 
4. The metal strip that cut the Concorde’s tyre was not manufactured, and was 
not installed in accordance with the manufacturer procedures. 
5. A high-speed runway excursion and landing gear collapse would have accord 
if the pilot had attempted to abort the takeoff. 
6. Even if the engines were operating normally, the aircraft would still crash 
because of the sever structural damage. 
The final report listed the following as probable causes for the Concorde’s crash 
(BEA, 2004): 
 High-speed passage of a tyre over a part lost by an aircraft that had taken off 
five minutes earlier and the destruction of the tyre.   
 The ripping out of a large piece of tank in a complex process of transmission 
of the energy produced by the impact of a piece of tyre at another point on the 
tank, this transmission associating deformation of the tank skin and the 
movement of the fuel, with perhaps the contributory effect of other more minor 
shocks and /or a hydrodynamic pressure surge.   
 Ignition of the leaking fuel by an electric arc in the landing gear bay or through 
contact with the hot parts of the engine with forward propagation of the flame 
 72 
 
causing a very large fire under the aircraft’s wing and severe loss of thrust on 
engine 2 then engine 1.   
 The impossibility of retracting the landing gear probably contributed to the 
retention and stabilisation of the flame throughout the flight. 
The UK is the joint State of Design and Manufacture of the Concorde aircraft and 
had the right to participate in the investigation according to ICAO Annex 13.  
The UK complained about the French approach to the investigation of aircraft 
accidents by involving the judiciary from the beginning of any French accident 
inquiry. Because of the involvement of the French judicial authorities, the UK AAIB 
was only allowed to examine crash evidence briefly. In addition, some evidence were 
withheld from the AAIB (Flightglobal, 2002). 
Comments from the UK Accredited Representative are attached to the final report. In 
these comments, the UK Accredited Representative pointed out that the AAIB was 
able to make an effective contribution to the investigation because of the cooperation 
between the AAIB and the French BEA. However, the separate inquiry into the 
accident that was conducted in parallel by the French judicial authorities presented 
“major impediments to the AAIB’s participation in the technical investigation.” The UK 
listed the following difficulties the AAIB faced because of the French judicial inquiry: 
 The French judicial authorities did not allow the AAIB Investigators to examine 
all items of the wreckage or to participate in component examinations  
 The French judicial authorities did not allow the AAIB Investigators full access 
to all relevant evidence as soon as possible. 
 The French judicial authorities specifically prohibited Advisors to the UK 
Accredited Representative from participating in the examination of major 
components for which the United Kingdom had primary airworthiness 
responsibility. 
3.5.2.1 Criminal Investigation of the Concorde Accident 
The French authorities initiated a criminal investigation of Continental Airlines, whose 
plane dropped the metal strip on the runway in March 2005. In addition, the former 
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head of the Concorde division at Aerospatiale and the Concorde chief engineer 
came under investigation for negligence. 
On 12 March 2008, judges brought manslaughter charges against Continental 
Airlines, an American Continental mechanic, an American Continental maintenance 
manager, a former head of Concorde division at Aerospatiale, a former employee of 
the French airline regulator, and the Concorde chief engineer (Michaelides-Mateou 
and Mateou, 2010). 
As a result of the trial that was started in February 2010:  
 Continental Airlines was found criminally responsible for the disaster by a 
Parisian court in December 2010. 
 A Continental mechanic was given a 15-month suspended sentence, 
 Another airline operative and three French officials were cleared of all 
charges.  
 Another Continental employee was found not guilty. 
On 29 November 2012, a French appeals court cleared Continental Airlines of 
manslaughter conviction. The Parisian court also ruled that Continental would have 
to pay 70% of any compensation claims. The French appeals court, while 
overturning the criminal rulings by the Parisian court, affirmed the civil ruling and left 
Continental liable for the compensation claims 
Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) general counsel Quinn stated that “We are very 
pleased that courts are recognizing that professional human error does not amount 
to criminal conduct, even where it can lead to catastrophic consequences.” He also 
commented that the effort should have been towards training, human factors and 
technology to prevent similar tragedies from occurring again (Mark, December 
2012). 
This case shows that the involvement of the judicial process makes the investigation 
slow and cumbersome and may cause witnesses to withhold information, thus 
compromising the prompt dissemination of safety information. Moreover, such 
involvement did not allow investigations to be carried out in the shortest possible 
time, as required by the European Council Directive 94/56/EC, which was later 
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replaced by EU Regulation 996/2010 (European Union, October, 2010), nor did it 
allow the AAIB to conduct in-depth technical investigations to the level they feel 
comfortable with. 
3.5.3 The Brazilian Aviation Case 
On September 29, 2006, Gol Boeing 737 was on scheduled passenger flight 1907 
from Manaus, Brazil to Rio de Janeiro. The Gol B737 collided with an Embraer 135 
Legacy aircraft that was in its way to the USA. The Gol B737 was a new aircraft that 
was delivered to Gol for operation on September 12, 2006 (17 days before the 
accident). The aircraft crashed into a rainforest after the collision. All 154 passengers 
and crew were killed. The Embraer Legacy also was a new aircraft that was in its 
delivery flight from the factory to the owner in the USA.  The Embraer sustained 
damages on the left wing and the tail section after the mid-air collision; however, it 
landed safely. There were seven people on the Legacy none of whom died or were 
injured (CENIPA, 2008). 
The accident was investigated by CENIPA (the Brazilian Air Force) and the NTSB 
(USA). CENIPA’s final report was released on December 10, 2008. The NTSB 
issued their report which was attached to the final accident investigation report. In its 
final report, CENIPA concluded that errors from both the air traffic controllers and the 
Embraer Legacy’s pilots caused the accident. The NTSB, however, concluded that 
all pilots acted properly and that the accident was a result of “individual and 
institutional” ATC errors. The NTSB strongly disagreed with CENIPA’s conclusion 
about the Embraer’s pilots and stated that “the crew flew the route precisely as 
cleared and complied with all ATC instructions.” (CENIPA, 2008).  
CENIPA controlled and operated Brazil’s airways at the time. In this investigation 
CENIPA was investigating itself and cannot be considered an independent 
investigation body. On the other hand, the NTSB can be considered independent 
investigation body that had no apparent ties to either of the two aircraft or the ATC 
involved in the accident. 
The Legacy aircraft landed at the Cachimbo’s base where the officials from ANAC 
(Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil – the National Agency of Civil Aviation) took 
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possession of the Legacy’s Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Flight Data 
Recorder (FDR). The recorders were sent to Sao Paulo (Sao Jose dos Campos) for 
further analysis. Moreover, the passengers and crew were interrogated. In October 
1st, a recovery process started to recover bodies and evidence, including the GOL 
Boeing’s CVR and FDR, from the rainforest, where the aircraft crashed. The 
operation lasted for about seven weeks. The CVR was found 20 centimetres under 
the ground, and was sent to Transport Safety Board of Canada (TSB) for further 
analysis. The Federal Police detained both of the Legacy’s pilots in Brazil. In 
November 16 2006, CENIPA released the preliminary investigation report, which 
revealed the multiple communication attempts between the Legacy Jet and the 
Brazilian ATC. It also reported that the Transponder in the Legacy Jet was not in 
operation. The report also showed that the GOL Boeing was, in accordance with its 
flight plan, flying at 37000 feet (de Souza, 2008). 
Transponders are used to inform ATC about the altitude, coordinates, and speed of 
an aircraft. The transponder is also responsible for activating the anti-collision 
system on the aircraft. However, no information was released in this report to 
indicate wither the Legacy crew was following their flight plan or not, which caused 
the media to speculate that the Legacy Jet was not following its flight plan. 
The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Association (IFATCA), a 
worldwide organisation representing more than fifty thousand air traffic controllers in 
134 countries, issued a statement criticizing CENIPA’s report and indicating the need 
of neutrality in the investigation. The Federation indicated that the final report did not 
offer “clear conclusions” with regard to known problems in the Brazilian ATC system 
and how it contributed to the accident. IFATCA stated that “Whereas the inquiries in 
regard to the events in the cockpit of the Legacy private jet seem to have received a 
lot of attention and were done with rather detailed care by CENIPA, the same cannot 
be said for investigations on the ATC side,” (Lacagnina, Feb 2009; IFATCA, 14 Jan 
2009; IFATCA, 12 Jan 2009). 
IFATCA did not believe the investigation was independent or impartial and presented 
its opinion in a strong statement that the Federation “… thinks that identified 
shortcomings in the CENIPA report are a missed opportunity for the Brazilian 
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aviation authorities to restore trust and safety in the national aviation system. This 
final accident report could have served as a starting point for an extensive and 
desperately needed healing process. 
…This has unfortunately not occurred, as CENIPA-an integral part of the same 
Brazilian Air Force that is responsible for the provision of air traffic control- has 
chosen to put the main responsibility for the midair collision of 2006 on the front-line 
operator only. This CENIPA decision appears driven by a reluctance to expose staff 
and departments situated in its own organization.” (IFATCA, 12 Jan 2009). 
The pilots were detained and later charged with the offence of “exposing to danger a 
ship or aircraft (…)”. The pilots were finally released and were allowed to leave the 
country around mid of December in 2006. Also, four air traffic controllers charged 
with criminal charges. Two ATC operators had the charges against them dismissed 
in 2008. In 2010, however, the Appeals Court overturned the ruling indicating that 
the two ATC operators should face charges (de Souza, 2008; Michaelides-Mateou 
and Mateou, 2010). 
CENIPA denied the Brazilian Federal Police the access to the data inserted in the 
Boeing equipment arguing that the investigation were proceeding under the provision 
and protection of ICAO Annex 13. Moreover, CENIPA indicated that the investigation 
was under military surveillance, and that the data would be available after Canada’s 
Transport Safety Board (TSB) finishes their analysis. The media accused the 
Brazilian government of hiding information (de Souza, 2008). This came as a result 
of the lost trust in CENIPA’s investigation process mainly because it was not 
perceived as an independent investigation body.  
It is clear in this case that the lack of CENIPA’s independence led to criminalizing 
pilots and ATC errors, which did not serve any positive purpose for this investigation. 
It is also noted that the lack of independence of CENIPA, and the perception of its 
lack of independence, had led the media and public to lose trust on the accident 
investigation process and on CENIPA in general. 
Furthermore, in 2007, an Airbus-320 belonging to the Brazilian company TAM 
skidded off the runway after landing at Sao Paulo’s domestic airport in rainy 
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conditions, smashed into a warehouse and exploded. The Brazilian Government 
were blamed for not closing the runway when they knew about the potential 
problems that it could cause. The director of the Sao Paulo-based airline industry 
magazine Asas (Wings) clarified that because of its shortness and poor drainage, 
the runway was known as the “aircraft carrier.” Moreover, two jets had slipped off the 
runway without injuries in rainy weather only a day earlier. Although the runway had 
unfinished repair work on it, the Brazilian Government did not close it (Al Jazeera 
English, 2007; Reuters, 2007b; Guardian, 2007; The New York Times, 2007). 
The Minister of Defence was fired on 25 July 2007 by President Luiz da Silva as a 
result of this crisis. The final report, published by CENIPA in September 2009, 
showed that one of the thrust levers was in a position to accelerate when it should 
have been in idle; it did not identify if the problem was mechanical or human failure. 
Also, CENIPA identified several contributing factors such as the high volume of rain 
on the day, the unfinished grooving of the runway, and the positions of the thrust 
levers. However, the length of the runway was not pointed out as a contributing 
factor (CENIPA, 2009; Reuters, 2007a; FOLHA online, 2009). 
The above event of the mid-air collision, and other subsequent events, such as the 
air controllers’ strikes and the Airbus-320 aircraft disaster, caused what the media 
called the “Brazilian aviation crisis.” 
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4 EXISTING TOOLS FOR MEASURING INDEPENDENCE  
This research focuses on air accident investigations and therefore the meaning of 
independence in this context should be explained. In chapter 2 of this thesis several 
definitions were presented from the existing literature. The definition that will be used 
for the purposes of this study is the one proposed by the ROSAT: “the structural 
(separation from authorities and clear legal status) and financial (yearly 
stability of funds) ability to decide what and how to investigate, and to publish 
the results of the investigations.” 
There are many factors involved in ensuring the proper independence of an 
investigation body from within the body itself and even from outside the body, 
especially from the judicial, legal, and political systems of that State. Having a 
dedicated accident investigation body that is separate from the Regulator is an 
essential step; however, it is not enough by itself to achieve the desired, and 
required, independence of investigation or the perception of being independent. An 
example of this is the Singapore Airlines B747 flight SQ006 accident in Taiwan in 
2000.  
On 31 October 2000, Singapore Airlines flight SQ006 departing to Los Angeles USA 
crashed on a partially closed runway in Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport during 
takeoff. 83 people were killed and 71 were injured. The aircraft was destroyed as a 
result of a collision with construction equipment and by post crash fire.  
Weather conditions were poor, heavy rain and strong winds, at the time of the 
accident. The aircraft was cleared to depart from runway 05L, however, the pilots 
entered the wrong runway, 05R, which was closed for repairs at the time. Because of 
the poor visibility caused by weather conditions, the construction equipment parked 
on the runway were not visible to the flight crew (ASC, 2002). 
The Aviation Safety Council (ASC) investigated the accident. The ASC, which was 
established as an independent agency in 1998 in New Taipei, Taiwan, is responsible 
for aviation accident investigations in the Free Area of the Republic of China. 
Although the ASC was an accident investigation body separated from the regulator 
at the time and indeed still is, Singapore Airlines did not believe that they are 
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independent. This might be due to the fact that Singapore Airlines pilots were 
arrested after the crash. The NTSB of the USA and ATSB of Australia were involved 
in the investigation to provide a “non-biased” view of the accident and contributing 
factors (Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou, 2010; Hannon, 2002; Gittings, 2000; BBC, 
2000) 
When the Justice Minister of Taiwan Chen Ting-nan announced that Taiwan will 
have judicial sovereignty over the investigation in SQ006 crash, the head of Taiwan's 
Aviation Safety Council (ASC), Jung Kai, warned against prosecuting the three SIA 
pilots and indicated that there was not such a precedent in the international aviation 
community. (Airline Industry Information, November 9, 2000)  
IFALPA issued a statement protesting against the arrest of the SQ006 flight crew 
stating that “in the strongest possible terms, the growing and extremely disturbing 
trend of apportioning ‘blame’ following aircraft accidents…the threat of civil or 
criminal proceedings for violations of aviation safety laws and regulations is having a 
profound and damaging effect on the flow of precious aviation safety information 
which is essential if lessons are to be learned from accident investigations.” IFALPA 
cautioned that its pilots would refuse to fly to Taiwan if the SQ006 flight crew is 
convicted on manslaughter charges (Airline Industry Information, November 9, 
2000). 
In the section titled “Findings Related to Probable Causes”, the final report listed 
several factors which investigators believe played a major role in the conditions 
leading to the accident. The section stated that pilots failed to notice that the aircraft 
entered the wrong runway because they did not review the taxi route. Also, the 
report indicates that the flight crew did not check the paravisual display (PVD) and 
the primary flight display (PFD), which would have told them they are on the wrong 
runway (ASC, 2002). 
The Accredited Representatives from Singapore did not like how the findings were 
presented in the report. They felt that the report concentrated on blaming the flight 
crew of SQ006 and “played down” the contributing factors from the closed runway. 
The runway did not have barriers or markings at the beginning to indicate that it is 
closed. Also, the runway had some lighting missing or not working at the time.  
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Singapore Ministry of Transport (MOT) disputed almost every single finding in the 
final report. The MOT wrote its own report and asked the ASC to attach it to the final 
published report, which they did. In addition, the NTSB’s comments are also 
attached to the final report. The NTSB stated that they “…wish to congratulate the 
ASC for an excellent job in conducting the investigation”. Moreover, the Australian 
ATSB’s comments were also attached to final report. The ATSB indicated that they 
believe that “…the report is thorough and the conclusions fully supported.” (ASC, 
2002; Hannon, 2002)   
Taiwanese prosecutors investigated the three pilots for possible negligence but did 
not pursue any criminal charges against them. The prosecutors recommended that 
two of the pilots have their licensed suspended and not allowed to fly in Taipei for 
one year (Nisha, 2011). 
It is important to understand that the ultimate goal of all air accident investigations is 
to improve safety. This is why commercial pilots should not be prosecuted. 
Otherwise, some facts, which might be crucial to the improvement of flight safety, will 
be held up by the lawyers if pilots to be prosecuted. By ensuring a “just culture”, the 
flight crew, maintenance, and witnesses, can share all information including the 
details of their mistakes during the accident which will eventually lead to better 
procedures or trainings. 
4.1 Analysing ICAO Annex 13 
ICAO Annex 13 is based on the concept of independent investigations. A huge 
amount of work has been put into ICAO Annex 13 since its first edition, to ensure the 
independence of air accident investigations, which in turn helps to realise the full 
benefits of learning from accidents and incidents. Analysing the ICAO Annex 13 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) revealed 12 elements that are 
aimed to ensure the independence of the air accident investigation when 
implemented correctly. 
Table ‎A-1 in Appendix A shows the analysis of ICAO Annex 13 SARPs to produce 
these elements. The results that analysis produced are the elements shown in Table 
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‎4-1. These elements can be considered as “indicators” of the level of independence 
of accident investigation authorities. 
Table ‎4-1 ICAO Annex 13 elements for investigation independence 
Not to Apportion 
Blame 
Conduct of 
Investigation 
Access & Control 
(Site/evidence/witnesses) 
Delegation 
Legal Framework Evidence Separation of 
investigation 
Participation 
Transparency Consultation Cooperation Coordination 
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Figure ‎4-1 Recognised benefits of independence achieved through correct implementation of ICAO Annex 13 SARPs 
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Figure ‎4-1 shows the most important benefits related to air accident investigations 
that can be achieved by the correct implementation of ICAO Annex 13 SARPs. The 
elements shown on the left side of the figure represent investigation elements that 
are embedded within ICAO Annex 13 SARPs. The “benefits” shown to the right of 
the figure are the benefits that are mentioned in the literature as expected benefits 
from having an independent accident investigation authority. 
The “separation of investigations” element includes both functional and structural (as 
required by the 10th edition of Annex 13) separation from judicial and other 
investigations.  
“Confidentiality” and protection of Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) are regulated under 
the “evidence” element mentioned above.  
Also, the “cooperation” and “coordination” elements are about regulating the 
relationship with judicial authorities, legal authorities, and other civil aviation 
authorities from other countries. These two elements also “regulate” the relationship 
within the industry by, for example, sharing findings with the industry so that they can 
take safety actions before the final report is published. 
The 12 elements are indicators of the Annex 13 SARPs “spirit” and their benefits can 
be achieved by any aircraft accident investigation authority if they are understood 
and implemented correctly. ICAO provides guidance on how to implement Annex 13 
correctly. However, 60% of the participants in this research survey, coming from 45 
different countries, indicated that ICAO guidance “could be improved.”  
Table ‎4-2 and Figure ‎4-2 show the distribution of what participants think about the 
clarity of ICAO documents when it comes to the requirements for the independence 
of accident investigation authorities, which will be discussed later in greater detail. 
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Table ‎4-2 Clarity of ICAO documents with regard to the requirements of independence 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Very clear 18 26.5 26.5 
Clear but could be improved 41 60.3 86.8 
Not clear 4 5.9 92.6 
Don't know 3 4.4 97.1 
Other 2 2.9 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
 
 
Figure ‎4-2 Clarity of ICAO documents with regard to the requirements of 
independence 
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4.2 Measuring Tools 
Many have discussed the benefits and necessity of the independence of air accident 
investigation; however, no measure has been introduced to evaluate it. This study 
proposes a methodology to measure that independence. The proposed method 
brings together valuable insights from different disciplines about the meaning of 
independence and how to measure it. These insights are scattered throughout the 
literature of Economic, Legal, Political Science, and other disciplines. 
4.2.1 Measuring the “Independence” of Central Banks and Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) 
Examining the literature revealed that a method to measure the independence of 
central banks has been developed many years back (Cukierman and Webb, 1995; 
Cukierman et al., 1992; Elgie, 1998; Grilli et al., 1991). 
In 1992, there was an attempt to measure “Central Banks’ legal independence” as 
an essential component of actual independence (Cukierman et al., 1992). 
Cukierman et al. (1992) used formal indicators based on legal issues, such as: head 
of central bank term in office, the process of appointing the head of central bank, and 
central bank objectives. Because of the lack of precise polices on central bank 
function, the authors also used informal indicators based on a questionnaire, such 
as: price stability priority, and central bank governor turnover. The questionnaire, 
which was used to measure the central bank independence (CBI), was sent to 
specialist on monetary in 72 countries. The study also identified the importance of 
central bank practice for price stability. Central bank independence (CBI) in this 
study refers to the formal and informal control of central bank over the levers of 
monetary policy, and its freedom to set monetary targets such as price stability. 
The questionnaire variables were divided into several possible responses, and given 
different “weights” and “numerical codes”. For example, the variable “limitations on 
lending in practice” was given the weight of (0.20) and each of its possible responses 
was given a “numerical code” as follows: Tight (1.0), Moderately tight (0.66), 
Moderately loose (0,33), and Loose or nonexistent (0.00). 
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Cukierman et al. (1992) studied the link between CBI and inflation performance in 
more depth than any related study before by examining a group of countries much 
bigger than any group examined before. The legal dimension of the CBI was 
analyzed and found to reveal a negative correlation, in general, between CBI and 
inflation. 
Six years later, Elgie indicated that “Cukierman’s” measure is by far the most 
sophisticated to date. Elgie added more indicators (from 16 to 37) and two 
dimensions; political independence and economic independence. The new index 
attempted to measure the formal and actual (de jure and de facto) independence of 
central banks (Elgie, 1998). 
Forder (2001) criticised the above measures and questioned whether they do their 
intended job. However, he did not suggest any different measures. Forder believes 
that Elgie’s argument is deficient in three ways: the methodology used to measure 
independence is “inappropriate”; the measure of accountability is not reliable 
because the argument about the nature of accountability is not convincing; and 
finally, Elgie’s conclusion is not derived from his argument. 
In 2002, Gilardi (2002) changed the “Cukierman” measure of independence to fit his 
purposes to measure the (formal) independence of the Independent Regulatory 
Agency (IRA) from the government. Gilardi greatly changed the measures and 
divided them into five dimensions: 
 The agency head status 
 The management board members’ status 
 The general frame of the relationship with government and the parliament 
 Financial and organisational autonomy 
 Extent of delegated regulatory competencies 
It should be noted that Gilardi made it clear that the concept of “independence” is 
most controversial and that the index he developed “...should not be evaluated 
against any possible conception of ‘independence’, but, rather, against the specific 
definition that is used here.” 
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In 2007, Maggetti developed a framework for “informal” independence of agencies. 
This measuring index (with its many different versions and developments) was used 
in the Economy and Banking field as well as in the Political Science field.  
Because Gilardi’s work is the most complete and relevant to this study, it will be 
discussed in more detail. 
Gilardi assumes all dimensions have the same effect on the independence of the 
IRAs, therefore, each of the five dimensions is given the same weight (0.20) or (1/5) 
of the overall scale. Moreover, each indicator in any category has the same weight 
(Gilardi, 2002; Gilardi, 2005). 
Table ‎4-3 shows the independence index used to measure the formal independence 
of IRAs. 
Table ‎4-3 measuring IRA’s formal independence (adapted from (Gilardi, 2002)) 
Dimension Category Indicators Coding 
Status of the agency 
head (Weight = 0.20) 
Term of office 
Over 8 years 
6 to 8 years 
5 years 
4 years 
Fixed term under 4 yrs or at 
the discretion of the appointer 
No fixed term 
1.00 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
 
0.00 
 
Who appoints the 
agency head? 
The members of the 
management board 
A complex mix of the 
parliament and the 
government 
The parliament 
The government collectively 
One or two ministers 
1.00 
 
0.75 
 
 
0.50 
0.25 
0.00 
 
Dismissal 
Dismissal is impossible 
Dismissal is possible, but only 
for reasons not related to 
policy 
There are no specific 
provisions for dismissal 
1.00 
0.67 
 
 
0.33 
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Dimension Category Indicators Coding 
Dismissal is possible at the 
appointer’s discretion 
0.00 
 
May the agency head 
hold other offices in 
government? 
No 
Only with permission of the 
government 
Yes/ no specific provisions 
1.00 
0.50 
 
0.00 
 
Is the appointment 
renewable? 
No 
Yes, once 
Yes, more than once 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
 Is independence a 
formal requirement 
for the appointment 
Yes 
No  
1.00 
0.00 
Status of the 
members of the 
management board 
(Weight = 0.20) 
Term of office 
Over 8 years 
6 to 8 years 
5 years 
4 years 
Fixed term under 4 yrs or at 
the discretion of the appointer 
No fixed term 
1.00 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
 
 
0.00 
 
Who appoints the 
members of the 
management board? 
The head of the agency 
A complex mix of the 
parliament and the 
government 
The parliament 
The government collectively 
One or two ministers 
1.00 
0.75 
 
 
0.50 
0.25 
0.00 
 
Dismissal 
Dismissal is impossible 
Dismissal is possible, but only 
for reasons not related to 
policy 
There are no specific 
provisions for dismissal 
Dismissal is possible at the 
appointer’s discretion 
1.00 
0.67 
 
 
0.33 
 
0.00 
 May the members of 
the management 
board hold other 
offices in 
government? 
No 
Only with permission of the 
government 
Yes/ no specific provisions 
1.00 
0.50 
 
0.00 
 Is the appointment No 1.00 
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Dimension Category Indicators Coding 
renewable? Yes, once 
Yes, more than once 
0.50 
0.00 
 Is independence a 
formal requirement 
for the appointment 
Yes 
No  
1.00 
0.00 
Relationship with 
government and 
parliament (Weight = 
0.20) 
Is the independence 
of the agency 
formally stated? 
Yes  
No 
 
1.00 
0.00 
 
What are the formal 
obligations of the 
agency vis-a-vis the 
government? 
There are no formal 
obligations 
Presentation of an annual 
report for information only 
Presentation of an annual 
report that must be approved 
The agency is fully 
accountable to the 
government 
1.00 
 
0.67 
 
0.33 
 
0.00 
 
What are the formal 
obligations of the 
agency vis-a-vis the 
parliament? 
There are no formal 
obligations 
Presentation of an annual 
report for information only 
Presentation of an annual 
report that must be approved 
The agency is fully 
accountable to the parliament 
1.00 
 
0.67 
 
0.33 
 
0.00 
 Which body, other 
than a court, can 
overturn the 
decisions of the 
agency where the 
latter has exclusive 
competence? 
No body 
A specialised body 
The government, with 
qualifications 
The government, 
unconditionally 
1.00 
0.67 
0.33 
 
0.00 
Financial and 
organisational 
autonomy (Weight = 
0.20) What is the source of 
the agency’s budget? 
Fees levied on the regulated 
industry 
Both the government and fees 
levied on the regulated 
industry 
The government 
1.00 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.00 
 
How is the budget 
controlled? 
By the agency 
By the accounting office or 
court 
By both the agency and the 
1.00 
0.67 
 
0.33 
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Dimension Category Indicators Coding 
government 
By the government only 
 
0.00 
 
Which body decides 
on the agency’s 
internal organisation? 
The agency 
Both the agency and the 
government 
The government 
1.00 
0.50 
 
0.00 
 Which body is in 
charge of the 
agency’s personnel 
policy (hiring and 
firing staff, deciding 
on its allocation and 
composition)? 
The agency 
Both the agency and the 
government 
The government 
 
1.00 
0.50 
 
0.00 
Regulatory 
competencies 
(Weight = 0.20) 
Who is competent for 
regulation in the 
sector? 
The agency only 
The agency and another 
independent authority 
The agency and the 
parliament 
The agency and the 
government 
The agency has only 
consultative competencies 
1.00 
0.75 
 
0.50 
 
0.25 
 
0.00 
4.2.1.1 Issues to Consider about Gilardi’s Index 
Gilardi’s index will not work if applied directly to measure the independence of the air 
accident investigations for several reasons: 
 The air accident investigation body is not a regulator. In fact, it has no power 
at all to regulate or enforce anything. It can only recommend. 
 Even though Gilardi’s index is considered to be the most comprehensive in its 
field, it has been criticised for being underdeveloped. 
 Gilardi gave the same “weight” to all of the five dimensions. In other words, 
every dimension measured has the same effect on the independence of the 
regulatory agency. 
 Gilardi measured the formal (de jure) independence only. Actual or informal 
(de facto) is not measured. This suits his purpose for “institutional design” 
research but may not be enough for measuring the air accident investigation. 
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4.2.2 Measuring Judicial Independence 
Many authors have written about judicial independence (Dubois, 1986; Feld and 
Voigt, 2003; Ferejohn et al., 2004; Geyh, 2003; Hayo and Voigt, 2007). Some have 
introduced ways to measure this independence. Much of this work discusses the 
independence of judges to freely do their work or what is called the “judicial 
behaviour”. Others look at what is called the “institutional framework” or the 
independence of the judiciary from other institutions and from politicians. 
In the judicial system the judges are considered independent if they are free to 
decide on government violations. In this type of judicial independence, whether 
judges’ decisions are independent is used as the measuring criteria. The institutional 
framework describes the limits and incentives that judges have compared to other 
governmental agents. The criteria to check if judicial independence from other 
governmental agencies exists can be found from the laws defining relationships with 
other governmental agencies. Another condition is that these laws must also be 
followed. 
One study, for example, divided judicial independence into three different 
components to be able to measure the de jure independence. Figure ‎4-3 and Figure 
‎4-4 are summaries of the components of the judicial independence and the variables 
used to measure them (Rios-Figueroa, 2006). 
De jure independence refers to the official or legal independence which could be 
stated in a constitution or a decree but may not be actually practised. It is the 
opposite of de facto independence which refers to the actual or practised 
independence. 
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Figure ‎4-3 Components of judicial independence (de jure) as described by Rios-
Figueroa (2006) 
 
 
Figure ‎4-4 Variables to measure each component of de jure judicial independence 
adapted from Rios-Figueroa (2006) 
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In Figure ‎4-4, Autonomy refers to the ability of the judiciary to decide its own basic 
institutional structure; External Independence to the relationship between Supreme 
Court Judges and the elected organs of Government; and internal independence to 
lower court Judges’ relationship with their superiors (Rios-Figueroa, 2006). 
4.2.3 Indicators Defined by SafetyNet in Transportation 
SafetyNet Integrated Working Package 4 “Independent Accident Investigation” 
introduced a framework to measure the independence of accident investigations 
including air accident investigations. The working group used the framework to 
evaluate accident investigation setups in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, and Finland (Jähi et al., 2005).  
Table ‎4-4 indicators used by SafetyNet to measure the independence of air accident 
investigations in European Countries: the case of the UK AAIB (Jähi et al., 2005) 
Established 1915 
Legal form of the body Public authority, state body 
(Department for Transport) 
Current status Annex13; Directive 
94/56/EC; Civil Aviation 
Regulation 1996 
Relation to the public powers The secretary of State for 
Transport appoints the Chief 
Inspector 
Budget nav 
Personnel 52 
Events notified nav 
Events investigated nav 
Reports published nav 
Structural independence:  
Separate from the market authority yes 
Separate from the operations authority yes 
Separate from the safety authority yes 
Permanence of the investigating body yes 
Safety investigation’s legal status yes 
Safety investigator’s legal status yes 
Liability issues excluded yes 
Findings cannot be used for the purposes of the judicial yes 
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enquiry 
Financial independence:  
Financial autonomy of the investigating body yes 
Financial autonomy to carry out investigations yes 
Relations to the industry (constructors, operators, or others) yes 
Functional independence:  
Obligation to investigate yes 
Liberty to investigate yes 
Autonomous determination of the scope of the investigation yes 
Autonomous determination of the methods of the 
investigation 
yes 
Access to the evidence yes 
Access to the witnesses yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of design of 
the vehicle 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of 
manufacture 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of 
occurrence 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of operator nap 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of registry yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of other substantially 
interested state 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of other interested 
organisations 
yes 
Diverging comments of the observers published yes 
Findings are public yes 
Reports published without further scrutiny yes 
Respect of the anonymity yes 
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Table ‎4-5 indicators used by SafetyNet to measure the independence of air accident 
investigations in European Countries: the case of the French BEA (Jähi et al., 2005). 
Established 1946 
Legal form of the body Public authority, attached to 
the Ministry of Transport 
Current status 2001; Annex13; Directive 
94/56/EC; Loi No. 99-234 of 
29/3/1999; Decret No 2001-
1043 of 8/11/2001 
Relation to the public powers The Minister of Transport 
appoints the Director for a 
renewable 7 years term 
Budget (2004) 3,4 M€ 
Personnel (2004) 110 of which 30 
investigators and 10 
investigative assistants 
Events notified 750 (average per year) 
Events investigated 300-350 (per year) 
Reports published 100-130 (per year) 
Structural independence:  
Separate from the market authority yes 
Separate from the operations authority yes 
Separate from the safety authority yes 
Permanence of the investigating body yes 
Safety investigation’s legal status yes 
Safety investigator’s legal status yes 
Liability issues excluded yes 
Findings cannot be used for the purposes of the judicial 
enquiry 
yes 
Financial independence:  
Financial autonomy of the investigating body yes 
Financial autonomy to carry out investigations yes 
Relations to the industry (constructors, operators, or others) yes 
Functional independence:  
Obligation to investigate yes 
Liberty to investigate yes 
Autonomous determination of the scope of the investigation yes 
Autonomous determination of the methods of the yes 
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investigation 
Access to the evidence yes 
Access to the witnesses yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of design of 
the vehicle 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of 
manufacture 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of 
occurrence 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of operator Yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of registry Yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of other substantially 
interested state 
Yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of other interested 
organisations 
No 
Diverging comments of the observers published Yes 
Findings are public yes 
Reports published without further scrutiny yes 
Respect of the anonymity yes 
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Table ‎4-6 indicators used by SafetyNet to measure the independence of air accident 
investigations in European Countries: the case of the German BFU (Jähi et al., 2005) 
Established 1998 
Legal form of the body Federal authority 
Current status 1998; Annex13; Directive 
94/56/EC; Flugunfall-
Untersuchungs- Gesetz 
FIUUG, August 26th, 1998 
Relation to the public powers nav 
Budget 2,4 M€ 
Personnel 35 
Events notified (2003) 44 
Events investigated (2003) 44 
Reports published (2003) 44 
Structural independence:  
Separate from the market authority yes 
Separate from the operations authority yes 
Separate from the safety authority yes 
Permanence of the investigating body yes 
Safety investigation’s legal status yes 
Safety investigator’s legal status yes 
Liability issues excluded yes 
Findings cannot be used for the purposes of the judicial 
enquiry 
yes 
Financial independence:  
Financial autonomy of the investigating body yes 
Financial autonomy to carry out investigations yes 
Relations to the industry (constructors, operators, or others) yes 
Functional independence:  
Obligation to investigate yes 
Liberty to investigate yes 
Autonomous determination of the scope of the investigation yes 
Autonomous determination of the methods of the 
investigation 
yes 
Access to the evidence yes 
Access to the witnesses yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of design of yes 
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the vehicle 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of 
manufacture 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of 
occurrence 
yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of operator Yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of the state of registry Yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of other substantially 
interested state 
Yes 
Investigation accessible to observers of other interested 
organisations 
No 
Diverging comments of the observers published Yes 
Findings are public Yes 
Reports published without further scrutiny yes 
Respect of the anonymity yes 
 
The above examples in tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 show the results of applying this 
model for the case of the UK AAIB, the case of the French BEA, and the case of the 
German BFU respectively. The measured independence in these cases is the formal 
or de jure independence. The indicators have one of two values; yes or no. 
Unavailable data and “not applicable” questions are indicated by “nav” and “nap” 
respectively. 
It is very difficult to differentiate between the capabilities of these three examples. 
This is because the indicators used in this model do not go deep enough to show the 
real differences between the mentioned accident investigation agencies with regard 
to their independence. 
Moreover, the indicators used by SafetyNet are not specific to aviation. The same 
indicators are also used for evaluating other modes of transportation namely marine, 
rail and road. 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
Because the concept of accident investigation independence is not clearly 
defined in the literature, this study was started as an exploratory type of 
research to help define the data collection method, best research design, and 
suitable selection of population and sample. The exploratory method applied 
thus far is not used to define any conclusions in this research. It is only used to 
help understand the best way to approach a vague concept, such as the 
concept of accident investigation independence. 
In order to improve something it needs to be measured first. Such a measuring 
tool for the independence of accident investigation does not exist today. This 
research proposes to fill this gap and develop such a tool.  
5.1 Research Strategy 
According to Robson (2002) the purpose of the investigation will dictate the 
research strategy: case studies for exploratory research; surveys for descriptive 
studies; and experiments for explanatory research. Although this is true for most 
of the researches, it is not always the case.  
Experiments can be used in social science to prove or disprove a theory. 
Experiments are due to lack of research in this area.  
Case studies are ideally the best strategy for exploratory work; however, for the 
purpose of this research case studies are also rejected because of the difficulty 
in obtaining sensitive information, attending meetings, and obtaining copies of 
communications, letters, etc. which are important for a case study strategy. In 
addition, it is not clear which cases (ICAO Member States) should be studied 
because it is not proven which States have the best independence, or the worst. 
For the purpose of this research, a literature review, surveys and interviews are 
the most appropriate strategies, given the requirement of the other strategies. 
The Methodology for this research is described in Figure ‎5-1. 
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5.2 Selecting a Philosophical Approach for the Research 
To the researcher’s knowledge there has not been a study in this area before. 
Therefore, there are no theories to test. Moreover, this research is more 
exploratory in nature and should have a wide scope initially. Hence, a 
phenomenological approach seems the most appropriate for this research. 
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Figure ‎5-1 Research Methodology Diagram 
Research Design 
Literature Review 
Identify Gaps/Problems, Research 
Questions, Objectives 
ICAO-Annex13 
Analysis 
Identify Indicators for Independence of 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Agency 
Creating Questionnaire 
Creating Independence 
Measuring Tool for Aircraft 
Accident Investigation 
Agency 
Pilot Study (Filter) 
Analysis of Responses – for responses other 
than responses used in Measuring Index 
Cleaning Data for 
Measuring Tool 
Ask Experts  
Results/Statistics 
from Measuring Tool 
Discussion of Results and Theory 
Formulation 
Quantitative 
PhD Thesis 
Fee
d
b
ack
 
Experts Validation 
Applying Measuring 
Tool on Sample 
Research Design 
Identify Gaps/Problems, Research 
Questions, Objectives 
Verification of 
Categorisation 
Scoring Technique 
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5.3 Theory  
As the phenomenological approach is selected for this research it implies that 
the data collected will be used to form the theory, rather than using data to test 
existing theory. Robson (2002) suggests that researches that are classified as 
exploratory are used to find out what is happening, to seek new insights, to ask 
questions, to assess phenomena in a new light, and are usually qualitative. 
Method is defined as “a set of procedures and a goal” (Kitchener, 1999). The 
goal or aim of this thesis therefore can be achieved by utilising scientific 
techniques or strategies. The study of scientific methods is called epistemology 
or theory of knowledge. The author makes a distinction between method and 
methodology. He describes method as the practices or steps taken or actions 
performed, whereas, methodology is the theory of these methods. 
The research design is a plan that “guides the investigator in the process of 
collecting, analysing and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof 
that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relationships 
among the variables under investigation. The research design also defines the 
domain of generality, i.e. whether the obtained interpretations can be 
generalised to a larger population or to different situations” (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1976). In an academic environment, the purpose of the research 
plan is to document the approach taken by the researcher and make it possible 
to repeat the same process. 
Different levels of scales are described in measurement theory literature. The 
needed level of measurement depends on the research question and the 
desired application of the indicator. Depending on the complexity of the 
information needed to be described, four different scale levels can be used; 
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio scale (Bowling, 2004).  
A nominal scale is used to describe basic relationships or for classification of 
data in a very simple way (for example, ‘independent’ or ‘dependent’). 
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Contingency coefficient is usually used as a measure of correlation for this level 
of data. 
The ordinal scale, also called the ranking scale, is more descriptive than the 
nominal scale in that it describes the “relationship” of one object to another (for 
example, “more effective”, “less effective”). Usually the median is used in 
statistics to describe the “central tendency of scores”. 
The interval scale is essentially an ordinal scale with known distances between 
any two numbers on the scale. Thus, this scale is categorised by a constant unit 
of measurement. With this quantitative scale, all common parametric statistics 
apply, such as standard deviations, means, etc. The interval scale is suitable if 
the research question is something like “How different is X to Y?” 
The ratio scale is an interval scale with a true zero defined. The ratio is 
independent of the unit of measurement.  
After selecting a philosophical approach for this research, a methodology was 
designed to answer the research question: 
Is it possible to measure the independence of air accident investigation in 
ICAO Member States? 
The research methodology is shown in Figure 5-1 above. 
5.4 Details of Data Collection 
5.4.1 Consulting the Literature 
The study started by looking to understand the independence concept in the 
literature. The literature is very vague about it and did not give any agreed 
definition that can be used in the context of aircraft accident investigations. The 
literature, however, spoke of different attributes or indicators that suggest the 
existence of independence in an organisation or the perception of its existence. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several attempts to measure the 
independence of different organisations in several disciplines. The most notable 
attempts to measure independence are those to measure the independence of 
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Central Banks, Regulated Agencies, and the shy attempt to measure the 
independence of transport accident investigation agencies in Europe. 
Because this research focuses on the independence of aircraft accident 
investigation agencies in ICAO Member States, ICAO Annex 13, Aircraft 
Accident and Incident Investigation, the standard for aircraft accident 
investigations for these States, was consulted since it is the agreed upon 
standard and the ultimate reference in this subject. Surprisingly and 
unfortunately, Annex 13 does not include a clear definition of independence of 
investigations.  
5.4.2 Asking ICAO 
ICAO was approached to understand what they mean by independence of 
investigation since it was a recommendation in their ICAO Annex 13, which has 
recently been upgraded to a Standard in the 10th edition of Annex 13. The 
Accident Investigation Group (AIG) was contacted directly via email to ask them 
about the definition of investigation independence. They replied that what ICAO 
is looking for is the functional independence as described in Part I in ICAO 
Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (ICAO Doc 9756) but no 
clear definition was given. This reply was an unofficial one and does not 
represent the ICAO’s position, as stated in the email. ICAO answers officially to 
Member States not to individuals. Note that this answer was before the 
publication of the latest edition of Annex 13 (10th edition), which requires the 
structural separation of the investigation agency in addition to the functional 
separation. The details of this are explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
5.4.3 Interviews 
Several professionals were interviewed informally and were asked about the 
meaning of investigation independence. Almost every one of them had a 
different opinion on what it means. These are working or retired professionals 
that spent many years of their lives working for accident investigation agencies 
in different countries and yet they could not agree on its meaning. 
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In addition, Captain Barayan, the head of the Saudi Arabian investigation team 
that was sent to participate in the investigation of the Saudi Airlines mid-air 
accident over India in 1996, was interviewed via email. Captain Barayan’s 
interview and his opinion in this regard can be found in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
5.4.4 ICAO Annex 13 Analysis 
Analysing ICAO Annex 13 to understand the requirements pertaining to the 
vague concept of independence of accident investigations was a logical step. 
The result of analysing ICAO Annex 13 is shown in Table ‎A-1 in Appendix A. 
Elements of the independence of aircraft accident investigation found to be 
impeded in ICAO Annex 13 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) 
are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
The results shown in the tables (in Chapter 6 and Appendix A) and the data 
gathered from the literature at this stage are used to build the survey 
questionnaire to collect data from ICAO Member States about their aircraft 
accidents and incidents investigation capabilities. 
5.4.5 The Survey 
The results of the exploratory approach explained above showed that there are 
indicators that can be used to measure the concept of independence in the 
context of aircraft accident investigation.  
Ideally, structured and semi-structured interviews with Chief Inspectors or 
heads of accident investigation agencies in ICAO Member States would have 
been the best way to gather the needed data. However, because of time 
constraints, busy schedules of targeted heads of investigation agencies and 
Chief Inspectors, and the prohibitive cost of travel around the world, the 
interview method was quickly disqualified. The most suitable method to collect 
data for the purposes of this study is by sending questionnaires (surveys) out to 
each of the Member States’ accident investigation authorities, if they exist, or 
the bodies that are responsible for accidents and incidents investigations in that 
State. 
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A questionnaire was prepared using the data gathered from the literature 
review, informal interviews of aviation professionals, and from the analysis of 
ICAO Annex 13. The questionnaire goal is to gather enough data about aircraft 
accident investigations and investigation agencies in ICAO Member States to 
understand their practices with regards to accident investigation independence. 
An online survey has been chosen over a paper survey for several reasons; it is 
faster, easier to complete, easier to send out to participants, and the results are 
faster and easier to download and analyse. A customised version of the Bristol 
Online Survey (BOS) tool was used for the preparation and dissemination of the 
questionnaire. The customised version looks very professional and 
personalised for Cranfield University as shown in the snapshot in Figure ‎B-1 in 
Appendix B. 
5.4.5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of using questionnaire in research 
There are several advantages and disadvantages of using questionnaire as a 
data collection method in research  
In general, using questionnaire is relatively easy to administer and analyze. 
Questionnaires can be used to collect information about sensitive topics which 
participants may feel uncomfortable speaking to an interviewer about. Also, 
questionnaires cost less in comparison with other methods. Moreover, several 
other advantages are mentioned in the literature such as (Key, 1997; Brace, 
2008; Ong'anya and Dr Ododa, Feb 2009): 
 Questionnaires remove the likelihood of interviewer bias 
 Geographically distant participants can easily take part in answering the 
questionnaire. 
 Uniformity of questions. Each participant receives the exact set of 
questions which yield data more comparable than data gathered from 
interviews. 
 It is possible for highly structured questions to be standardized. 
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 Questionnaires are a useful method in investigating patterns and 
frequencies. 
 Questionnaire format is familiar to most respondents. 
 Gives plenty of time for the respondents usually to think about their 
answers. 
 Questionnaires are relatively a fast way to collect data. 
 Results can be quickly quantified. 
 Data analysis can be more objectively than other forms of research. 
Moreover, there are some specific advantages of using online questionnaires 
such as: 
 Responses can be pre-coded eliminating transcript errors 
 Data is already in electronic format making analysis easier 
 Guidance and/or software is widely available. 
There are also some disadvantages of using questionnaire such as: 
 Some people are not honest with their answers. 
 Some people may not fully understand some of the questions. 
 Some people may leave blank spaces or write down silly answers. 
 People can choose not to fill in the questionnaire. 
 Relies on the subject to be honest 
 Response rate is usually low 
 There is no follow-up mechanism 
 Timing of sending out the questionnaire, length of the questionnaire, and 
complexity of the questions can affect the response rate 
 Obtaining sufficient number of responses can be difficult sometimes. 
 Questions in questionnaires can be misinterpreted 
 Open-ended questions can generate large amount of data which makes 
it difficult to interpret. 
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Disadvantages of using online questionnaires: 
 Technical problems can occur. 
 people may respond more than once 
 some types of surveys may not be deliverable online 
5.4.6 Pilot Study 
Valid question means it should measure the concept it is intended to measure 
and reliable question means that it should be answered the same way every 
time it is asked (Weisberg et al., 1996).  
The questionnaire was sent to different countries with different languages. The 
English language was used because it is the aviation language. Also, the 
standardized answers (answer options) used for questions were based on the 
literature review and the pilot study. 
An indicator is considered a valid measure if it actually measures what it says it 
measures. Terminology is one well known problem affecting the validity of the 
measurements. The literature talks about different types of validity such as: 
 Content validity: shows the extent to which the measure represents all 
aspects of a given construct. It is also referred to as logical validity. 
 Face validity: shows if it measures the concept that it is supposed to 
measure. 
 Criterion validity: shows how close a variable can predict the result based 
on input from other variables. 
 Concurrent validity: used to show correlation of a test with a previously 
validated measure. 
 Predictive validity: shows how well a score from a scale can predict other 
scores on some measured criterion. 
 Construct validity: shows the validity of inferences that a measuring tool 
actually measures the investigated construct. 
 Convergent and Discriminant validity: shows the extent to which two 
measures of constructs are related. They are considered as subtypes of 
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construct validity. The convergent validity is established when two similar 
constructs correspond with each others, however, discriminant validity is 
established when the constructs are easily distinguished. 
In order to eliminate the risk of misunderstanding questions in the 
questionnaire, and to test the validity and reliability of the questions used in the 
questionnaire, a pilot study was conducted. The pilot study was split into two 
parts; one for the paper version and the other for the electronic version. 
The paper survey was given to five different aviation safety professionals, who 
are not part of the final sample, to complete and comment upon it.  
Difficulties encountered with some questions were reported in separate 
debriefings. There were not, however, any substantial changes to the 
questionnaire to mandate another pre-test. 
One problem was pointed out – the length of the questionnaire. Several 
attempts have since been taken to shorten the questionnaire but it was very 
difficult to remove any questions without compromising the results. After careful 
consideration, very few questions were removed from the questionnaire; 
however, the resultant questionnaire is still considered to be long. Since there 
was only a single chance to obtain reliable information from very busy 
professionals, the researcher decided that shortening the questionnaire any 
more would jeopardise missing important information. 
Other problems pointed out and suggestions from the pilot study were: 
 The choice of the words “Agency”, “Authority”, “Body” or “Office” when 
referring to the entity responsible for aircraft accident investigations. 
 Adding the choices of “Other” and “Don’t Know” to every question. 
 One question split into two questions, so that each question represents 
one idea only. 
 Add a note at the beginning of the questionnaire to indicate that this 
questionnaire is about the participant’s country. 
 Lightly rephrasing some questions. 
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 Change the order of some questions. 
 Replace some words with less ambiguous ones. 
5.4.7 Treatment of Data 
Many participants used the “Other” options to express their opinion which meant 
that most of the data had to be treated and cleaned to make it usable. The 
answers given under “Other” option were analysed, classified and matched with 
the available options where possible. Otherwise, it is left ‘as is’ if it does not 
match any option.  
Because the practice above depends on the researcher’s opinion, an 
independent opinion was needed to verify the process. A sample of the 
questions and answers from participants were given to another, independent 
researcher to classify them into available categories or in a category on their 
own. After the independent researcher put answers into available options for 
that question it was compared with the original classification. The answers 
matched more than 86% of the time for the sample questions and, therefore, 
the original classifications for the whole questionnaire were accepted and 
considered valid. 
Also, the answers to narrative questions (two questions) were classified into 
categories to make them usable for statistical analysis. There was no validation 
needed for this process because the created categories were created from the 
data available and did not have to match any prescribed options or categories. 
5.4.8 Coding the Answers 
The data had to be coded in order to quantify the qualitative inputs and be able 
to use software packages such as SPSS. By using an electronic survey, many 
of the inherent problems with coding the paper survey questions disappeared. 
For example, problems such as: unclear marking on paper, misreading the 
participant’s answer in the data entry phase, interviewer checking the wrong 
box, or interviewer check mark may be unclear so that it leads to wrong code. 
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All these problems were overcome by the use of an advanced electronic survey 
tool. 
5.4.9 Ethics Committee Approval  
Cranfield Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee (SEREC) is the 
committee responsible for evaluating researchers’ fieldwork proposals, 
providing feedback on adequate ethical research practices, and approving 
acceptable proposals. Their primary function, as stated in their website, “... is to 
safeguard the rights, safety, physical and mental well-being of direct and 
indirect participants, stakeholders and researchers in studies carried out by staff 
and students. This involves determining that research processes and methods 
address relevant ethical concerns and meet applicable professional and 
University requirements.” (Cranfield University, 2012) 
A research proposal was submitted to the SEREC for review. It reviewed the 
ethics proposal and asked for some required changes before they approved the 
proposal. The changes were incorporated in accordance with SEREC’s 
feedback and the corrected proposal was approved by the Committee. The 
approved ethical proposal is shown in Appendix C. 
5.4.10 Population and Research Sample 
There were a total of 68 responses covering 45 different countries. The 
countries are shown in Table ‎5-1. 
The 45 countries, as the research sample, represent less than 24% of the total 
number of ICAO Member States (more than 192 States), which is the research 
population. However, the assumption that all of these countries have accident 
investigation capabilities to do their own investigations is an incorrect 
assumption. 
ICAO USOAP audit results indicate that a number of ICAO Member States have 
not been able to implement an effective accident and incident investigation 
system (Costa, 2011).  However, it can be seen from Costa's keynote speech 
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that there are “a number of states” in “many regions” that do not do their own 
investigations. Also, the two examples of Regional Accident Investigation 
Organisations (RAIOs) that Costa talks about have 19 States within them that 
do not do their own investigations. Therefore, although 45 different States have 
participated in this research, the percentage of the sample from the population 
is actually unknown. 
The researcher contacted Costa to obtain a fixed number or a percentage of the 
number of States that do not do their own investigations but could not get a 
clear answer. 
Instead, the aircraft traffic around the world was used to understand how 
representative the sample is in this research. The world’s aircraft traffic data are 
available from the ICAO website. Table ‎5-2 shows the Global traffic for 2009-
2010 as published by ICAO. 
Table ‎5-1 countries responded to survey 
ANTIGUA & 
DEPS 
AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM BOLIVIA 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY 
ITALY LATVIA LIBYA LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG 
PAKISTAN POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
SUDAN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TUNISIA TURKEY 
BULGARIA CANADA CROATIA ESTONIA UGANDA 
GREECE HUNGARY ICELAND 
IRELAND 
(REPUBLIC) 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
MACEDONIA MALAYSIA MOROCCO NETHERLANDS 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
HONG KONG 
SAR 
SERBIA SINGAPORE SLOVAKIA 
UNITED 
STATES 
According to ICAO’s statistics shown in Table ‎5-2 and Table ‎5-3, the 45 
countries covered represent more than 66% of the estimated world traffic for 
2010, and more than 68% of actual world traffic for 2009. 
 115 
 
Table ‎5-2 Global Traffic by Country 2009-2010 (Source: ICAOdata website) 
 
Increase Increase Increase Increase
Rank or Rank or Rank or Rank or
Country or group number decrease number decrease number decrease number decrease
of countries in 2010 2010 2009 (%) in 2010 2010 2009 (%) in 2010 2010 2009 (%) in 2010 2010 2009 (%)
United States 1 156,286 147,819 6 1 59,641 54,372 10 1 1,299,874 1,256,996 3 1 394,281 372,738 6
China
2 
2 53,302 42,155 26 6 18,871 12,618 50 2 400,610 334,762 20 10 73,488 55,348 33
          Hong Kong SAR
3
16,189 16,966 -5 16,189 16,966 -5 85,811 89,019 -4 85,811 89,019 -4
         Macao SAR
4
246 240 3 246 240 3 2,106 2,078 1 2,106 2,078 1
Germany 3 29,518 26,796 10 2 28,489 25,818 10 4 202,047 202,681 0 3 191,037 192,489 -1
United Arab Emirates 4 28,347 23,126 23 3 28,347 23,126 23 5 186,821 154,561 21 4 186,821 154,561 21
United Kingdom 5 23,650 23,453 1 4 23,053 22,785 1 3 229,649 230,644 0 2 221,953 222,319 0
Republic of Korea 6 21,175 16,166 31 5 20,724 15,696 32 13 91,759 83,459 10 9 87,121 78,470 11
Japan 7 20,401 18,170 12 9 14,470 12,665 14 7 138,079 127,859 8 11 72,212 66,575 8
France 8 19,543 19,150 2 7 17,837 17,370 3 6 154,761 154,407 0 5 136,493 135,601 1
Singapore 9 14,788 13,997 6 8 14,788 13,997 6 17 87,674 84,514 4 8 87,674 84,514 4
Netherlands 10 13,845 12,500 11 10 13,845 12,500 11 16 87,696 84,575 4 7 87,695 84,575 4
Russian Federation 11 13,474 9,918 36 14 7,614 5,168 47 9 109,435 83,828 31 16 52,616 37,143 42
Canada 12 13,144 11,904 10 12 8,017 6,942 15 8 115,793 107,371 8 12 68,167 60,979 12
Australia 13 11,388 11,652 -2 17 6,721 6,923 -3 12 96,579 100,515 -4 19 46,902 50,061 -6
India 14 10,578 8,944 18 20 5,990 5,086 18 11 99,692 85,788 16 18 49,885 43,773 14
Brazil 15 10,451 7,364 42 25 3,377 2,464 37 14 90,846 74,049 23 25 22,777 20,649 10
Spain 16 9,367 8,276 13 15 7,424 6,369 17 15 88,300 80,094 10 13 68,079 59,782 14
Ireland 17 9,229 7,370 25 11 9,225 7,366 25 10 100,664 80,502 25 6 100,633 80,462 25
Thailand 18 7,844 6,964 13 16 7,359 6,590 19 19 57,201 54,106 6 14 53,257 49,337 8
Qatar 19 7,723 5,621 37 13 7,723 5,621 37 20 52,733 40,408 31 15 52,733 40,408 31
Turkey 20 7,351 6,420 14 18 6,139 5,230 17 18 64,800 57,488 13 17 51,475 44,717 15
Malaysia 21 7,140 6,207 15 19 6,137 5,251 17 21 51,564 45,532 13 20 40,719 35,020 16
Italy 22 5,645 5,151 10 23 4,383 4,187 5 22 50,446 43,951 15 23 37,341 34,084 10
Switzerland 23 5,314 4,371 22 21 5,299 4,358 22 25 40,564 33,698 20 21 40,408 33,552 20
Luxembourg 24 5,234 4,696 11 22 5,234 4,696 11 111 529 483 10 110 529 483 10
Scandinavia
5
25 4,761 4,303 11 24 4,150 3,729 11 24 43,748 41,449 6 22 37,387 35,447 5
Indonesia 26 4,370 3,836 14 45 1,329 1,097 21 23 46,974 37,675 25 38 12,660 9,443 34
Saudi Arabia 27 4,102 3,746 9 26 3,224 2,902 11 27 30,758 28,891 6 27 21,842 20,248 8
South Africa 28 3,554 3,379 5 28 2,676 2,501 7 26 31,012 29,700 4 26 22,101 20,804 6
(passengers, freight and mail) PASSENGER-KILOMETRES PERFORMED (millions)
Total operations 
Table 5.    Tonne-kilometres and passenger-kilometres performed on scheduled services
(countries and groups of countries whose airlines performed more than 100 million total tonne-kilometres in 2010
1
)
International operations
TONNE-KILOMETRES PERFORMED (millions)
(international and domestic) International operations
Total operations 
(international and domestic)
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Philippines 29 3,438 2,684 28 30 2,590 1,899 36 28 28,084 25,364 11 29 20,196 16,910 19
Chile 30 3,140 2,769 13 33 2,495 2,204 13 33 19,200 17,523 10 39 12,628 11,822 7
Colombia 31 3,097 2,499 24 32 2,495 1,977 26 42 14,760 13,983 6 44 9,596 9,005 7
New Zealand 32 3,083 3,249 -5 27 2,804 2,922 -4 30 25,512 25,358 1 28 21,809 21,736 0
Portugal 33 2,728 2,367 15 31 2,509 2,144 17 29 25,918 22,656 14 24 23,735 20,448 16
Israel 34 2,680 2,375 13 29 2,610 2,348 11 36 18,369 16,757 10 32 17,477 16,454 6
Finland 35 2,456 2,159 14 34 2,361 2,056 15 34 18,947 18,374 3 31 17,883 17,233 4
Austria 36 2,358 2,210 7 35 2,337 2,191 7 32 19,293 17,965 7 30 19,077 17,776 7
Viet Nam 37 2,344 1,797 30 42 1,439 1,065 35 31 21,095 16,531 28 37 12,721 9,530 33
Mexico 38 2,306 2,404 -4 39 1,680 1,715 -2 35 18,546 20,831 -11 41 12,079 13,616 -11
Belgium 39 2,221 1,843 21 36 2,221 1,843 21 48 8,609 7,079 22 47 8,609 7,079 22
Egypt 39 2,186 1,820 20 37 2,074 1,776 17 37 18,217 16,326 12 34 17,123 15,845 8
Bahrain 41 1,773 1,893 -6 38 1,773 1,893 -6 44 12,753 13,950 -9 36 12,753 13,949 -9
Iran (Islamic Republic of Of) 42 1,683 1,373 23 49 943 635 49 39 16,322 14,487 13 51 7,770 6,333 23
Ethiopia 43 1,671 1,478 13 40 1,653 1,460 13 45 10,875 9,746 12 42 10,681 9,562 12
Morocco 44 1,652 1,501 10 41 1,614 1,471 10 38 17,557 15,797 11 33 17,141 15,474 11
Pakistan 45 1,554 1,515 3 44 1,374 1,331 3 43 14,326 13,779 4 40 12,581 12,047 4
Argentina 46 1,501 1,225 23 50 932 716 30 41 15,158 11,997 26 46 8,808 6,418 37
Hungary 47 1,421 1,204 18 43 1,421 1,204 18 40 15,512 13,115 18 35 15,512 13,115 18
Sri Lanka 48 1,180 988 19 46 1,180 988 19 47 9,338 7,750 20 45 9,338 7,750 20
Kuwait 49 1,003 1,004 0 47 1,003 1,004 0 52 7,886 7,962 -1 49 7,886 7,962 -1
Peru 50 992 909 9 53 762 646 18 50 8,458 8,765 -4 56 6,056 5,911 2
Kenya 51 986 987 0 48 967 965 0 51 8,257 7,925 4 48 8,026 7,695 4
Greece 52 921 917 0 55 725 734 -1 49 8,563 8,900 -4 53 6,557 7,083 -7
Panama 53 912 916 0 51 912 916 0 46 10,138 10,175 0 43 10,138 10,175 0
Jordan 54 877 747 17 52 875 746 17 53 7,805 6,734 16 50 7,789 6,721 16
Mauritius 55 762 668 14 54 756 663 14 56 6,320 5,605 13 55 6,257 5,551 13
Poland 56 736 700 5 56 715 681 5 54 7,710 7,169 8 52 7,453 6,939 7
Ukraine 57 707 588 20 57 659 536 23 55 6,980 5,880 19 54 6,454 5,311 22
Uzbekistan 58 657 507 29 58 627 482 30 58 5,567 4,775 17 59 5,249 4,505 17
Brunei Darussalam 59 603 454 33 59 603 454 33 59 5,260 3,885 35 58 5,260 3,885 35
Czech Republic 60 564 601 -6 60 562 598 -6 57 6,014 6,350 -5 57 5,994 6,324 -5
Oman 61 530 431 23 62 496 404 23 60 5,129 4,308 19 61 4,763 4,016 19
Bangladesh 62 521 623 -16 61 517 620 -17 62 4,905 4,953 -1 60 4,872 4,927 -1
Kazakhstan 63 495 455 9 70 308 283 9 61 4,905 4,529 8 72 2,987 2,760 8
Fiji 64 428 368 17 63 424 363 17 66 3,855 3,230 19 64 3,802 3,182 19
Romania 65 421 377 12 65 402 359 12 64 4,438 3,960 12 62 4,218 3,762 12
Algeria 66 406 365 11 68 347 299 16 63 4,554 4,033 13 65 3,762 3,302 14
Cyprus 67 403 412 -2 64 403 412 -2 65 4,070 4,163 -2 63 4,070 4,163 -2
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Iceland 68 398 424 -6 66 398 424 -6 72 3,180 3,445 -8 70 3,180 3,445 -8
Lebanon 69 377 366 3 67 377 366 3 71 3,182 3,075 3 69 3,182 3,075 3
Ecuador 70 340 476 -29 75 228 360 -37 74 2,837 4,248 -33 80 1,473 2,954 -50
Latvia 71 311 283 10 69 311 283 10 67 3,591 2,993 20 66 3,591 2,993 20
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 72 308 309 0 73 280 277 1 69 3,384 3,293 3 71 3,111 2,920 7
El Salvador 73 299 332 -10 71 299 331 -10 70 3,223 3,516 -8 68 3,219 3,511 -8
Tunisia 74 295 330 -11 72 295 330 -11 68 3,510 3,252 8 67 3,510 3,252 8
Trinidad and Tobago 75 256 279 -8 73 241 255 -5 76 2,718 2,879 -6 74 2,675 2,828 -5
Venezuela 76 249 230 8 91 99 91 8 75 2,765 2,551 8 90 1,069 987 8
Malta 76 249 230 8 74 249 230 8 73 2,949 2,529 17 73 2,949 2,529 17
Yemen 78 237 218 9 76 228 210 9 78 2,448 2,258 8 76 2,357 2,175 8
Costa Rica 79 228 215 6 78 225 213 6 77 2,582 2,877 -10 75 2,555 2,854 -10
Tajikistan 80 205 189 8 80 192 182 6 80 2,166 2,005 8 78 2,084 1,928 8
Jamaica 81 202 206 -2 79 201 206 -2 79 2,187 2,241 -2 77 2,187 2,241 -2
Cuba 82 199 184 8 81 189 175 8 84 1,538 1,427 8 81 1,462 1,357 8
Nigeria 83 183 169 8 97 90 80 12 81 2,121 1,873 13 97 879 870 1
Syrian Arab Republic 84 162 132 23 82 159 129 23 87 1,468 1,415 4 82 1,437 1,385 4
Bolivia 85 153 132 16 90 106 95 12 83 1,570 1,519 3 91 1,050 1,021 3
Angola 86 147 126 16 84 137 119 15 100 760 680 12 101 671 605 11
Suriname 87 146 136 8 83 146 136 8 92 1,121 1,131 -1 87 1,121 1,131 -1
Myanmar 88 145 134 9 89 108 98 11 82 1,611 1,470 10 85 1,200 1,093 10
Namibia 89 139 171 -19 85 137 168 -18 85 1,498 1,668 -10 79 1,473 1,640 -10
Azerbaijan 90 136 122 12 86 135 110 23 89 1,428 1,274 12 84 1,416 1,148 23
Seychelles 91 134 182 -26 87 134 181 -26 88 1,431 1,452 -1 83 1,425 1,446 -1
Turkmenistan 92 132 185 -29 91 102 126 -19 86 1,475 1,955 -25 88 1,088 1,310 -17
Armenia 93 114 103 11 88 114 103 11 90 1,194 1,074 11 86 1,194 1,074 11
Papua New Guinea 94 112 94 20 102 68 56 21 95 997 728 37 108 544 386 41
Madagascar 95 109 88 24 94 99 79 25 96 983 819 20 98 872 719 21
Bulgaria 96 104 115 -9 92 100 111 -10 91 1,126 1,248 -10 89 1,083 1,202 -10
Total for above countries (98) 
6
601,419 538,201 12 414,536 365,157 14 4,668,771 4,324,648 8 2,859,370 2,635,036 9
Total for other countries 1,611 1,455 1,449 1,315 16,131 15,070 14,436 13,505
Total for 190 ICAO Member States 603,031 539,655 12 415,985 366,472 14 4,684,902 4,339,719 8 2,873,806 2,648,541 9
1. Most 2010 data are estimates, thus the ranking and the rate of increase or decrease may change when final data become available.
2. For statistical purposes, the data for China excludes the traffic for the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR), and that of the Taiwan province of China.
Source.—  ICAO Air Transport Reporting Form A plus ICAO estimates for non-reporting States.
3. Traffic for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).
4. Traffic for the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR).
5. Three States – Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
6. Includes the States listed in note 5.
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Table ‎5-3 Traffic data for the 34 States that participated in this research’s survey 
(extracted from Table ‎5-2) 
Country 2010 (Estimated) 2009 
United States 156,286 147,819 
          Hong Kong SAR3 16,189 16,966 
Germany 29,518 26,796 
United Arab Emirates 28,347 23,126 
United Kingdom 23,650 23,453 
France 19,543 19,150 
Singapore 14,788 13,997 
Netherlands 13,845 12,500 
Russian Federation 13,474 9,918 
Canada 13,144 11,904 
Australia 11,388 11,652 
Ireland 9,229 7,370 
Turkey 7,351 6,420 
Malaysia 7,140 6,207 
Italy 5,645 5,151 
Switzerland 5,314 4,371 
Luxembourg 5,234 4,696 
Portugal 2,728 2,367 
Finland 2,456 2,159 
Austria 2,358 2,210 
Belgium 2,221 1,843 
Morocco 1,652 1,501 
Pakistan 1,554 1,515 
Hungary 1,421 1,204 
Greece 921 917 
Poland 736 700 
Czech Republic 564 601 
Romania 421 377 
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Country 2010 (Estimated) 2009 
Iceland 398 424 
Latvia 311 283 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 308 309 
Tunisia 295 330 
Bolivia 153 132 
Bulgaria 104 115 
Total for 190 ICAO Member 
States 
603,031 539,655 
Total for survey sample (34 
States) 
398,686 368,483 
   
Sample's Traffic percentage of the Total 
Global Traffic 
66.11% 68.28% 
Note that only 34 countries out of the participating 45 countries are listed in 
Table ‎5-2. The traffic data were extracted for the 34 ICAO Member States and 
the percentage of this traffic out of the total global traffic was calculated as 
shown in Table ‎5-3. Even without taking into account the missing data for 11 
States out of the 45 total States represented in the survey, the total aircraft 
traffic in the 34 States represents more than 66% of the total global traffic in 
2010 (estimated), and more than 68% of the total global traffic in 2009. Also 
note that out of the total sample’s traffic percentage, the US alone represents 
39.2% of the 2010 (estimated) global traffic, and 40.11% of the 2009 Global 
traffic. However, this should not be a problem because the US covers a huge 
area and has a huge aviation industry. 
ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system was used to collect 
data about number of accident (commercial and non-commercial) per each 
participating State. The results are shown in Table ‎5-4. ICAO-ADREP website 
explains that the database “…contains all official accident and incidents which 
were officially notified to ICAO by the States as per ICAO Annex 13 since 1st of 
January 2000. The list also contains unofficial reports, collected by ICAO 
through other sources.”  
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Table ‎5-4 shows that the states participating in this research represent about 
63% of the accidents in the world.  
Table ‎5-4 Number of Accidents by Country Since 2000 ( Source: ICAO ADREP 
Database – last access in December 2013) 
ICAO-State 
Total Number of Accidents 
(Commercial and Non-
Commercial) 
Total Number of Fatalities 
(Commercial and Non-
Commercial) 
WORLD (general) 8877 16964 
Australia 184 118 
Germany 184 224 
UK 140 107 
Poland 17 6 
Finland 3 0 
UAE 15 65 
Portugal 23 17 
Lithuania 2 0 
Serbia 0 0 
Ireland 22 8 
Switzerland 62 68 
USA 3675 2361 
Greece 9 130 
Hungary 16 4 
Singapore 7 0 
Denmark 13 3 
Italy 120 315 
Romania 14 7 
Austria 17 28 
Sweden 33 7 
Russia 163 960 
Netherlands 16 19 
Czech R. 8 0 
Estonia 6 18 
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ICAO-State Total Number of Accidents 
(Commercial and Non-
Commercial) 
Total Number of Fatalities 
(Commercial and Non-
Commercial) 
Iceland 4 3 
Bulgaria 24 3 
Latvia 1 1 
Canada 476 198 
Croatia 2 0 
Pakistan 10 217 
France 192 367 
Luxembourg 3 20 
Hong Kong No Data No Data 
Slovakia 4 5 
Bolivia 15 19 
Belgium 6 11 
Antigua 2 0 
Sudan 40 108 
Turkey 23 211 
Morocco 9 13 
Macedonia No Data No Data 
Malaysia 15 5 
Libya 6 231 
Tunisia 5 16 
Uganda 5 16 
Sum of accidents in all States 5591 
Percentage of all accident in all participating 
States to the total number of accidents in the 
world 
62.983% 
In conclusion and based on the above analysis, this sample is found to be 
representative of the whole population. 
5.4.11 Difficulties of Data Collection 
Collecting data from qualified personnel has proved to be a very difficult task in 
this research. Because the research is about ICAO Member States, the logical 
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place to find contact details is from the ICAO website. The website was 
consulted first for a list of contact details but the list found was to be out-of-date. 
The researcher contacted ICAO directly asking for an updated list. The 
researcher was directed to another list and was told that it is the latest and most 
up-to-date list. 
However, even this “latest and most up-to-date” list has many problems. An 
email with a link to the electronic survey was sent to all emails shown on the list. 
There were many “wrong email address” automatic replies, and those emails 
that were apparently working emails did not reply. The researcher managed to 
send to the few working faxes on the list; however, very few replied. 
The link to the electronic survey was posted on several aviation safety related 
groups in LinkedIn; however, the response rate did not improve. 
After that, the researcher contacted former UK Chief Inspector, and asked for 
his help for a valid contact list and to write a letter of introduction so that people 
could trust giving information for purposes of the research. The letter was used 
to invite experts from different countries to participate in the survey. This 
actually worked to a certain extent. Although the link to the survey was sent to 
many more emails and faxes, only 68 persons participated in the survey 
representing 45 different countries. 
It is not clear why the majority of the invited recipients did not participate. One 
reason could be the length of the questionnaire. Another could be the sensitivity 
of the information given. It could also be that these professionals are very busy 
and cannot spare time to reply to surveys. 
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6 DEVELOPMENT OF A MEASURING TOOL FOR THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
Although ICAO imposes requirements to ensure investigation independence, it 
does not specify a definition for this independence. The requirements for 
independence have been emphasised even more in the new 10th edition of 
ICAO Annex 13, published in July 2010. In order to elicit reasonable measures, 
a definition to clarify the meaning of independence in the context of accident 
investigation must be either introduced by this research or selected from the 
different definitions in the existing literature. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there have been several attempts to define 
‘independence of accident investigation’. The definition that will be used for the 
purposes of this study is the one proposed by the Road Strategy for Accident in 
Transport (ROSAT). 
Therefore, this study will look at the three different dimensions mentioned in the 
ROSAT definition; structural independence, financial independence, and 
functional independence. 
Moreover, because the aim is to measure the independence of air accident 
investigation in ICAO Member States, this research proposes a fourth 
dimension which will be referred to as ‘operational’ independence (see Figure 
‎6-1). The “operational dimension” encompasses the two sides of the 
independence of investigation authorities; legal or regulatory and political. 
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Figure ‎6-1 Four Dimensions Measuring Index (4DMI) model for measuring the 
independence of aircraft accident investigation 
Each of the four ‘dimensions’ shown in the model in Figure ‎6-1 will be measured 
using different ‘variables’ or ‘indicators’ that can estimate the level of 
independence of the specified dimension. The model will be referred to as 4DMI 
throughout this research. The proposed model is not a measure of “compliance” 
with ICAO Annex 13; therefore, it is not a replacement for the ICAO USOAP 
Audit, which is a measure of compliance.  
6.1 4DMI Model Development 
Figure ‎6-1 above shows the 4DMI model. At first, the researcher look at ICAO’s 
accident investigation model to understand the dimension it considers. ICAO’s 
focus found to be on the functional dimension only. However, it is understood 
that this is the “minimum” compliance needed from each ICAO-Member States. 
ICAO also considers that some States do not have the capability or the 
resources to comply with an accident investigation model that considers 
different dimensions, at least for the time being. But this should not stop this 
research from exploring a wider understanding of this vague concept. 
Functional 
Financial 
Operational 
Structural 
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Next, the research analyzed ICAO-Annex 13, which encompasses the 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that ICAO believes will lead 
to good and impartial accident investigations results when correctly 
implemented by Member States. The analysis showed that there are 12 
different “elements” impeded within the SARPs that are related to the 
independence of accident investigation as shown in Table ‎4-1. These elements 
can be attributed to different dimensions, however, not all of the SARPs 
emphasising these elements are obligatory. Only the ones concerned with the 
functional dimension of the independence of aircraft accident investigations are 
obligatory.  
Next, looking back at the adopted definition of independence in this research, 
the Structural Dimension was considered and related indicators were added to 
the measuring index. Also, Financial dimension’s indicators were considered 
and added to the measuring index. The financial capability of the accident 
investigations authority has a clear effect on how the authority ensures its 
independence and the independence of its investigations. Therefore, this effect 
needs to be measured to correctly consider the big picture of investigation 
independence. 
Then, the idea was developed to include the legality that is needed to ensure 
that the functional independence is respected within a Member State. 
Therefore, related indicators were added to the measuring index. Later on, 
related legal dimension’s indicators for the Structural and Financial dimensions 
were added. 
After that, the political dimension came into the picture because it has the power 
to interfere with, or support the independence of aircraft accident investigations 
regardless if there were regulations/legislations already in place to support the 
investigations independence or not. The combination of both Legal and Political 
Dimensions are referred to as Operational Dimension in this research. 
The concept of independence must be taken as a “whole”. It cannot be 
successful if parts only are favoured and the rest is ignored. By looking at the 
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model in Figure ‎6-1, it can be seen that the “Operational Dimension” (both 
Political and Legal) is in the heart of the model. Each of the other dimensions in 
the 4DMI has one of its sides in touch with the Operational Dimension which is 
in the centre. This is to say that each of the dimensions (Structural, Financial, 
and Functional) should have solid Legal and/or Political support. The stronger 
the support (in the form of Regulations/Legislations, international agreements, 
memorandum of understandings (MoU), …etc), the stronger the independence 
of the setup of the accident investigation body.  
The process of building a new independent body should start at the centre of 
the model by establishing the necessary regulations/legislations, with enough 
political support. Starting with the Operational dimension, good independence 
practices related to each of the Functional, Structural, and Financial dimensions 
should be documented formally when possible, and encouraged in case of 
informal practices. 
It should be noted that each dimension has elements from other dimensions. 
Structural practices, for example, can have some elements of Financial and/or 
Functional dimensions. However, in this case, the elements of Structural 
dimension would be dominant in these particular practices. This again suggests 
that successful setup should consider the model as a whole. 
Usually the independence of the three dimensions (Functional, Structural, and 
Financial) can be controlled and ensured by the accident investigation body 
itself. However, the Operational Dimension usual necessitates the coordination 
with other bodies such as the Judicial and Political systems in that State. It is 
crucially important that other bodies (judicial/police/legal/political) understand 
the importance of ensuring the independence of the air accident investigations, 
and the independence of the investigating agency itself, in order to ensure the 
highest level of aviation safety. 
The judicial authorities specifically have the ability to hamper the independence 
of the air accident investigations and, therefore, must be fully informed of the 
massive consequences of their cooperation, or failure of cooperation. It is 
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equally crucial that the independent accident investigation body shows their 
understanding of the needs for the judicial system to investigate with the 
intention to blame and punish when necessary.  
The political system’s power must also be respected and acknowledged by the 
independent investigation body and an understanding must be reached to keep 
this power from affecting the independence of the accident investigation body. 
All these understandings must be documented in some way or another to give 
them some power and engrave them in the heart of all practices in the 
independent accident investigation body. This is the only way that can ensure a 
functional “just culture” within an ICAO-Member State.  
Proper regulations/legislations must be in place to ensure the benefits of 
independent investigations. For example, without the proper regulations in 
place, witnesses could be blamed for self-incriminating information they 
provided in an accident investigation if this information was used in judicial 
proceeding even if it had been years after the conclusion of the safety 
investigation.  
Table ‎6-1 shows the questions used in the 4DMI and their dimensions colour-
coded for easy reference. The table also shows the location of each question in 
the original questionnaire and its location in the 4DMI tool after being 
rearranged. 
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Table ‎6-1 Identifying Dimensions of each question in 4DMI 
  Colour Codes 
 
Structural 
Functional 
Financial 
Operational (Legal) 
Operational 
(Political) 
Q # in 
questionnaire 
Q # in 
4DMI 
Tool 
Question Dimension 
3 1 State has permanent accident 
Investigation agency? 
Structural 
6 2 Agency (physically) separate from 
regulator 
Structural 
7 3 Agency (generally) separated from 
operation authorities 
Structural 
  Specific separations from 
Operation authorities 
 
9 4 Internal organisation decided by:  Operational (Political) 
10 5 Personnel policy (hire, fire, etc) 
decided by: 
Operational (Political) 
12 6 Is there a Law or Reg to prevent 
use of safety findings in judicial 
inquiry? 
Operational (Legal) 
14 7 Who appoints head of Agency? Operational (Political) 
15 8 Whom he reports to? Structural 
16 9 Independence of Agency formally 
stated? 
Operational (Legal) 
18 10 Can politicians decide which 
accident to investigate? 
Operational (Political) 
19 11 Can politicians stop ongoing 
investigation? 
Operational (Political) 
24 12 Does the Agency require approval 
to release report? 
Operational (Legal) 
25 13 Can Agency launch investigation 
without prior permission? 
Operational (Legal) 
27 14 Investigators have 
immediate/unrestricted access to 
evidence WITHOUT prior consent? 
Operational (Legal) 
28 15 Agency’s investigation procedures Operational (Legal) 
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specified in: 
34 16 Agency has ready access to 
sufficient funds for proper 
investigations (within 
responsibilities of agency)? 
Financial 
  Funding for Agency’s investigation 
is: 
 
34 17 Independent of political pressure? Financial 
34 18 Independent of other influences? Financial 
36 19 Law in place forcing Agency to 
release documents to public? 
Operational (Legal) 
37 20 Regulations specify types of 
accidents & incidents that must be 
investigated? 
Operational (Legal) 
38 21 Can Agency decide to investigate 
occurrences outside its mandate? 
Operational (Legal) 
39 22 Who determines the scope of 
investigation? 
Functional 
40 23 Who determines the method of 
investigation 
Functional 
41 24 Who has 1st access to witnesses? Operational (Legal) 
42 25 State has regulations to protect 
witnesses’ confidentiality? 
Operational (Legal) 
43 26 Who speaks to media on behalf of 
Agency? 
Structural 
44 27 Who controls/reviews Agency’s 
budget? 
Financial 
46 28 Agency is dependent on outside 
support to conduct its 
investigations? 
Financial 
47 29 Budgetary resources of Agency 
considered: 
Financial 
8 30 Are there employees (from 
industry) on loan or working part-
time for the agency? 
Structural 
13 31 Head of Agency term in office? Operational (Political) 
  If not permanent, is appointment 
renewable? 
 
17 32 Does the agency have a Board? Structural 
  Board Members:  
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  Does Agency have:  
20 33 Flight Recorder readout facilities? Functional 
21 34 Material failure analysis facilities? Functional 
22 35 Voluntary incident reporting 
system? 
Functional 
23 36 Safety Database? Functional 
23 37 Is data in this Database available 
to others? 
Functional 
23 38 Who pays for data collection for 
Database? 
Financial 
26 39 How do you know if Agency’s 
investigations are perceived by 
public as credible and partial? 
Operational (Legal) 
29 40 Salaries of investigators are: Financial 
30 41 According to regulations in your 
State, determination of causation 
is: 
Operational (Legal) 
32 42 Regulations clearly state that 
investigators are not to testify in 
courts...? 
Operational (Legal) 
33 43 Agency recommendations 
acceptance rate measured?  
Functional 
The four dimensions of the 4DMI are defined as follows: 
 Structural Dimension: where the answers show how the structure or 
setup of the investigation agency supports, or not, the independence of 
the investigation. 
 Financial Dimension: where the answers are related to financial 
independence of the investigation authority. 
 Functional Dimension: where the answers show how independent the 
investigation body is in performing its primary function: investigation. 
 Operational Dimension: is about legal (or regulatory) and political 
issues. 
There are 43 questions in total used in the measuring tool but the total number 
of points is 47 points because the first question is given five points. The reason 
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for giving five points to the first question regarding “permanent accident 
investigation agency” is because it is the most fundamental feature of an 
independent accident investigation authority, and to put a clear gap between the 
States that have it and those who do not. This question is very important to this 
research and also an important indicator of the independence of the accident 
investigation agency in a State. To learn more about accident investigation 
independence from the States that rank high in the 4DMI tool, this important 
question was given five times the score to make sure the high ranking states 
are actually those that have dedicated accident investigation authorities, and to 
reduce the chances that a State could rank higher because of the way the 
participants answered other questions.  
6.1.1 Weight of Dimensions in the 4DMI Tool 
The questions are divided into four dimensions as shown below: 
 Functional = 8 questions  (8 points / 47 = 17.02%) 
 Structural =  7 questions   (11 points / 47 = 23.40%) 
 Financial =  8 questions   (8 points / 47 = 17.02%) 
 Operational = 20 questions  (20 points / 47 = 42.55%) 
Operational dimension was further divided into legal (regulatory) and political 
dimensions.  
 Operational-Legal (or regulatory): if the question is about the legality of 
an issue or to check if it is protected by regulation.  
 Operational-Political: to measure the influence of politicians.  
There are six questions within the Operational dimension classified as 
indicators for political related issues, and 14 classified as legal or regulatory 
related. Therefore, the new classification for the questions used in the 
measuring tool becomes as follows: 
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 Functional =    8 points/ 47 =  17.02% 
 Structural =     11 points/ 47 =  23.40% 
 Financial =     8 points /47 =  17.02% 
 Operational-Political =   6 points /47 =  12.76% 
 Operational-Legal =   14 points /47 =  29.79% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total =        99.99% 
Just by inspecting the number of questions in each dimension it can be seen 
that there is more emphasis on the Operational dimension (42.55%), and 
especially on the Operational-Legal (regulatory) part of it (29.79%). 
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7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Results from the 4DMI 
Appendix D. Figure D-1 shows the 4DMI indicators (questions) and their 
answers and scores in a single Microsoft Excel datasheet. The scores for each 
indicator, based on survey answers from all of the 68 participation, are shown in 
the datasheet. Answers for all dimensions (Structural, Functional, Financial, and 
Operational) are shown in the datasheet along with the participants’ random ID 
numbers, percentage of Total Score, and RANKs.  
The following steps are taken to apply the 4DMI measuring technique and 
examine the survey data: 
1- The results from each dimension alone will be analyzed. 
2- Unique participation per each ICAO-Member State (45 States) will 
be identified and the rest of the participation will be filtered. 
3- The 4DMI is divided into three categories of independence: High, 
Average, and Low independence. Based on their 4DMI “Total 
Score”, States within each category will be identified. 
4- States’ scores within each category are analysed. 
5- States’ practices within each category are analysed to identify 
common practices of these States. 
6- The differences between the High Independence category and the 
Low Independence Category are also examined. 
7- The effects of the scores from each dimension are examined in 
two ways: 
a) By removing the scores of a single dimension at a time, 
and keeping the rest of scores. 
b) By examining the scores from a single dimension alone. 
The conclusions and key finding will be identified at the end. 
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7.1.1 Structural Dimension Results  
Structural Dimension: where the answers show how the structure of the 
investigation agency/setup supports, or hampers, the independence of the 
investigation authority. 
Table ‎7-1 Questions related to Structural Dimension 
Original 
# 
# in 4DMI 
Tool 
Question Dimension 
3 1 Does your State have a permanent 
accident investigation 
authority/body/agency? 
Structural 
6 2 Is the accident investigation authority 
physically separate from the Civil 
Aviation Authority (Regulator)? 
Structural 
7 3 Is the accident investigation authority 
separate from the operation 
authority/authorities (airport, air 
navigation, air traffic controller)? 
Structural 
  Separation details of Investigation 
Authorities from Operation Authorities  
 
15 8 To whom does the head of the 
accident investigation agency report? 
Structural 
43 26 In the event of an accident, who 
speaks to the media on behalf of the 
accident investigation agency? 
Structural 
8 1 Are there any employees from the 
industry (e.g. manufacturers, 
operators, or others) on loan or 
working part-time for the accident 
investigation authority? 
Structural 
17 3 Does the agency have a Board? Structural 
  Board Members: (details)  
The issue of having a permanent authority to deal with accident investigations 
has been discussed in chapter 2. The USOAP results mentioned in chapter 2 
discussed some ICAO Member States having trouble with this issue. Some 
States have not established any permanent authority or office to be in charge of 
accident and incident investigations. The USOAP audit also noted that there are 
several States that do not have the capability to establish an investigation 
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system on their own, and do not have guidance on how to cooperate with other 
States in this matter. 
Moreover, articles 3 and 4 of the EU Regulation 996/2010 require each EU 
Member State to have a permanent, functionally independent body to 
investigation accidents and serious incidents in civil aviation. 
To explore this issue, this survey asks the following questions: 
 Does your State have a permanent accident investigation 
authority/body/agency? 
 Is the accident investigation authority physically separate from the Civil 
Aviation Authority (Regulator)? 
 Is the accident investigation authority separate from the operation 
authority/authorities (airport, air navigation, air traffic controller)? 
 What are the separation details of Investigation Authorities from 
Operation Authorities 
Table ‎7-2 Does your State have a permanent accident investigation 
authority/body/agency? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Yes 62 91.2 91.2 
No 6 8.8 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
As shown in Table ‎7-2, more than 91% of the respondents indicated that their 
countries have a permanent accident investigation authority. However, when 
asked if the accident investigation authority is physically separate from the 
regulator, 72% out of the whole sample (100% of the respondents) answered 
yes (see Table ‎7-3 and Figure ‎7-1). 
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Table ‎7-3 Is the accident investigation authority physically separate from the 
Civil Aviation Authority (Regulator)? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
No, they are located in the same 
building 
18 26.5 26.5 
Yes, they are separated in different 
buildings 
49 72.1 98.5 
Don't know 1 1.5 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
 
Figure ‎7-1 Is the accident investigation authority physically separate from the 
Civil Aviation Authority (Regulator)? 
When the respondents were asked if the accident investigation authority in their 
State is separate from the operation authorities (airlines, ground support, traffic 
control, etc.), 82.4% (out of 100% of the respondents) said “Yes” and 13% said 
“No” (see Table ‎7-4). 
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The respondents to this question were then asked (if they answered yes) about 
the details of this separation. Note that the respondents were allowed to choose 
from the following options: 
(select all that apply) 
 Functionally separated (the accident investigation authority doing its own 
function only) 
 Structurally separated (they are not in the same organisational structure) 
 Physically separated (located in separate buildings) 
 Physically separated (located in the same building but on different floors) 
Table ‎7-4 Separation from the operation authority/ 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
No, they are not separated 9 13.2 13.2 
Yes, they are separated 56 82.4 95.6 
Don't know 3 4.4 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
The answers were rearranged for the purpose of SPSS analysis and the results 
are as shown in Table ‎7-5 and Figure ‎7-2.  
Out of the 82.4% that said yes in Table ‎7-4; 
 22.1% (No response) 
 20.6% said (functionally) separated 
 5.9% said (structurally) separated 
 2.9% said (physically) separated 
 2.9% said (functionally and physically (in different buildings)) separated 
 44.1% said (functionally, structurally and physically) separated 
The results suggest that the focus in many ICAO Member States is on the 
separation from the CAA. Moreover, this separation from the CAA is focused on 
“functional” and “structural” separation; however, less emphasis is given to 
physical separation. 
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It should be noted that these results do not take into account the repeated 
entries for the same country (e.g. US seven entries, UK six entries). The results 
give the perception of the participants and, therefore, it is important to keep all 
the entries to measure the perception of the people individually as their 
understanding and experience is what this research aims to document. 
Table ‎7-5 Separation details of Investigation Authorities from Operation 
Authorities 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not separate or No 
response 
15 22.1 22.1 
Functionally 14 20.6 42.6 
Structurally (not in the same 
organisational structure) 
4 5.9 48.5 
Physically (located in 
separate buildings) 
2 2.9 51.5 
Functionally and Physically 
in different buildings 
2 2.9 54.4 
Structurally and Physically 
(different Buildings) 
1 1.5 55.9 
Functionally, Structurally 
and Physically (different 
Buildings) 
30 44.1 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
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Figure ‎7-2 Separation details of Investigation Authorities from Operation 
Authorities 
About 53% of the participants indicated that the accident investigation 
authorities in their States do not have employees from the industry that are “on 
loan” or working “part-time”, which may suggest that these authorities are 
structured in a way that makes them less dependent on (higher independence 
from) the industry to fulfil their intended function (see Table ‎7-6 and Figure ‎7-3).  
Table ‎7-6 On loan or part-time employees 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Yes 23 33.8 33.8 
No 36 52.9 86.8 
Don't know 9 13.2 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
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Figure ‎7-3 On loan or part-time employees 
When asked “to whom does the head of the agency report”, 61.76% said “to 
Minister of Transport or equal level”, 16.18% said “Congress/Prime Minister or 
equal level”; however, 20.59% said “Head of civil aviation authority” (see Table 
‎7-7 and Figure ‎7-4). 
Table ‎7-7 To whom does the head of the accident investigation agency report? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Minister of Transportation or 
equal level 
42 61.8 61.8 
Congress/Prime Minister/ or 
equal level 
11 16.2 77.9 
Head of civil aviation 
authority 
14 20.6 98.5 
Don't know 1 1.5 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
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Figure ‎7-4 To whom does the head of the accident investigation agency report? 
Based on this sample, the findings show that about 62% of the accident 
investigation authorities report to the Minister of Transport or equal level and 
about 16% report to a higher level (Prime Minister/Congress/ or equivalent). 
There are, however, about 20% of the investigation authorities that report to the 
Head of the national aviation authority, which may indicate a problem in the 
structure of how these authorities are setup. Clearly there is the potential to 
hamper their independence from the regulator. But if the 8.8% who said they do 
not have a permanent accident investigation agency in their States are removed 
from the equation, the percentage goes down to about 10% or less of the 
permanent accident investigation agencies that report to the head of the civil 
aviation authority. This might be an indication that some States work harder to 
achieve compliance than to achieve the benefits of having an independent 
investigation authority. Or it might be an indication that some States do not fully 
understand that having a permanent investigation authority is not enough, if that 
authority reports to the regulator at the end. 
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Table ‎7-8 In the event of an accident, who speaks to the media on behalf of the 
accident investigation agency? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
A spokesperson who works for 
the agency and speaks on 
behalf of the agency only 
50 73.5 73.5 
A spokesperson who works for 
another agency (e.g.) and 
speaks on behalf of both 
7 10.3 83.8 
Don't know 8 11.8 95.6 
Other 3 4.4 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
The purpose of this question (in the event of an accident, who speaks to the 
media on behalf of the accident investigation agency?) is to try to understand if 
the accident investigation authority in a State is structured in a way that allows it 
to speak freely to the media through their own spokesperson in the event of an 
accident. The results suggest that this is actually the case in most of the 
countries (73.53% out of 68 replies). However, there are countries which have 
this problem (10.29%) and there are participants who are not sure about this 
point (11.8%) as shown in Table ‎7-8 and Figure ‎7-5. 
 
Figure ‎7-5 In the event of an accident, who speaks to the media on behalf of the 
accident investigation agency?  
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7.1.2 Financial Dimension Results 
Financial Dimension: where the answers are related to financial independence 
of the investigation agency/setup. Table ‎7-9 shows the questions that are 
related to the Financial dimension in the survey. 
Table ‎7-9 Questions related to the Financial Dimension 
Original 
# 
# in 4DMI 
Tool 
Question Dimension 
34 16 Agency has ready access to sufficient 
funds for proper investigations (within 
responsibilities of agency)? 
Financial 
  Funding for Agency’s investigation is:  
34 17 Independent of political pressure? Financial 
34 18 Independent of other influences? Financial 
44 27 Who controls/reviews Agency’s 
budget? 
Financial 
46 28 Agency is dependent on outside 
support to conduct its investigations? 
Financial 
47 29 Budgetary resources of Agency 
considered? 
Financial 
23 9 Who pays for data collection for 
Database? 
Financial 
29 11 Salaries of investigators are? Financial 
The respondents were asked if the agency has ready access to sufficient funds 
to investigate the accidents and incidents that fall within its responsibility. The 
results are as follows: 
 50% said they agree (26.5%) or strongly agree (23.5%) 
 31% said they disagree (22.1%) or strongly disagree (8.8%) 
The results suggest that there are States that do not have access to sufficient 
funds to investigate the accidents and incidents they are required to investigate. 
This result agrees in part with what Costa, Chief of Accident Investigation and 
Prevention Section in ICAO, reported, i.e. that the USOAP audits found a lack 
of the implementation of effective accident investigation authorities in several 
States in many regions, which was linked to insufficient human and financial 
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resources (Costa, 2011). This research cannot confirm that this lack of sufficient 
resources is the reason for an ineffective accident investigation system as the 
efficiency of the investigation authority is outside the scope of this research.  
Participants have different opinions about political and other influences that 
might affect the accident investigation authorities in their States. More than 51% 
of the respondents either agree (32.4%) or strongly agree (19.1%) that the 
funding of the accident investigation authorities in their countries is free from 
political pressure (see Table ‎7-10). About 33% of the respondents either 
disagree (23.5%) or strongly disagree (8.8%) that the funding of the accident 
investigation authorities in their countries is free from political pressure. 
Moreover, when asked if the funding is independent of “other” influences, 54.5% 
said they either strongly agree (22.1%) or agree (32.4%), and 30.9% said they 
either strongly disagree (10.3%) or disagree (20.6%). 
Table ‎7-10 Funding for the agency's investigations is independent of political 
pressure 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Strongly disagree 6 8.8 8.8 
Disagree 16 23.5 32.4 
Neutral 9 13.2 45.6 
Agree 22 32.4 77.9 
Strongly agree 13 19.1 97.1 
Don't know 2 2.9 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
In another question, the respondents were asked if the investigation agencies in 
their States are dependent on financial support from outside the agency to 
conduct their investigation; the results were as follows (see Table ‎7-11 and 
Figure ‎7-6): 
 13.2% said yes there is a need, (the budget does not cover investigation) 
 30.9% said there is a need sometimes 
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 41.2% said no there is no need, there is enough budget 
 14.7% said they do not know. 
Table ‎7-11 Is the investigation agency dependent on financial support from 
outside the agency to conduct its investigations? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Yes, there is always a need 
for financial support from 
outside the agency (the 
budget does not cover 
investigations) 
9 13.2 13.2 
Sometimes there is a need 21 30.9 44.1 
No, the agency has enough 
budget and does not use 
any outside financial support 
28 41.2 85.3 
Don't know 10 14.7 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
 
Figure ‎7-6 Is the investigation agency dependent on financial support from 
outside the agency to conduct its investigations? 
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In a related question, the respondents were asked to give their opinion (by 
choosing from the list) on whether they think the accident investigation agency’s 
budget is sufficient or not. The results were as follows (see Table ‎7-12): 
 About 45% said it is sufficient 
 About 39% said it is insufficient 
 13% said they do not know 
Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed the consequences of not having sufficient 
funding to be able to perform the job. One of the recommendations from the 
Senate inquiry with regard to the Australian CASA was to review CASA’s 
funding arrangements to ensure it is equipped to deal with the new regulatory 
challenges without being “captured” by the industry (Sterle, 2008). A parallel 
can be drawn here to apply the same recommendation to ICAO Member States, 
and that is to ensure that the accident investigation authorities in their States 
have enough funding to be independent from the regulator or other interested 
organisations.  
Table ‎7-12 Do you consider budgetary resources of the agency as sufficient 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Sufficient 30 44.1 45.5 
Insufficient 26 38.2 84.8 
Don't know 9 13.2 98.5 
Other 1 1.5 100.0 
Total 66 97.1  
Missing System 2 2.9  
Total 68 100.0  
Moreover, the respondents were asked a question about the salaries offered by 
the accident investigation authority in their States to try to measure if the 
agency has enough budget to hire highly qualified and experienced people from 
the industry. The question also aims to give an indication of how financially 
independent the investigators themselves are. The results suggest that most of 
the investigation authorities pay their investigators “around the average” 
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(26.5%) or “below” (44.1%) as shown in Table ‎7-13 and Figure ‎7-7. However, 
when the researcher consulted experts who work in this field they commented 
that the salaries are actually higher than average if not the best in the industry. 
So, why are there discrepancies? 
Kovach (1987) claims that there are different levels of employees’ motivators. 
He suggests that money becomes less of a motivator for employees as their 
income increases and that as employees become older, interesting work 
becomes their biggest motivator. 
However, Rynes et al. (2004) suggest that the effect of employees’ pay is 
underestimated in many researches. They claim that pay is an important and 
powerful general motivator, especially when it is tied to the employee’s 
performance, despite not being equally important in all situations or to all 
individuals. 
From the discipline of Psychological theory, Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) give 
an explanation for this behaviour. They indicate that “the tendency to choose 
items that reflect societally approved behaviours” are called socially desirable 
responding. Rynes et al. (2004) explain that “people are likely to understate 
importance in the case of salaries because either they misjudge how they might 
react to an offer of a higher paying job, or due to social norms that view money 
as a less noble source of motivation than factors such as challenging work or 
work that makes a contribution to society.”  
In this research, the aim is to present the importance of good compensation to 
attract experienced professionals and keep them in the job, which enhances the 
independence of the accident investigation authority in such a way that it is not 
dependent on other organisations’ employees to perform its intended work.  
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Table ‎7-13 Salaries offered by the accident investigation agencies 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
The best in the aviation 
industry and very attractive 
to experts 
6 8.8 8.8 
Around the average of the 
aviation industry 
18 26.5 35.3 
Below the average salaries 
in the industry 
30 44.1 79.4 
Don't know 11 16.2 95.6 
Other 3 4.4 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
 
 
Figure ‎7-7 Salaries offered by the accident investigation agencies 
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7.1.3 Functional Dimension Results 
Functional Dimension: where the answers show how independent the 
investigation body is in performing its primary function – investigation. 
Table ‎7-14 Questions related to the Functional Dimension 
Original 
# 
# in 4DMI 
Tool 
Question Dimension 
39 22 Who determines the scope of 
investigation? 
Functional 
40 23 Who determines the method of 
investigation? 
Functional 
  Does the Agency have:  
20 4 Flight Recorder readout facilities? Functional 
21 5 Material failure analysis facilities? Functional 
22 6 Voluntary incident reporting system? Functional 
23 7 Safety Database? Functional 
23 8 Are data in this Database available to 
others? 
Functional 
33 14 Agency recommendations acceptance 
rate measured?  
Functional 
Two open-ended questions were asked in the survey: Who determines the 
scope of the investigation? and Who determines the method of investigation? 
The answers were as follows: 
 Almost 90% said one of the following “Agency, IIC, Head of investigation 
office, Board members, or commissioner” 
 Only 4.4% said CAA or Minister of Transport. 
For the second question about who determines the method of investigation: 
 100% said one of the following “Agency, IIC, Head of investigation office, 
Board members, or commissioner”. 
These answers suggest that almost all ICAO Member States are aware of, and 
in compliance with the requirements for functional independence when it comes 
to determining the scope and method of investigation. 
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The respondents were asked if the accident investigation agencies in their 
States have flight data recorder (FDR) readout facilities. 48.5% of the 
participants said their accident investigation authorities in their States do have 
FDR readout facilities. 51.5% said “No”. 
The flight recorder readout facilities are very important to have under the control 
of the investigation authorities because it also involves evidence that must be 
protected and must not be made public or made available to the judicial 
proceedings unless it is deemed to be required. Although accident investigation 
authorities can have access to FDR readout facilities outside their control, this 
situation suggests dependency on these facilities, their integrity, and the 
integrity of their employees, and therefore may suggest a lack of functional 
independence of the accident investigation authorities. 
The frequency analysis was regenerated for 45 cases, where each State has 
one entry only. The results shown in Table ‎7-15 indicate that only 33% (15 
States) of the respondents have FDR readout facilities. 66% (30 States) do not 
have these facilities.  
Table ‎7-15 Does the accident investigation authority have flight recorder readout 
facilities? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
No 30 66.7 66.7 
Yes 15 33.3 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
When asked if the accident investigation agencies in their States have material 
failure analysis facilities, out of the 68 replies, 68% said “No” and 32% said 
“Yes”. This facility is less sensitive than the FDR readout facility. Having a 
material failure analysis facility is important and enhances the independence of 
the investigation body; however, it is difficult to find trained and experienced 
personnel to do the work, and its overhead costs make it a lower priority for 
many States. Such facilities are not expected in all ICAO Member States. 
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If the repeated participations are taken into consideration (for example, USA 7 
times, and UK 6 times), then it can be seen that the percentage of participants 
who said they have a material failure analysis facility would drop dramatically. 
Table ‎7-16 shows the frequency analysis for 45 States only, where each case 
represents a State. The number of States that have this facility dropped to 
22.2% and those that do not have it rose to 77.8% Therefore, the answers are 
as expected. 
Table ‎7-16 Does the accident investigation authority have material failure 
analysis facilities? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
No 35 77.8 77.8 
Yes 10 22.2 100.0 
Total 45 100.0  
When the participants were asked if the accident investigation authority has a 
“voluntary accident reporting system”, the respondents replied as follows: 
 42.6% said “Yes” 
 33.8% said “No” 
 17.6” said “Other” 
It is interesting to learn what some of the participants said under “Other”. One 
participant indicated that there is a regulation for it but there is no system in 
place to report accidents. Another participant indicated that there is a “poorly 
managed system” in place. Others indicated that there is a voluntary reporting 
system but it is located within the CAA. Although having a voluntary reporting 
system within the accident investigation authority is not a requirement, it can 
highly enhance the independence and the perception of independence of the 
accident investigation authority. 
When asked if the investigation authority has a safety database, the 
respondents answered with the following (see Table ‎7-17): 
 79.4% said “Yes” 
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 17.6% said “No” 
And when asked if the database is available to others, the participants 
answered with the following (out of the 79.4% who said “Yes” above): 
 55.8% said “Yes” 
 23.5% said “No” 
 
Table ‎7-17 Does the accident investigation authority have a safety database 
(reports, safety studies, recommendations, etc)? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Yes 54 79.4 79.4 
No 12 17.6 97.1 
Don't know 2 2.9 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
The survey asks if the acceptance rate for the safety recommendations of the 
accident investigation authority in the participants’ States is measured. The 
answers are as follows (see Table ‎7-18 and Figure ‎7-8): 
 48.5% said “Yes” 
 38.2% said “No” 
 
Table ‎7-18 Is the acceptance rate for the safety recommendations of the accident 
investigation authority in your State measured? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Yes 33 48.5 48.5 
No 26 38.2 86.8 
Don't know 7 10.3 97.1 
Other 2 2.9 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
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Figure ‎7-8 Is the acceptance rate for the safety recommendations of the accident 
investigation authority in your State measured?  
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7.1.4 Operational-Political Dimension Results 
The Operational Dimension is about Legal (or Regulatory) and Political issues. 
Operational-Political: to measure the influence of politicians. 
Table ‎7-19 Questions related to the Operational-Political Dimension 
Original 
# 
# in 4DMI 
Tool 
Question Dimension 
9 4 Internal organisation decided by:  Operational (Political) 
10 5 Personnel policy (hire, fire, etc) 
decided by: 
Operational (Political) 
14 7 Who appoints the Head of Agency? Operational (Political) 
18 10 Can politicians decide which accident 
to investigate? 
Operational (Political) 
19 11 Can politicians stop ongoing 
investigations? 
Operational (Political) 
13 2 Head of Agency term in office? Operational (Political) 
  If not permanent, is appointment 
renewable? 
 
When the participants were asked who decides on the agency’s internal 
organisation, out of 45 participants: 
 20% said the government only 
 17.8 said the agency only 
 53.3% said both 
When the respondents were asked who is responsible for the agency’s 
personnel policy, out of 45 replies: 
 15.6% said the government only 
 35.6% said the agency only 
 44.4% said both 
The respondents were asked who appoints the head of the agency. Out of 45 
replies: 
 13.3% said Head of State 
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 44.4% said one or two ministers 
 11.1% said members of safety board 
 15.6% said mix of parliament and government 
The respondents were asked if politicians can decide which accidents are 
investigated by the accident investigation authority in their States. Out of 45 
replies, the answers are as follows: 
 82.2% said no 
 8.9% said yes 
When the respondents were asked if the politicians can stop an ongoing 
investigation, they answered the following (out of 45 replies): 
 84.4% said no 
 8.9% said yes 
The results may suggest that in most of the countries the politicians do not, or 
cannot, directly influence the accident investigation authorities’ decisions with 
regard to starting or stopping an investigation. 
When asked about the head of investigation agency’s term in office, out of 45 
replies, they gave different answers but the most notable is that 57.8% said 
“permanent or unspecified term”. 
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7.1.5 Operational-Legal (Regulatory) Dimension Results 
Operational-Legal (regulatory): the question is about the legality of an issue 
or to check if it is protected by regulation. 
Table ‎7-20 Questions related to Operational-Legal Dimension 
Original 
# 
# in 4DMI 
Tool 
Question Dimension 
12 6 Is there a Law or Reg to prevent use 
of safety findings in a judicial inquiry? 
Operational-Legal 
16 9 Independence of Agency formally 
stated? 
Operational-Legal 
24 12 Does the Agency require approval to 
release report? 
Operational-Legal 
25 13 Can Agency launch investigation 
without prior permission? 
Operational-Legal 
27 14 Investigators have 
immediate/unrestricted access to 
evidence WITHOUT prior consent? 
Operational-Legal 
28 15 Agency’s investigation procedures 
specified in: 
Operational-Legal 
36 19 Law in place forcing Agency to 
release documents to public? 
Operational-Legal 
37 20 Regulations specify types of accidents 
& incidents that must be investigated? 
Operational-Legal 
38 21 Can Agency decide to investigate 
occurrences outside its mandate? 
Operational-Legal 
41 24 Who has 1st access to witnesses? Operational-Legal 
42 25 State has regulations to protect 
witnesses’ confidentiality? 
Operational-Legal 
26 10 How do you know if Agency’s 
investigations are perceived by public 
as credible and partial? 
Operational-Legal 
30 12 According to regulations in your State, 
determination of causation is: 
Operational-Legal 
32 13 Regulations clearly state that 
investigators are not to testify in 
courts...? 
Operational-Legal 
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Most of the questions in this dimension are related to the legal framework within 
which the accident and incident investigation authority works.  
The questionnaire asks if the ICAO Member State has a law or regulation to 
prevent the use of safety findings in a judicial inquiry. Since this is an ICAO 
requirement, and these are ICAO Member States that are signatories to the 
Chicago Convention, it was expected to see a very high percentage of the 
answers indicating that their State does have such a law or regulation. 
However, the answers were as follows: 
 58.82% said yes, there is 
 33.82% said no, there isn’t 
In addition, the survey asks if the independence of the accident investigation 
agency is formally stated in the State’s regulation or legislation. The answers 
were as follows: 
 83.8% said yes 
 13.2% said no 
7.1.5.1 ICAO Annex 13 SARPs are not Regulations  
The Chicago Convention is subject to the general international law of treaties; 
however, the annexes to the Convention are not an integral part of the 
Convention. Therefore, the signatory States to the Chicago Convention must 
implement the Convention’s provisions into their domestic legislations. On the 
other hand, ICAO SARPs do not have the same legal status as the provisions of 
the Chicago Convention. Therefore, with the exception of a few standards such 
as the recognition of licences issued by other States, each ICAO Member State 
has the power to decide which of the standards of the annexes are “practicable” 
to comply with, as stated in Article 37 of the Chicago Convention: “...to 
collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in 
regulations, standards”. ICAO does not have the legal power to enforce these 
SARPs (Trogeler, 2011).  
The survey in this research asked the following related question: 
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Where are the agency’s accident investigation procedures specified?  
The respondents can choose more than one answer from the following list: 
o Annex13 
o National Legislation 
o Regulations 
o Don’t know 
o Other 
 
Table ‎7-21 Where are the agency's accident investigation procedures specified? 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Annex 13 9 13.2 13.2 
National Legislation 4 5.9 19.1 
Regulations 1 1.5 20.6 
Don't know 3 4.4 25.0 
Other 2 2.9 27.9 
Annex 13 and National 
Legislation 
8 11.8 39.7 
Annex 13 and Regulations 4 5.9 45.6 
National Legislation and 
Regulations 
5 7.4 52.9 
Annex 13, National 
Legislation and Regulations 
32 47.1 100.0 
Total 68 100.0  
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Figure ‎7-9 Where are the agency's accident investigation procedures specified? 
Table ‎7-21 and Figure ‎7-9 show the data collected to understand where 
participants think their authority’s investigation procedures are specified. As 
mentioned above, the participants had the chance to choose more than one 
answer. Surprisingly, 78% (13.2%+11.8%+5.9%+47.1%) thought of ICAO 
Annex 13 as a regulation for them to follow. 13.2% out of the 78% have Annex 
13 as their only source of regulation for accident investigation procedures. This 
may suggest that there is a widespread false belief that ICAO Annex 13 
contains directly applicable regulations at the State’s national legislation or 
regulation level.  
This can be looked at from two opposing points of view. On the one hand, this is 
good because it might be an indication that ICAO SARPs are being enforced in 
States even though ICAO does not have the legal power to enforce them. On 
the other hand, this may hamper the independence of the accident investigation 
authorities in these States because they do not really have regulations in place 
to give them the legal power to help their independence. 
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The respondents were asked if the regulations in their States consider finding 
the causation as the “main” or “sole” purpose of the investigation. Their answers 
were as follows: 
 47.1% said “main” purpose 
 36.8% said “sole” purpose 
The participants were asked if the regulations clearly state that the agency’s 
investigators are precluded from testifying in courts in litigation processes 
stemming from the agency’s investigation reports. The responses were as 
follows: 
 32.4% said yes, clearly stated 
 51.5% said no, not stated 
The respondents were also asked if the regulations in their States specify the 
type of accidents and incidents that the accident investigation agency must 
investigate. They answered with the following: 
 76.5% said yes 
 22.1% said no 
When the participants were asked if the investigation agency can decide to 
investigate occurrences that it is not obligated to investigate they answered with 
the following: 
 83.8% said yes 
 5.9% said no 
 10.3% said they don’t know 
The answers to the question of who has the first access to witnesses were as 
follows: 
 10.3% said “the agency’s investigators ALWAYS have first access” 
 48.5% said “the agency’s investigators USUALLY have first access but 
not always” 
 8.8% said “the judicial (police) ALWAYS have first access” 
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 19.1% said “the judicial (police) USUALLY have first access but not 
always” 
The respondents were also asked if their States have regulations to protect the 
confidentiality of the witnesses. The responses were as follows: 
 73.5% said yes 
 11.8% said no 
 14.7% said they don’t know 
7.2 Three Categories of Independence 
There are 68 responses to the survey representing 45 ICAO Member States. 
Some States are represented more than once, while others are represented 
only once. The following criteria were adopted to limit the cases to one per 
ICAO Member State in order to compare between States, their Total Score on 
the 4DMI scale, and the common practices in each category: 
1- If there is only one reply for a State, that reply is utilised 
2- If there is more than one participation, then they are prioritised as 
follows: 
a.  participation from someone who works for the accident 
investigation authority itself, or a retired person from it 
b.  If there is no such participation as described in “a” above or if 
there is more than one participation that has the same level of 
priority, then the highest score is adopted. 
After applying the criteria above to obtain a single reply for each State (see 
Table ‎7-22), the 4DMI scale was divided into three categories of independence 
based on the Total Score as follows: 
1. Low-independence category: states that scores below 50%. There are 
10 States in this category. 
2. Average-independence category: states that score above 50% and 
lower than 75%. There is a total of 23 states in this category. 
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3. High-Independence category: contains 12 States with scores between 
74.66% and the highest score of 87.74%. Only 11 States scored above 
75%, however, the USA (scored 74.66%) was added to this category 
because of the reputation this state has in accident investigations. Also, 
because there is a 4.65% of “Don’t Know or missing answers” for this 
state which affected its Total Score.  
 
Table ‎7-22 Total Score and RANK for 45 States 
ID 
 Don't know 
 (or missing) %  
Percentage of 
Total Score 
ICAO Member States 
sorted and colour-coded 
according to their category 
RANK 
7381258 0.00% 87.74% Australia 1 
7322436 2.33% 84.55% Germany 2 
7291614 0.00% 81.89% UK 3 
7426589 0.00% 79.77% Poland 4 
7322370 0.00% 78.70% Finland 5 
7334963 2.33% 78.36% UAE 6 
7331355 0.00% 77.83% Portugal 7 
7353645 0.00% 76.57% Lithuania 8 
7433742 0.00% 76.57% Serbia 9 
7433772 0.00% 75.51% Ireland 10 
7485138 0.00% 75.30% Switzerland 11 
7736005 4.65% 74.66% USA 12 
7432620 0.00% 74.53% Greece 13 
7436086 0.00% 74.45% Hungary 14 
7476200 0.00% 74.11% Singapore 15 
7323590 0.00% 74.11% Denmark 16 
7705647 2.33% 73.81% Italy 17 
7439738 2.33% 73.17% Romania 18 
7479530 9.30% 72.85% Austria 19 
7485841 4.65% 72.85% Sweden 20 
7662286 0.00% 71.79% Russia 21 
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7432755 2.33% 70.64% Netherlands 22 
7333337 4.65% 70.28% Czech R. 23 
7321240 2.33% 69.66% Estonia 24 
7420566 0.00% 68.91% Iceland 25 
7601145 0.00% 68.60% Bulgaria 26 
7323504 2.33% 67.19% Latvia 27 
7317893 6.98% 65.91% Canada 28 
7475610 0.00% 64.53% Croatia 29 
7306664 11.63% 63.53% Pakistan 30 
7429600 6.98% 62.74% France 31 
7576288 0.00% 61.87% Luxembourg 32 
7457483 0.00% 60.64% Hong Kong 33 
7348681 4.65% 59.74% Slovakia 34 
7919248 0.00% 58.15% Bolivia 35 
7864988 20.93% 42.89% Belgium 36 
7338848 16.28% 42.02% Antigua 37 
7629632 6.98% 40.94% Sudan 38 
7427396 0.00% 33.51% Turkey 39 
7457442 9.30% 33.19% Morocco 40 
7561808 2.33% 31.91% Macedonia 41 
7294276 32.56% 30.85% Malaysia 42 
7358909 4.65% 26.60% Libya 43 
7465330 18.60% 15.96% Tunisia 44 
7359109 2.33% 15.96% Uganda 45 
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7.2.1 Bird’s-Eye View of Independence Scores 
The following scatter plots give a general idea of how different ICAO Member 
States scored in general and per specific dimension. The x-axis in the plots 
represents the RANK for each independence category. The y-axis represents 
the percentage of the score of each State. Note that these plots are for the 45 
cases; each case represents an ICAO Member State.  
 
Figure ‎7-10 Structural Dimension Scores – scatter plot 
The differences in Structural Dimension scores between the three 
independence categories are shown in Figure ‎7-10. Note how the “Low-
independence” category scores are lower than the scores of the rest of the 
categories. These data may suggest that the structural dimension is a big 
weakness in the States in this category. States in other categories are very 
similar in their Structural Dimension scores. 
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Figure ‎7-11 Functional Dimension Scores – scatter plot 
Figure ‎7-11 shows that within each category several ICAO-Member States 
scored the same, which may indicate consistency in approaching the functional 
independence in States within each category. On the other hand, there seems 
to be big variation between the two extremes of independence categories (Low 
and High-Independence categories). Scores for the States in the Average-
Independence Category, as expected, fall in between the two extremes, but in 
general their scores seem to be closer to the scores of the States in the High-
Independence Category. 
 
Figure ‎7-12 Financial Dimension Scores – scatter plot 
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States in the Low-Independence and in the Average-Independence categories 
are, in general, struggling with their financial independence as shown in Figure 
‎7-12. States in the High-Independence category seem to be scoring better in 
general than the rest of the States in this dimension. 
 
Figure ‎7-13 Operational_Political Dimension Scores – scatter plot 
Apart from the Low-Independence category, all categories in general scored 
fairly similarly in the Operational_Political and Operational_Legal dimensions as 
shown in Figure ‎7-13 and Figure ‎7-14. 
 
Figure ‎7-14 Operational_Legal Dimension Scores - scatter plot 
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7.2.2 Similarities and Differences between Categories 
Answers to each question from the survey were thoroughly analysed to 
understand if there are any similar practices between the countries that belong 
to each of the three categories: Low-Independence, Average-Independence, 
and High-Independence. Also, the similarities and differences across the three 
categories were studied. 
Table ‎7-23 shows the results of the analysis. The criteria of “similarity” in the 
answers are: 
 The occurrence of that answer 70% of the time or more per question.  
 If there are no significant similarities within a category, or if there are 
similarities in the answers for a single question across all of the three 
categories, that question is ignored because the aim is to study the 
common practices within the low and high independence categories 
specifically to understand what affects investigation independence in 
states in these categories. 
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Table ‎7-23 Significant agreement (70% or more) on answers per Category 
 
Text of Q Low-Independence Category Average-Independence Category High-Independence Category
Q2 Please specify your Organization No Significant Agreement
Accident Investigation Authority
10/12  83.3%
Q3
Does your State have a permanent accident 
investigation authority/body/agency?
No Significant Agreement
Yes
12/12  100%
Q4
The aircraft accident investigation authority in your 
State is:
Specific to Aviation
8/10   80%
No Significant Agreement
Q6
Is the accident investigation authority physically 
separate from the Civil Aviation Authority 
(Regulator)?
No, they are located in the 
same building
10/10  100%
No Significant Agreement
Yes, they are separated in 
different buildings
10/12  83.3%
Q7
Is the accident investigation authority separate 
from the operation authority/authorities (airport, 
air navigation, air traffic controller)?
No Significant Agreement
Yes, they are separated  
12/12  100%
Q7_a
Separation details of Investigation Authorities from 
Operation Authorities
No Significant Agreement
Functionally, Structurally and 
Physically (different Buildings)
10/12  83.3%
Q8
Are there any employees from the industry (e.g. 
manufacturers, operators, or others) on loan or 
working part time for the accident investigation 
authority?
No Significant Agreement
No
9/12  75%
Q12
Does the State have a law or regulation to prevent 
the use of safety findings in judicial inquiry?
No, there isn't
8/10  80%
No Significant Agreement
Yes, there is
12/12  100%
Q15
To whom does the head of the accident 
investigation agency report?
No Significant Agreement
Minister of Transportation or 
equal level
11/12  91.7%
Q16
Is the independence of the accident investigation 
agency formally stated (in the regulations or 
legislation)?
No Significant Agreement
Yes
12/12  100%
Q17
Does the accident investigation authority in your 
State have a Board?
No Significant Agreement
No
10/12  83.3%
Q18
Can Politicians (government) in your State decide 
which accidents are investigated by the accident 
investigation authority?
No Significant Agreement
No
12/12  100%
Q19
Can Politicians (government) stop an on-going 
investigation?
No Significant Agreement
No
12/12  100%
Q20
Does the accident investigation authority have 
flight recorder read-out facilities?
No
9/10  90%
No Significant Agreement
Q21
Does the accident investigation authority have 
material failure analysis facilities?
No
9/10  90%
No Significant Agreement
No
9/12  75%
Q23
Does the accident investigation authority have a 
safety database (reports, safety studies, 
recommendations, etc)?
No Significant Agreement
Yes
12/12  100%
Q24
Does the accident investigation authority require 
the approval of another government official, body 
or agency to release a report?
Yes
7/10  70%
No Significant Agreement
No, no approval needed
12/12  100%
Q25
Can the accident investigation agency launch 
investigations without prior permission from 
anybody outside of the agency?
No Significant Agreement
Yes, always
12/12  100%
Q27
Do accident investigation agency's safety 
investigators have immediate and unrestricted 
access to all relevant evidence WITHOUT prior 
consent from judicial bodies or other authorities?
No Significant Agreement
Yes, always
12/12  100%
Q28
Where are the agency's accident investigation 
procedures specified?
No Significant Agreement
Annex 13, National Legislation, 
and Regulations
9/12  75%
Q32
Is it clearly stated in the regulations that the agency 
investigators are precluded from testifying in courts 
in litigation process growing from the agency's 
investigation reports?
Yes
7/10  70%
No Significant Agreement
Q33
Is the acceptance rate for the safety 
recommendations of the accident investigation 
authority in your State measured?
Yes
7/10  70%
No Significant Agreement
Yes
11/12  91.7%
Q35_a
The greater the independence of the accident 
investigation agency, the greater the CREDIBILITY of 
the agency
Yes
7/10  70%
No Significant Agreement
Strongly agree
9/12  75%
Q37
Does the regulation specify the types of accidents 
and incidents that the investigation agency must 
investigate?
No Significant Agreement
Yes
12/12  100%
Q38
Can the investigation agency decide to investigate 
occurrences that it is not obligated to investigate?
No Significant Agreement
Yes
11/12  91.7%
Q42
Does your State have regulations to protect the 
confidentiality of the witnesses?
No Significant Agreement
Yes
11/12  91.7%
Q43
In the event of an accident, who speaks to the 
media on behalf of the accident investigation 
agency?
No Significant Agreement
A spokeperson who works for the 
agency and speaks on behalf of 
the agency only
11/12  91.7%
Q47
Do you consider budgetary resources of the agency 
as
No Significant Agreement
Sufficient
10/12  83.3%
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Note that there are 23 States in the Average-Independence category and in 
order to show any significant agreement (at least 70%) 17 States or more must 
agree on an answer to a question. As shown in Table 8-25 above, there are no 
significant agreements between States in any answer for questions shown in 
the table. 
The common answers within the “Low-Independence” category and the “High-
Independence” category are examined next. 
7.2.3 Common Answers within the “High-Independence” Category: 
Table ‎7-24 shows the practices that distinguish the High-Independence 
category from the rest of the categories. The table also shows the number of 
States (and the percentage they represent) that agree on that answer within the 
category. 
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Table ‎7-24 Common answers for the High-Independence category 
  Text of Question 
Category  
Independent 
Q7_a 
Separation details of Investigation Authorities from 
Operation Authorities 
Functionally, 
Structurally and 
Physically (different 
Buildings) 
10/12  83.3% 
Q8 
Are there any employees from the industry (e.g. 
manufacturers, operators, or others) on loan or 
working part-time for the accident investigation 
authority? 
No 
9/12  75% 
Q15 
To whom does the head of the accident investigation 
agency report? 
Minister of 
Transportation or equal 
level 
11/12  91.7% 
Q27 
Do accident investigation agency's safety 
investigators have immediate and unrestricted 
access to all relevant evidence WITHOUT prior 
consent from judicial bodies or other authorities? 
Yes, always 
12/12  100% 
Q28 
Where are the agency's accident investigation 
procedures specified? 
Annex 13, National 
Legislation, and 
Regulations 
9/12  75% 
Q33 
Is the acceptance rate for the safety 
recommendations of the accident investigation 
authority in your State measured? 
Yes 
11/12  91.7% 
Q47 
Do you consider budgetary resources of the agency 
as: 
Sufficient 
10/12  83.3% 
Table ‎7-24shows seven common practices that are consistent in this category. 
The data in the table suggest that ICAO Member States that scored higher in 
the independence scale of the 4DMI have, in general, investigation authorities 
that are functionally, structurally and physically separate from the Operation 
Authorities. This type of separation, in addition to the separation from the 
regulator, is expected in independent authorities (see Figure ‎7-15). 
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Figure ‎7-15 Separation from Operation Authorities 
In general, the investigation authorities in most of the States in this category 
have no employees on loan from the industry. This practice improves the 
separation between the investigation authorities and the industry they 
investigate, and makes sure there is no real or perceived pressure on the 
employees from the industry (see Figure ‎7-16). 
 
Figure ‎7-16 Employees on loan 
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Also, in most of the States in this category, the head of the investigation 
authority reports to the Minister of Transport or equal level. This ensures the 
independence of the head of the accident investigation authority and removes 
pressure or influence from interested parties such as the head of the regulation 
authority (see Figure ‎7-17). 
 
Figure ‎7-17 Head of agency chain of command 
Moreover, in this category, safety investigators in all States are allowed 
immediate and unrestricted access to all evidence and without prior consent 
from the judicial or other authorities. Not only does this improve the credibility of 
the investigators, it also ensures that safety investigators get to perishable 
evidence in timely manner (see Figure ‎7-18). 
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Figure ‎7-18 Access to evidence without consent 
Another common practice of the States in this category, in general, is the 
documentation of the agency’s accident investigation procedures in National 
Legislation and Regulation. However, it is a surprise that participants from these 
States, in general, also selected Annex 13 as a source of regulation. The data 
suggest that most of the participants believe that ICAO Annex 13 has legal 
power in their States even if the Annex 13 SARPs are not incorporated within 
the National Legislation or Regulation (see Figure ‎7-19). 
 
Figure ‎7-19 Where are investigation procedures specified? 
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It also appears to be common practice for the States in this category, in general, 
to measure the acceptance rate of their safety recommendations. This could be 
a means for feedback for the authorities to assess the credibility of their 
investigations and, therefore, improve their independence (see Figure ‎7-20). 
 
Figure ‎7-20 Is the acceptance rate measured? 
States in this category also agree, in general, that the budgetary resources are 
sufficient for them to conduct their investigations. This may indicate that there is 
no financial pressure on the investigation agencies in these States (see Figure 
‎7-21). 
 
Figure ‎7-21 Are budgetary resources sufficient? 
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The figures above show that although there are practices which are common 
within the High-Independence category, they are not unique to that category. 
The figures also show the similarities with other categories, even if these 
similarities do not show in the tables as “significant” practices. 
7.2.4 Common Answers in the “Low-Independence” Category: 
In this category, the following two scenarios are examined: 
 The agreement on answers within the category, which is different 
from the rest of the categories (see Table ‎7-25).  
 The disagreement with the rest of the categories, even if there is no 
common agreement on anything within the “Low-Independence” 
category (see Table ‎7-26). 
Table ‎7-25 Common answers for Low-Independence category 
  Text of Q 
Category  
Low-Independence 
Q4 
The aircraft accident investigation authority 
in your State is: 
Specific to Aviation 
8/10  80% 
Q6 
Is the accident investigation authority 
physically separate from the Civil Aviation 
Authority (Regulator)? 
No, they are located in the 
same building 
10/10  100% 
Q12 
Does the State have a law or regulation to 
prevent the use of safety findings in a 
judicial inquiry? 
No, there isn't 
8/10  80% 
Q24 
Does the accident investigation authority 
require the approval of another government 
official, body or agency to release a report? 
Yes 
7/10  70% 
Q32 
Is it clearly stated in the regulations that the 
agency investigators are precluded from 
testifying in courts in litigation process 
growing from the agency's investigation 
reports? 
No, not stated 
7/10  70% 
Q33 
Is the acceptance rate for the safety 
recommendations of the accident 
investigation authority in your State 
measured? 
No 
7/10  70% 
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The analysis shown in Table ‎7-25 indicates six common characteristics in the 
Low-Independence category.  
The data show that, in general, States in this category have single-mode, 
aviation-specific accident investigation authorities (8 out of 10 States, 80%). 
However, there is no evidence that changing to a multi-modal setup will help the 
independence of the investigation authority. Other categories do not seem to 
have an agreement on this point.  
 
Figure ‎7-22 Mode of investigation authority 
Also, the data suggest that the physical separation between the accident 
investigation authority and the regulator is a clear characteristic of the States 
within the Low-Independence category. Within this category 10 out of 10 States 
(100%) indicated that the accident investigation authorities in their States are 
not physically separate from the regulator. On the other hand, all other 
categories indicated that the two are physically separate in their States (see 
Figure ‎7-23). 
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Figure ‎7-23 Physical separation from Regulator 
Additionally, most of the States in the Low-Independence category do not have 
a law to prevent the use of safety findings from safety investigations in a judicial 
inquiry (8 out of 10 States, 80%). Attachment E of ICAO Annex 13 discusses 
the need for protecting safety information from inappropriate use to ensure the 
continued availability of such information. It is therefore expected that the 
absence of law or regulation to guarantee the protection of safety information in 
a State could be an indicator of lack of independence in accident investigations 
in that State (see Figure ‎7-24). 
 
Figure ‎7-24 Use of safety findings in a judicial inquiry 
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Another indication that the accident investigation authority in a State may not be 
able to act independently is its ability to release a report without approval from 
anybody outside the agency. In the Low-Independence category, 7 out of 10 
(70%) said their investigation authority needs approval from another entity 
outside of the agency to release a report (see Figure ‎7-25). 
 
Figure ‎7-25 Agency requires approval to release a report? 
Also, 7 out of 10 (70%) of the States in this category indicated that they do not 
have a regulation to prevent safety investigators from testifying in courts in 
litigation processes that result from the accident investigation authority’s 
investigation reports. Such actions may lead the public and the industry to lose 
their trust in the investigation authority and question its independence. Note that 
the rest of the categories have a similar practice even though it did not show in 
the table (see Figure ‎7-26). 
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Figure ‎7-26 Safety investigators testify in courts 
Moreover, 7 out of 10 (70%) in this category indicated that the acceptance rate 
of the safety recommendations generated by the accident investigation authority 
is not measured. This may suggest that, in general, failure in measuring the 
acceptance rate of the authority’s recommendations might be an indication that 
there is a lack of the independence of that authority (see Figure ‎7-27).  
 
 
Figure ‎7-27 Is the acceptance rate measured?  
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The practices that are common in all categories except the Low-Independence 
category are shown in Table ‎7-26. 
Table ‎7-26 Other differences between Low-Independence and other categories 
  Text of Q 
Category  
Low-
Independence 
Category  
Average-Independence 
Category  
High-Independent 
Q3 
Does your State have a permanent 
accident investigation 
authority/body/agency? 
  
Yes 
23/23   100% 
Yes 
12/12  100% 
Q7 
Is the accident investigation authority 
separate from the operation 
authority/authorities (airport, air 
navigation, air traffic controller)? 
  
Yes, they are separated   
22/23   95.6% 
Yes, they are 
separated   
12/12  100% 
Q16 
Is the independence of the accident 
investigation agency formally stated 
(in the regulations or legislation)? 
  
Yes 
21/23   91.3% 
Yes 
12/12  100% 
Q18 
Can Politicians (government) in your 
State decide which accidents are 
investigated by the accident 
investigation authority? 
  
No 
22/23   95.6% 
No 
12/12  100% 
Q19 
Can Politicians (government) stop an 
ongoing investigation? 
  
No 
22/23   95.6% 
No 
12/12  100% 
Q23 
Does the accident investigation 
authority have a safety database 
(reports, safety studies, 
recommendations, etc)? 
  
Yes 
22/23   95.6% 
Yes 
12/12  100% 
Q25 
Can the accident investigation agency 
launch investigations without prior 
permission from anybody outside of 
the agency? 
  
Yes, always 
22/23   95.6% 
Yes, always 
12/12  100% 
Q38 
Can the investigation agency decide to 
investigate occurrences that it is not 
obligated to investigate? 
  
Yes 
22/23   95.6% 
Yes 
11/12  91.7% 
Q42 
Does your State have regulations to 
protect the confidentiality of the 
witnesses? 
  
Yes 
20/23   86.9% 
Yes 
11/12  91.7% 
Q43 
In the event of an accident, who 
speaks to the media on behalf of the 
accident investigation agency? 
  
A spokesperson who 
works for the agency and 
speaks on behalf of the 
agency only 
20/23   86.9% 
A spokesperson who 
works for the agency 
and speaks on behalf 
of the agency only 
11/12  91.7% 
Table ‎7-26 shows patterns that are common in all categories except the 
category of “Low-Independence”. Although there are no certain common 
practices related to the questions shown within this category, the fact that the 
rest of the States outside this category agree in general on certain practices 
suggests that accident investigation authorities in the States within the Low-
Independence category need to adopt these practices to improve their level of 
aircraft accident investigation independence. However, these practices by 
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themselves may not be enough to upgrade a State from this category to a 
higher category of investigation independence. Also, the absence of some of 
these practices may not be enough to downgrade a State from another category 
to this category of Low-Independence.  
It can be seen from the data shown above that ICAO Member States have 
different practices when it comes to the independence of accident 
investigations, even if these States’ total 4DMI scores are similar enough to be 
in the same category. 
7.2.5 Multinomial Logistic Regression Statistical Tests 
7.2.5.1 Low-Independence Category 
Logistic regression is a statistical technique that offers a method for modelling a 
binary response variable, which takes values 1 and 0. The logistic regression 
technique is very similar to linear regression; however, linear regression uses a 
continuous variable as the dependent variable in the model. The Multinomial 
Logistic Regression model accepts Dependent Variables (DV) with more than 
two outcomes. 
The Multinomial Logistic Regression model is utilised (using SPSS) to predict 
the probability of a States, with certain characteristics from the “common 
answers”, to be in the Low-Independence category or in the High-Independence 
category when its investigation independence “total score” is calculated using 
the 4DMI. 
Table ‎7-27 Recoding Common Answers for Low-Independence Category 
Question from 4DMI 
SPSS 
Original 
Code  
SPSS 
Recoded 
Name 
SPSS 
Recoded 
Value 
Q4:The aircraft accident 
investigation authority in your State 
is: 
1=Specific to 
Aviation 
RecQ4_Com 1->1, else->0 
Q6: Is the accident investigation 
authority physically separate from 
the Civil Aviation Authority 
(Regulator)? 
1=No, not 
separated 
RecQ6_Com 1->1, else->0 
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Q12: Does the State have a law or 
regulation to prevent the use of 
safety findings in a judicial inquiry? 
2=No, it 
doesn’t 
RecQ12_Com 2->1, else->0 
Q24: Does the accident 
investigation authority require the 
approval of another government 
official, body or agency to release a 
report? 
1= Yes RecQ24_Com 1->1, else->0 
Q32: Is it clearly stated in the 
regulations that the agency 
investigators are precluded from 
testifying in courts in litigation 
process growing from the agency's 
investigation reports? 
2=No, not 
stated 
RecQ32_Com 2->1, else->0 
Q33: Is the acceptance rate for the 
safety recommendations of the 
accident investigation authority in 
your State measured? 
2=No RecQ33_Com 2->1, else->0 
Table ‎7-27 above shows the recoding of SPSS variable of interest to allow for 
the Logistic regression test.  
Table ‎7-28 SPSS Parameter Estimates Table for RecQ4_Com variable 
Independence Category based on Total Scorea B Exp(B) 
Low-Independence 
Intercept .134  
[RecQ4_Com=.00] -1.050 .350 
[RecQ4_Com=1.00] 0b . 
Average-Independence 
Intercept .619  
[RecQ4_Com=.00] .074 1.077 
[RecQ4_Com=1.00] 0b . 
a. The reference category is: High-Independence. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
In this statistical test, the dependent variable is the “Independence Category 
based on Total Score”, and the independent variable is the recoded Q4 (the 
mode of the aircraft accident investigation agency) from the 4DMI 
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“RecQ4_Com”. SPSS produces several tables; however, only the Parameter 
Estimates table is of interest for the purpose of this research.  
The (B) coefficient in the SPSS output table represents the coefficient for the 
constant (also called the "intercept") in the null model. 
The Exp (B) is the exponentiation of the B coefficient, which is an odds ratio. 
The reference category is identified in the footnote to the table. 
The B coefficient (for the RecQ4_Com variable) can be interpreted as follows: 
 
(RecQ4_Com) 
coefficient (B) 
Conclusion 
If B > 0  
(i.e. Exp (B) > 1) 
Non-Single mode, compared to Single mode setups, will 
more likely be in the specified group relative to the 
reference group (or category). 
If B = 0  
(i.e. Exp (B) = 1) 
Non-Single mode, compared to Single mode setups, will 
equally likely be in the specified group relative to the 
reference group. 
If B < 0  
(i.e. Exp (B) < 1) 
Non-Single mode, compared to Single mode setups, will 
less likely be in the specified group relative to the 
reference group. 
 
In this analysis, two comparisons will be made:  
1. the Low-Independence category will be compared to the High-
Independence category (the reference category) 
2. the Average-Independence category will be compared to the High-
Independence category 
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The data in the output table (Table ‎7-28) from SPSS can be interpreted as 
follows:  
There is a lower likelihood (negative B value= -1.050) of States with accident 
investigation body setup that is multimodal or multi-sector (as oppose to single-
mode specific to aviation setup) to score in the Low-Independence Category 
relative to High-Independence Category when measuring their accident 
investigation independence using the 4DMI.  
In SPSS output, the Exp (B) value, also known as the Odd Ration (OR), 
indicates that States that do NOT have single mode setup are, in comparison to 
those that have single mode setup, 0.35 less likely to be in the Low-
Independence Category relative to High-Independence Category (the 
reference category). This can be expressed in percentages ((0.35-1.0)*100= -
99.65%). This means that the States which did not have “single mode specific 
to aviation setup” were 99.65% less likely to be in the Low-Independence 
Category, which proves that this is a characteristic of the States that scored in 
the Low-Independence category. 
In addition, the test also shows that States with multimodal or multi-sector 
setup, in comparison to single mode, are more likely to score in the Average-
Independence Category relative to the reference category (High-
Independence). However, the B value is close to zero (0.74) and the Exp (B) is 
close to one (1.077). This can be approximated to 1, which means that States 
with that do NOT have single mode setup, in comparison to State that have 
single mode setup, are equally likely to be in either the Average or High-
Independence Categories. 
In the next set of tests the focus of this analysis will be on the differences 
between the High-Independence and Low-Independence categories only. 
Re-running SPSS commands for the rest of the “common answers” in the Low-
Independence Category produced the results shown in Table ‎7-29. Note that in 
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this table the reference category is always “High-Independence” and the values 
shown are for the “Low-Independence” category. 
Table ‎7-29 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Low-Independence 
Independent 
Variable 
B value Exp (B) Interpretation 
RecQ6_Com = 0 -23.17 8.652E-11 There is lower likelihood (more than 99%) 
of States with accident investigation body 
physically separated from the Regulator 
(as oppose to not separated) to score in 
the Low-Independence Category relative 
to High-Independence Category. 
RecQ12_Com = 0 -20.95 7.969E-10 There is lower likelihood (more than 99%) 
of States that have a law or regulation to 
prevent the use of safety findings in 
Judicial proceedings (as oppose to those 
that don’t have it) to score in the Low-
Independence Category relative to High-
Independence Category when measuring 
their accident investigation independence 
using the 4DMI. 
RecQ24_Com = 0 -19.765 2.607E-9 There is lower likelihood (more than 99%) 
of States that do NOT need an approval 
from another authority to release a report 
(as oppose to those that need it) to score 
in the Low-Independence Category 
relative to High-Independence Category 
when measuring their accident 
investigation independence using the 
4DMI. 
RecQ32_Com = 0 -1.184 0.306 There is lower likelihood (69.4%) of States 
that have regulations precluding safety 
investigators from testifying in litigations 
growing from the authorities’ investigation 
reports (as oppose to those that don’t 
have it) to score in the Low-Independence 
Category relative to High-Independence 
Category when measuring their accident 
investigation independence using the 
4DMI. 
RecQ33_Com = 0 -3.245 0.039 There is lower likelihood (96.1%) of States 
that measure the acceptance rate of their 
investigation authority’s safety 
recommendations (as oppose to not 
measuring them) to score in the Low-
Independence Category relative to High-
Independence Category. 
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7.2.5.2 High-Independence Category 
The recoding of SPSS variables and the common answers in the High-
Independence category are shown in Table ‎7-30 below. 
Table ‎7-30 Recoding Common Answers for High-Independence Category 
Question from Survey 
SPSS Original 
Code of 
common 
Answer 
SPSS Recoded 
Name 
SPSS Recoded 
Value 
Q7_a: Separation details of 
Investigation Authorities from 
Operation Authorities 
8=Functional, 
Structural, and 
Physical 
separation 
RecQ7_a_HCom 8->1, else->0 
Q8: Are there any employees 
from the industry (e.g. 
manufacturers, operators, or 
others) on loan or working part-
time for the accident 
investigation authority? 
2= No RecQ8_HCom 2->1, else->0 
Q15: To whom does the head 
of the accident investigation 
agency report? 
1=Minister of 
Transport or 
equal 
RecQ15_HCom 1->1, else->0 
Q27: Do accident investigation 
agency's safety investigators 
have immediate and 
unrestricted access to all 
relevant evidence WITHOUT 
prior consent from judicial 
bodies or other authorities? 
1= Yes, 
Always 
RecQ27_HCom 1->1, else->0 
Q28: Where are the agency's 
accident investigation 
procedures specified? 
123=Annex13, 
Legislations & 
Regs 
RecQ28_HCom 123->1, else->0 
Q33: Is the acceptance rate for 
the safety recommendations of 
the accident investigation 
authority in your State 
measured? 
1=Yes RecQ33_HCom 1->1, else->0 
Q47: Do you consider 
budgetary resources of the 
agency as: 
3= Sufficient RecQ47_HCom 3->1, else->0 
The Multinomial Logistic Regression model is used again to test the common 
answers in the High-Independence category. The results are shown in tables 
Table ‎7-31 and Table ‎7-32. 
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Table ‎7-31 SPSS Parameter Estimates Table for RecQ7_a_HCom variable 
Independence Category based on Total Scorea B Exp(B) 
High-Independence 
Intercept 2.303  
[RecQ7_a_HCom=.00] -3.807 .022 
[RecQ7_a_HCom=1.00] 0b . 
a. The reference category is: Low-Independence. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
Note that the reference category in the Table ‎7-31 is the “Low-Independence”. 
Table ‎7-32 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for High-Independence 
Independent 
Variable 
B value Exp (B) Interpretation 
RecQ7_a_HCom=0 -3.807 0.022 There is lower likelihood (97.8%) of States 
with accident investigation body that is 
NOT functionally, structurally and 
physically separated from the Operations 
Authorities (as oppose to separated) to 
score in the High-Independence Category 
relative to Low-Independence Category. 
RecQ8_HCom=0 -1.504 0.222 There is lower likelihood (77.8%) of States 
that do NOT have employees on-loan from 
the industry working for them (as oppose 
to those that have them) to score in the 
High-Independence Category relative to 
the Low-Independence Category when 
measuring their accident investigation 
independence using the 4DMI. 
RecQ15_HCom=0 -2.803 0.061 There is lower likelihood (93.9%) of States 
that do NOT have the Head of the 
accident investigation body report to the 
Minister of Transport or equal level (as 
oppose to those that have them) to score 
in the High-Independence Category 
relative to the Low-Independence 
Category when measuring their accident 
investigation independence using the 
4DMI. 
RecQ27_HCom=0 -23.503 6.204E-
11 
There is lower likelihood (more than 99%) 
of States that the safety investigators in 
their accident investigation body do NOT 
have immediate and unrestricted access 
to all evidence WITHOUT prior consent 
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(as oppose to those that have this kind of 
access ) to score in the High-
Independence Category relative to the 
Low-Independence Category when 
measuring their accident investigation 
independence using the 4DMI. 
RecQ28_HCom=0 -1.946 0.143 There is lower likelihood (85.7%) of States 
that do NOT have the accident 
investigation procedures specified in 
Annex13, Legislations, and regulations (as 
oppose to those that have them) to score 
in the High-Independence Category 
relative to the Low-Independence 
Category when measuring their accident 
investigation independence using the 
4DMI. 
RecQ33_HCom=0 -4.595 0.010 There is lower likelihood (99%) of States 
that do NOT have the acceptance rate for 
the safety recommendations of their 
investigation body measured (as oppose 
to those that have them measured) to 
score in the High-Independence Category 
relative to the Low-Independence 
Category when measuring their accident 
investigation independence using the 
4DMI. 
RecQ47_HCom=0 -3.807 0.022 There is lower likelihood (97.8%) of States 
that do NOT have sufficient budgetary 
resources (as oppose to those that have 
them) to score in the High-Independence 
Category relative to the Low-
Independence Category when measuring 
their accident investigation independence 
using the 4DMI. 
 
In conclusion, the results which are shown above from the Logistic Regression 
tests support the research findings that the specified characteristics are 
common to the ICAO-Member States within that specific independence 
category. 
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7.3 Examining the Effect of Each Dimension  
Several tables were created to demonstrate the effect of each dimension on a 
State’s Total score and its RANK in comparison with other States. The tables 
are collected together in Table ‎7-33. 
The columns in Table ‎7-33 are explained as follows: 
ID# Unique ID number for each participant 
% of Total Score: The State’s Total Score percentage in 
comparison with the ideal 100% 
RANK: The rank of the State based on its Total Score 
ICAO Member State: The name of ICAO Member State colour-coded 
according to their category (see section ‎7.2) 
Don’t Know (or Missing) %: The percentage of “Don’t Know” or “missing” 
answers per each participation. 
Total (Without Structural + 23.40%): The percentage of Total Score after removing 
the scores from the questions of this dimension 
and adding its percentage 
RANK: The new Rank based on the new Total 
(compared to the rest of the States) 
ICAO Member State: The name of the State colour-coded based on 
the new Total 
The same thing is then repeated for the other dimensions as shown in the table. 
When a dimension is removed, its percentage is added to the Total score to 
show the effect of removing that dimension. In other words, it is as if all 
participants scored full marks on that dimension. Therefore, the colour coding 
scheme stays the same as before and the new score can now be compared 
with the actual score. 
The breakdown of these percentages is shown in section ‎6.1.1 of this thesis.  
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For example, to examine the effect of the Functional dimension: 
8- The questions from the Functional dimension alone contribute 17.02% 
to the Total Score of each State. 
9- The functional dimension’s questions (and their scores) are removed 
from the 4DMI. 
10- To be able to compare with the actual scores (to examine the effect of 
removing the dimension on the actual scores) and to keep the colour-
coding scheme, the full percentage of 17.02% is added to the Total 
Score of each State. 
11- Because of the above procedure, everything stays the same as before. 
The only difference is that all States scored 100% in the Functional 
dimension. 
12- The effect of the Functional dimension for State A, for example, 
depends on its actual Functional score and the new Total score, and 
can be understood as follows: 
a) If State A’s actual score in the Functional dimension was high: 
the effect will be minimal and therefore this dimension is NOT a 
weakness in this State. 
b) If State A’s actual score in the Functional dimension was low: the 
effect will be high and may even upgrade State A to a higher 
independence category (if it is not already in the highest 
category). Therefore, this dimension is a weakness in this State 
and more resources should be allocated to rectify this weakness 
(lack of independence). 
The above is also applicable to all other dimensions. 
For example, looking at the results of Slovakia and France (see Table ‎7-34), 
note that: 
 The colour-code changes when a State’s score moves from one category 
to another. 
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 The RANK changes in comparison to other States’ scores. It is only an 
indication of how a State’s score has changed in comparison to how 
other States’ scores after removing a dimension.  
Changes in RANKs after removing a dimension suggest that some of the States 
that rank low in general may actually do better in some dimensions than the 
higher ranking States. This is further proof that States ensure the independence 
of their investigation authorities using different methods.  
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Table ‎7-33 Effect on Total Score and RANK after removing each dimension 
 
 
ID# % of Total Score RANK
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) % 
Total (Without 
Structural + 
23.40%)
RANK
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) % 
Total (Without 
Functional + 
17.02%)
RANK
ICAO-
Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) 
% 
Total (Without 
Financial + 
17.02%)
RANK
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) 
% 
Total (Without 
Operational_Politic
al + 12.76%)
RANK
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) % 
Total (Without 
Operational_Legal + 
29.79%)
RANK
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) 
% 
7381258 87.74% 1 Australia 0.00% 88.83% 1 Australia 0.00% 87.74% 3 Australia 0.00% 92.00% 1 Australia 0.00% 89.33% 1 Australia 0.00% 93.07% 1 Australia 0.00%
7322436 84.55% 2 Germany 2.33% 85.63% 2 Germany 2.33% 89.87% 1 Germany 2.33% 90.93% 2 Germany 0.00% 86.14% 2 Germany 2.33% 85.62% 4 Germany 2.33%
7291614 81.89% 3 UK 0.00% 82.97% 3 UK 0.00% 88.28% 2 UK 0.00% 85.08% 6 UK 0.00% 82.95% 3 UK 0.00% 88.28% 2 UK 0.00%
7426589 79.77% 4 Poland 0.00% 80.85% 7 Poland 0.00% 86.15% 5 Poland 0.00% 85.08% 4 Poland 0.00% 81.89% 5 Poland 0.00% 85.09% 6 Poland 0.00%
7322370 78.70% 5 Finland 0.00% 81.91% 5 Finland 0.00% 87.21% 4 Finland 0.00% 79.76% 17 Finland 0.00% 81.36% 6 Finland 0.00% 84.56% 8 Finland 0.00%
7334963 78.36% 6 UAE 2.33% 82.97% 4 UAE 2.33% 82.62% 8 UAE 2.33% 82.62% 10 UAE 0.00% 80.48% 10 UAE 2.33% 84.75% 7 UAE 2.33%
7331355 77.83% 7 Portugal 0.00% 80.31% 9 Portugal 0.00% 84.21% 6 Portugal 0.00% 82.08% 12 Portugal 0.00% 82.61% 4 Portugal 0.00% 82.09% 12 Portugal 0.00%
7353645 76.57% 8 Lithuania 0.00% 79.78% 10 Lithuania 0.00% 80.83% 14 Lithuania 0.00% 85.08% 5 Lithuania 0.00% 80.82% 7 Lithuania 0.00% 79.77% 19 Lithuania 0.00%
7433742 76.57% 9 Serbia 0.00% 81.91% 6 Serbia 0.00% 80.83% 13 Serbia 0.00% 82.96% 9 Serbia 0.00% 78.16% 14 Serbia 0.00% 82.43% 11 Serbia 0.00%
7433772 75.51% 10 Ireland 0.00% 76.59% 13 Ireland 0.00% 81.89% 10 Ireland 0.00% 77.64% 24 Ireland 0.00% 80.82% 8 Ireland 0.00% 85.09% 5 Ireland 2.33%
7485138 75.30% 11 Switzerland 0.00% 79.78% 11 Switzerland 0.00% 81.68% 11 Switzerland 0.00% 77.42% 25 Switzerland 0.00% 79.55% 12 Switzerland 0.00% 82.75% 9 Switzerland 0.00%
7736005 74.66% 12 USA 4.65% 75.53% 18 USA 4.65% 76.79% 25 USA 4.65% 83.17% 8 USA 4.65% 80.50% 9 USA 0.00% 82.64% 10 USA 4.65%
7432620 74.53% 13 Greece 0.00% 80.85% 8 Greece 0.00% 78.79% 18 Greece 0.00% 77.72% 23 Greece 0.00% 78.78% 13 Greece 0.00% 81.98% 13 Greece 0.00%
7436086 74.45% 14 Hungary 0.00% 75.53% 19 Hungary 0.00% 78.70% 19 Hungary 0.00% 85.08% 3 Hungary 0.00% 79.76% 11 Hungary 0.00% 78.70% 21 Hungary 9.30%
7476200 74.11% 15 Singapore 0.00% 76.59% 14 Singapore 0.00% 78.36% 20 Singapore 0.00% 78.36% 20 Singapore 0.00% 75.16% 20 Singapore 0.00% 87.94% 3 Singapore 0.00%
7323590 74.11% 16 Denmark 0.00% 76.59% 15 Denmark 0.00% 82.62% 9 Denmark 0.00% 78.36% 21 Denmark 0.00% 77.29% 15 Denmark 0.00% 81.56% 14 Denmark 0.00%
7705647 73.81% 17 Italy 2.33% 75.53% 20 Italy 2.33% 80.19% 15 Italy 2.33% 82.32% 11 Italy 0.00% 76.99% 17 Italy 2.33% 80.19% 17 Italy 2.33%
7439738 73.17% 18 Romania 2.33% 75.53% 21 Romania 2.33% 81.68% 12 Romania 2.33% 80.62% 13 Romania 0.00% 76.36% 18 Romania 2.33% 78.49% 23 Romania 2.33%
7479530 72.85% 19 Austria 9.30% 76.06% 17 Austria 6.98% 77.11% 24 Austria 9.30% 83.49% 7 Austria 4.65% 76.04% 19 Austria 6.98% 78.70% 20 Austria 0.00%
7485841 72.85% 20 Sweden 4.65% 75.00% 22 Sweden 4.65% 83.49% 7 Sweden 2.33% 77.11% 26 Sweden 2.33% 74.44% 21 Sweden 4.65% 81.36% 15 Sweden 4.65%
7662286 71.79% 21 Russia 0.00% 75.00% 23 Russia 0.00% 78.17% 21 Russia 0.00% 80.30% 15 Russia 0.00% 77.10% 16 Russia 0.00% 76.58% 27 Russia 0.00%
7432755 70.64% 22 Netherlands 2.33% 76.59% 16 Netherlands 2.33% 79.15% 17 Netherlands 2.33% 79.15% 19 Netherlands 0.00% 71.70% 25 Netherlands 2.33% 75.96% 28 Netherlands 2.33%
7333337 70.28% 23 Czech R. 4.65% 77.66% 12 Czech R. 2.33% 77.72% 23 Czech R. 2.33% 74.53% 30 Czech R. 4.65% 71.33% 26 Czech R. 4.65% 79.85% 18 Czech R. 4.65%
7321240 69.66% 24 Estonia 2.33% 70.74% 25 Estonia 2.33% 76.04% 26 Estonia 2.33% 80.30% 16 Estonia 0.00% 72.85% 24 Estonia 2.33% 78.70% 22 Estonia 2.33%
7420566 68.91% 25 Iceland 0.00% 71.27% 24 Iceland 0.00% 79.55% 16 Iceland 0.00% 80.62% 14 Iceland 0.00% 73.16% 22 Iceland 0.00% 71.05% 33 Iceland 0.00%
7601145 68.60% 26 Bulgaria 0.00% 69.68% 29 Bulgaria 0.00% 72.85% 27 Bulgaria 0.00% 78.17% 22 Bulgaria 0.00% 72.85% 23 Bulgaria 0.00% 80.83% 16 Bulgaria 0.00%
7323504 67.19% 27 Latvia 2.33% 69.68% 30 Latvia 2.33% 77.83% 22 Latvia 2.33% 76.76% 27 Latvia 0.00% 69.85% 28 Latvia 2.33% 74.64% 30 Latvia 2.33%
7317893 65.91% 28 Canada 6.98% 70.74% 26 Canada 4.65% 70.17% 31 Canada 6.98% 74.42% 31 Canada 6.98% 71.23% 27 Canada 4.65% 77.09% 26 Canada 4.65%
7475610 64.53% 29 Croatia 0.00% 70.21% 27 Croatia 0.00% 70.91% 30 Croatia 0.00% 79.42% 18 Croatia 0.00% 66.12% 31 Croatia 0.00% 71.45% 32 Croatia 0.00%
7306664 63.53% 30 Pakistan 11.63% 70.21% 28 Pakistan 11.63% 65.66% 34 Pakistan 9.30% 70.98% 33 Pakistan 9.30% 68.85% 29 Pakistan 9.30% 78.43% 24 Pakistan 6.98%
7429600 62.74% 31 France 6.98% 65.95% 34 France 4.65% 64.87% 35 France 6.98% 75.51% 28 France 4.65% 66.46% 30 France 4.65% 78.17% 25 France 6.98%
7576288 61.87% 32 Luxembourg 0.00% 66.49% 32 Luxembourg 0.00% 72.51% 28 Luxembourg 0.00% 71.45% 32 Luxembourg 0.00% 65.59% 32 Luxembourg 0.00% 71.45% 31 Luxembourg 0.00%
7457483 60.64% 33 Hong Kong 0.00% 67.02% 31 Hong Kong 0.00% 71.28% 29 Hong Kong 0.00% 63.83% 35 Hong Kong 0.00% 64.89% 34 Hong Kong 0.00% 75.53% 29 Hong Kong 0.00%
7348681 59.74% 34 Slovakia 4.65% 66.49% 33 Slovakia 4.65% 68.25% 33 Slovakia 2.33% 74.64% 29 Slovakia 2.33% 65.06% 33 Slovakia 4.65% 64.53% 35 Slovakia 4.65%
7919248 58.15% 35 Bolivia 0.00% 65.95% 35 Bolivia 0.00% 68.79% 32 Bolivia 0.00% 65.59% 34 Bolivia 0.00% 62.40% 35 Bolivia 0.00% 69.85% 34 Bolivia 0.00%
7864988 42.89% 36 Belgium 20.93% 50.00% 38 Belgium 20.93% 53.53% 37 Belgium 16.28% 56.72% 36 Belgium 16.28% 49.27% 37 Belgium 18.60% 62.05% 36 Belgium 11.63%
7338848 42.02% 37 Antigua 16.28% 61.17% 36 Antigua 13.95% 52.66% 38 Antigua 13.95% 51.59% 38 Antigua 9.30% 45.74% 38 Antigua 16.28% 56.92% 39 Antigua 11.63%
7629632 40.94% 38 Sudan 6.98% 49.46% 40 Sudan 6.98% 53.70% 36 Sudan 6.98% 54.76% 37 Sudan 6.98% 50.50% 36 Sudan 6.98% 55.30% 40 Sudan 0.00%
7427396 33.51% 39 Turkey 0.00% 51.59% 37 Turkey 0.00% 46.28% 39 Turkey 0.00% 40.96% 42 Turkey 0.00% 43.08% 39 Turkey 0.00% 52.13% 41 Turkey 0.00%
7457442 33.19% 40 Morocco 9.30% 44.68% 42 Morocco 6.98% 43.83% 41 Morocco 6.98% 47.02% 40 Morocco 6.98% 39.57% 41 Morocco 9.30% 57.66% 38 Morocco 6.98%
7561808 31.91% 41 Macedonia 2.33% 50.00% 39 Macedonia 2.33% 44.68% 40 Macedonia 2.33% 47.87% 39 Macedonia 2.33% 38.82% 42 Macedonia 2.33% 46.28% 43 Macedonia 0.00%
7294276 30.85% 42 Malaysia 32.56% 41.49% 43 Malaysia 30.23% 39.36% 43 Malaysia 30.23% 42.55% 41 Malaysia 25.58% 41.48% 40 Malaysia 23.26% 58.51% 37 Malaysia 20.93%
7358909 26.60% 43 Libya 4.65% 45.74% 41 Libya 4.65% 39.36% 42 Libya 4.65% 38.30% 43 Libya 2.33% 32.97% 43 Libya 4.65% 50.00% 42 Libya 2.33%
7465330 15.96% 44 Tunisia 18.60% 36.17% 44 Tunisia 13.95% 28.72% 45 Tunisia 18.60% 31.91% 44 Tunisia 13.95% 23.40% 45 Tunisia 18.60% 43.62% 44 Tunisia 9.30%
7359109 15.96% 45 Uganda 2.33% 34.04% 45 Uganda 2.33% 30.85% 44 Uganda 2.33% 31.91% 45 Uganda 0.00% 27.65% 44 Uganda 2.33% 39.36% 45 Uganda 2.33%
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In the example in Table ‎7-34, note that Slovakia’s scored the highest 
percentage when the Financial dimension was removed. This suggests that 
Slovakia should focus more to improve its financial independence to achieve a 
higher overall level of investigation independence. 
France, on the other hand, moved from one category to another (changed 
colour code) when the Financial dimension was removed and also when the 
Operational_Legal dimension was removed. This suggests that the Financial 
and the Operational_Legal dimensions have a big effect on causing France to 
score lower in the 4DMI scale. It also suggests that the accident investigation 
authority in France should consider improving its practices within these two 
dimensions to improve its overall investigation independence.  
Table ‎7-34 Slovakia and France example – removing dimensions 
 Total score & RANK 
(Slovakia) 
Total score & RANK 
(France) 
All Dimensions 59.74%, RANK=34 62.74%, RANK=31 
Without Structural 66.49%, RANK=33 65.95%, RANK=34 
Without Functional 68.25%, RANK=33 64.87%, RANK=35 
Without Financial 74.64%, RANK=29 75.51%, RANK=28 
Without Operational_Political 65.06%, RANK=33 66.46%, RANK=30 
Without Operational_Legal 64.53%, RANK=35 78.17%, RANK=25 
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7.4 Comparing Scores from Each Dimension Separately  
Another set of tables was created to examine the scores of each dimension 
separately. Table ‎7-36 below shows all these tables together in a single table. 
Note that there is no colour-coding. The percentages shown are out of the total 
that could be achieved from that specific dimension only.  
The percentages are reported for the purpose of comparison between the 
scores of all participants within that dimension. Moreover, the changes in the 
RANK based on the scores from each dimension alone are shown in the table 
to illustrate the performance of each State in comparison to the rest of the 
participating States. 
The logic here is straightforward. The scores shown are the percentages that 
each State scored from the 100% possible score in that dimension alone. 
The same examples as before will be used, i.e. Slovakia and France (see Table 
‎7-35). The results show that the lowest score, percentage-wise, for Slovakia 
came from the Financial dimension (12.50%). This confirms the results found 
before (see Table ‎7-34) by removing the Financial dimension. 
Table ‎7-35 Slovakia and France example – for each dimension 
 Total score & RANK 
(Slovakia) 
Total score & RANK 
(France) 
Structural 71.19%, RANK=33 86.29%, RANK=22 
Functional 50.00%, RANK=29 87.50%, RANK=4 
Financial 12.50%, RANK=42 25.00%, RANK=37 
Operational_Political 58.36%, RANK=35 70.87%, RANK=19 
Operational_Legal 83.92%, RANK=7 48.21%, RANK=38 
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The same can be said about France with regard to the Financial dimension. 
However, in the case of France there is another dimension that has a big effect 
on its score and that is the Operational_Legal dimension. Using only the tables 
that show the score from each dimension separately does not show the effect of 
this dimension because there is always room for improvement in all dimensions. 
Hence, it is important to use both of the tables (Table ‎7-33 and Table ‎7-36) to 
see the big picture. 
By using both tables it can be seen that the accident investigation authority in 
France can dramatically improve its overall independence by improving either 
the Financial independence or Operational_Legal independence, or both. On 
the other hand, findings suggest that Slovakia can improve its current total 
score of investigation independence (obtained from the 4DMI) by improving its 
practices in all dimensions, although the Financial dimension seems to be the 
weakest between all dimensions. 
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Table ‎7-36 Total Score from each dimension separately 
 
 
ID# % of Total Score RANK
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) % 
% of score from 
Structural 
dimension
RANK (Structural 
Dimension)
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) % 
% of score from 
Functional 
dimension
RANK (Functional 
Dimension)
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't 
know
 (or 
missing) % 
% of score 
from Financial 
dimension
RANK (Financial 
Dimension)
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) 
% 
% of Score from 
Operational_Poli
tical Dimension
RANK 
(Operational_Politic
al Dimension)
ICAO-Member State
 Don't know
 (or missing) % 
% of Score from 
Operational_Leg
al Dimension
RANK 
(Operational_Legal 
Dimension)
ICAO-Member 
State
 Don't know
 (or missing) 
% 
7381258 87.74% 1 Australia 0.00% 95.38% 2 Australia 0.00% 100.00% 1 Australia 0.00% 75.01% 7 Australia 0.00% 87.54% 5 Australia 0.00% 82.14% 8 Australia 0.00%
7322436 84.55% 2 Germany 2.33% 95.38% 3 Germany 0.00% 68.75% 14 Germany 0.00% 62.50% 15 Germany 2.33% 87.54% 6 Germany 0.00% 96.42% 1 Germany 0.00%
7291614 81.89% 3 UK 0.00% 95.38% 4 UK 2.33% 62.50% 15 UK 0.00% 81.26% 4 UK 0.00% 91.71% 1 UK 0.00% 78.56% 15 UK 0.00%
7426589 79.77% 4 Poland 0.00% 95.38% 5 Poland 0.00% 62.50% 16 Poland 0.00% 68.76% 14 Poland 0.00% 83.37% 10 Poland 0.00% 82.14% 9 Poland 0.00%
7322370 78.70% 5 Finland 0.00% 86.29% 18 Finland 0.00% 50.00% 25 Finland 0.00% 93.76% 1 Finland 0.00% 79.20% 12 Finland 0.00% 80.35% 12 Finland 0.00%
7334963 78.36% 6 UAE 2.33% 80.29% 24 UAE 0.00% 75.00% 5 UAE 0.00% 75.01% 8 UAE 2.33% 83.37% 11 UAE 0.00% 78.56% 16 UAE 0.00%
7331355 77.83% 7 Portugal 0.00% 89.38% 14 Portugal 0.00% 62.50% 17 Portugal 0.00% 75.01% 9 Portugal 0.00% 62.53% 29 Portugal 0.00% 85.71% 4 Portugal 0.00%
7353645 76.57% 8 Lithuania 0.00% 86.29% 19 Lithuania 0.00% 75.00% 6 Lithuania 0.00% 50.00% 21 Lithuania 0.00% 66.70% 22 Lithuania 0.00% 89.28% 3 Lithuania 0.00%
7433742 76.57% 9 Serbia 0.00% 77.20% 27 Serbia 9.30% 75.00% 7 Serbia 0.00% 62.50% 16 Serbia 0.00% 87.54% 7 Serbia 0.00% 80.35% 13 Serbia 0.00%
7433772 75.51% 10 Ireland 0.00% 95.38% 6 Ireland 0.00% 62.50% 18 Ireland 0.00% 87.51% 2 Ireland 0.00% 58.36% 30 Ireland 0.00% 67.85% 26 Ireland 0.00%
7485138 75.30% 11 Switzerland 0.00% 80.83% 23 Switzerland 0.00% 62.50% 19 Switzerland 0.00% 87.51% 3 Switzerland 0.00% 66.70% 23 Switzerland 0.00% 74.99% 19 Switzerland 0.00%
7736005 74.66% 12 USA 4.65% 96.29% 1 USA 0.00% 87.50% 2 USA 0.00% 50.00% 22 USA 0.00% 54.19% 36 USA 4.65% 73.21% 23 USA 0.00%
7432620 74.53% 13 Greece 0.00% 73.01% 30 Greece 0.00% 75.00% 8 Greece 0.00% 81.26% 5 Greece 0.00% 66.70% 24 Greece 0.00% 74.99% 20 Greece 0.00%
7436086 74.45% 14 Hungary 0.00% 95.38% 7 Hungary 0.00% 75.00% 9 Hungary 0.00% 37.50% 31 Hungary 0.00% 58.36% 31 Hungary 0.00% 85.71% 5 Hungary 0.00%
7476200 74.11% 15 Singapore 0.00% 89.38% 16 Denmark 0.00% 75.00% 10 Singapore 0.00% 75.01% 10 Singapore 0.00% 91.71% 2 Singapore 0.00% 53.57% 32 Singapore 0.00%
7323590 74.11% 16 Denmark 0.00% 89.38% 15 Singapore 0.00% 50.00% 26 Denmark 0.00% 75.01% 11 Denmark 0.00% 75.04% 14 Denmark 0.00% 74.99% 21 Denmark 0.00%
7705647 73.81% 17 Italy 2.33% 92.65% 10 Italy 0.00% 62.50% 20 Italy 0.00% 50.00% 23 Italy 2.33% 75.04% 15 Italy 0.00% 78.56% 17 Italy 0.00%
7439738 73.17% 18 Romania 2.33% 89.93% 12 Romania 0.00% 50.00% 27 Romania 0.00% 56.25% 17 Romania 2.33% 75.04% 16 Romania 0.00% 82.14% 10 Romania 0.00%
7479530 72.85% 19 Austria 9.30% 86.29% 20 Austria 0.00% 75.00% 11 Austria 0.00% 37.50% 32 Austria 4.65% 75.04% 17 Austria 2.33% 80.35% 14 Austria 0.00%
7485841 72.85% 20 Sweden 4.65% 90.83% 11 Sweden 0.00% 37.50% 31 Sweden 2.33% 75.01% 12 Sweden 2.33% 87.54% 8 Sweden 0.00% 71.42% 24 Sweden 0.00%
7662286 71.79% 21 Russia 0.00% 86.29% 21 Russia 0.00% 62.50% 21 Russia 0.00% 50.00% 24 Russia 0.00% 58.36% 32 Russia 0.00% 83.92% 6 Russia 0.00%
7432755 70.64% 22 Netherlands 2.33% 74.56% 29 Netherlands 2.33% 50.00% 28 Netherlands 0.00% 50.00% 25 Netherlands 2.33% 91.71% 3 Netherlands 0.00% 82.14% 11 Netherlands 0.00%
7333337 70.28% 23 Czech R. 4.65% 68.47% 35 Czech R. 0.00% 56.25% 24 Czech R. 2.33% 75.01% 13 Czech R. 0.00% 91.71% 4 Czech R. 0.00% 67.85% 27 Czech R. 0.00%
7321240 69.66% 24 Estonia 2.33% 95.38% 8 Estonia 0.00% 62.50% 22 Estonia 0.00% 37.50% 33 Estonia 2.33% 75.04% 18 Estonia 0.00% 69.64% 25 Estonia 0.00%
7420566 68.91% 25 Iceland 0.00% 89.93% 13 Iceland 0.00% 37.50% 32 Iceland 0.00% 31.25% 34 Iceland 0.00% 66.70% 25 Iceland 0.00% 92.85% 2 Iceland 0.00%
7601145 68.60% 26 Bulgaria 0.00% 95.38% 9 Bulgaria 0.00% 75.00% 12 Bulgaria 0.00% 43.75% 27 Bulgaria 0.00% 66.70% 26 Bulgaria 0.00% 58.92% 31 Bulgaria 0.00%
7323504 67.19% 27 Latvia 2.33% 89.38% 17 Latvia 4.65% 37.50% 33 Latvia 0.00% 43.75% 28 Latvia 2.33% 79.20% 13 Latvia 0.00% 74.99% 22 Latvia 0.00%
7317893 65.91% 28 Canada 6.98% 79.38% 26 Canada 0.00% 75.00% 13 Canada 0.00% 50.00% 26 Canada 0.00% 58.36% 33 Canada 2.33% 62.49% 29 Canada 2.33%
7475610 64.53% 29 Croatia 0.00% 75.74% 28 Croatia 6.98% 62.50% 23 Croatia 0.00% 12.50% 41 Croatia 0.00% 87.54% 9 Croatia 0.00% 76.78% 18 Croatia 0.00%
7306664 63.53% 30 Pakistan 11.63% 71.47% 32 Pakistan 0.00% 87.50% 3 Pakistan 2.33% 56.25% 18 Pakistan 2.33% 58.36% 34 Pakistan 2.33% 50.00% 35 Pakistan 4.65%
7429600 62.74% 31 France 6.98% 86.29% 22 France 0.00% 87.50% 4 France 0.00% 25.00% 37 France 2.33% 70.87% 19 France 2.33% 48.21% 38 France 0.00%
7576288 61.87% 32 Luxembourg 0.00% 80.29% 25 Luxembourg 0.00% 37.50% 34 Luxembourg 0.00% 43.75% 29 Luxembourg 0.00% 70.87% 20 Luxembourg 0.00% 67.85% 28 Luxembourg 0.00%
7457483 60.64% 33 Hong Kong 0.00% 72.74% 31 Hong Kong 0.00% 37.50% 35 Hong Kong 0.00% 81.26% 6 Hong Kong 0.00% 66.70% 27 Hong Kong 0.00% 50.00% 36 Hong Kong 0.00%
7348681 59.74% 34 Slovakia 4.65% 71.19% 33 Slovakia 0.00% 50.00% 29 Slovakia 2.33% 12.50% 42 Slovakia 2.33% 58.36% 35 Slovakia 0.00% 83.92% 7 Slovakia 0.00%
7919248 58.15% 35 Bolivia 0.00% 66.65% 36 Bolivia 0.00% 37.50% 36 Bolivia 0.00% 56.25% 19 Bolivia 0.00% 66.70% 28 Bolivia 0.00% 60.71% 30 Bolivia 0.00%
7864988 42.89% 36 Belgium 20.93% 69.65% 34 Belgium 6.98% 37.50% 37 Belgium 4.65% 18.75% 38 Belgium 4.65% 50.02% 37 Belgium 2.33% 35.71% 40 Belgium 9.30%
7338848 42.02% 37 Antigua 16.28% 18.19% 43 Antigua 2.33% 37.50% 38 Antigua 2.33% 43.75% 30 Antigua 6.98% 70.87% 21 Antigua 0.00% 50.00% 37 Antigua 4.65%
7629632 40.94% 38 Sudan 6.98% 63.56% 37 Sudan 2.33% 25.00% 40 Sudan 0.00% 18.75% 39 Sudan 0.00% 25.01% 42 Sudan 0.00% 51.78% 33 Sudan 6.98%
7427396 33.51% 39 Turkey 0.00% 22.73% 40 Turkey 0.00% 25.00% 41 Turkey 0.00% 56.25% 20 Turkey 0.00% 25.01% 43 Turkey 0.00% 37.50% 39 Turkey 0.00%
7457442 33.19% 40 Morocco 9.30% 50.92% 39 Morocco 0.00% 37.50% 39 Morocco 2.33% 18.75% 40 Morocco 2.33% 50.02% 38 Morocco 0.00% 17.86% 43 Morocco 2.33%
7561808 31.91% 41 Macedonia 2.33% 22.73% 41 Macedonia 2.33% 25.00% 42 Macedonia 0.00% 6.25% 43 Macedonia 0.00% 45.85% 40 Macedonia 0.00% 51.78% 34 Macedonia 2.33%
7294276 30.85% 42 Malaysia 32.56% 54.56% 38 Malaysia 0.00% 50.00% 30 Malaysia 2.33% 31.25% 35 Malaysia 6.98% 16.67% 44 Malaysia 9.30% 7.14% 44 Malaysia 11.63%
7358909 26.60% 43 Libya 4.65% 18.19% 44 Libya 0.00% 25.00% 43 Libya 0.00% 31.25% 36 Libya 2.33% 50.02% 39 Libya 0.00% 21.43% 41 Libya 2.33%
7465330 15.96% 44 Tunisia 18.60% 13.64% 45 Tunisia 4.65% 25.00% 44 Tunisia 0.00% 6.25% 44 Tunisia 4.65% 41.69% 41 Tunisia 0.00% 7.14% 45 Tunisia 9.30%
7359109 15.96% 45 Uganda 2.33% 22.73% 42 Uganda 0.00% 12.50% 45 Uganda 0.00% 6.25% 45 Uganda 2.33% 8.34% 45 Uganda 0.00% 21.43% 42 Uganda 0.00%
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7.5 Results from Qualitative Questions 
In this questionnaire, three qualitative, open-ended questions were asked. The 
answers were analysed and grouped into categories where appropriate. 
In response to question Q26 “How do you know if the agency’s 
investigations are perceived by the public as being credible and 
impartial?” 20 out of 68 responses (around 30%) said they “don’t know”. Some 
have indicated that the investigations are not being perceived by the public as 
credible or impartial (seven times). Other respondents have identified one or 
more factors that they consider as indicators of the public perceiving the 
investigations as credible and impartial. Table ‎7-37 show the categories and 
corresponding number of responses for each category. 
Actual and perceived independence can be different. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
discussed the perception of independence and its requirements, as stated in 
ICAO document Doc 9756 titled “Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation”. The document states that [emphasis added], “the investigation 
authority must be strictly objective and totally impartial and must also be 
perceived to be so”. The ICAO document indicates how important impartiality is 
and also the perception of being impartial. Nevertheless, the data suggest that 
many ICAO States still do not know how to “sense” or “measure” this 
perception.  
Some participants (16) indicated that investigation agencies use feedback for 
this purpose. Others (14) indicated that media or press is the source of this 
information. Feedback is an active process where the accident investigation 
authority seeks feedback from the public using questionnaires or similar tools, 
or at least invites it using their website or similar means. The media or press, on 
the other hand, are passive techniques in collecting feedback about the 
perception of the public. Therefore, accident investigation agencies can only 
react to the media/press after the fact, while agencies that seek feedback from 
the public are proactive in their approach. The feedback that comes through the 
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media/press is usually harmful to the independence of the agency and creates a 
lot of pressure from the public, government, and other parties. For these 
reasons, the 4DMI model gives a score of one point to all answers that mention 
“feedback”, and zero otherwise, including the answers that mention 
“media/press” as indicators of public perception. 
One participant stated that in their “culture” this is “out of question”. There are 
no further data to explain why this is the case in this State. This answer could 
be related to other replies (three) such as “that is how the agency is setup”, 
which suggests that it is culturally out of question.  
In general, the results suggest that there is no agreement on how to “measure” 
this public perception of the level of credibility and impartiality of the agency’s 
investigations. Additionally, there is no clear guidance available to describe how 
to go about this. The results also suggest that different countries do this in 
different ways and the most notable is by using direct feedback or feedback 
from the media or press. 
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Table ‎7-37 Qualitative analysis for Q26 
Categories (Q26) Number of 
responses 
Don’t Know 20 
Feedback 16 
Media or Press 14 
My own experience 8 
Not (credible/impartial) 7 
Published Reports 6 
Public not aware or Don’t know 4 
Absence of litigation 3 
That is how the agency is setup 3 
Transparency  1 
Culture 1 
Method of investigation 1 
Open meetings 1 
From Politicians 1 
Experienced Staff 1 
Separation from others 1 
In response to question Q48 “In your opinion, what factors influence the 
independence of the accident investigation agency/authority?” 32 out of 
the 68 (47%) respondents either said “don’t know” or did not answer this 
question. Table ‎7-38 shows the replies in categories. 
The purpose of this question is to understand what factors are considered by 
professionals as threats to the independence of accident investigations. Out of 
68 total participants, 32 responses (47%) said that they don’t know or did not 
answer. This is an optional question. It is not clear why this many did not 
answer the question. However, if the 30% who said they don’t know to the 
obligatory question (Q26) above are considered, which draws from the 
respondents’ experiences in the same domain as this question, it can be said 
that the respondents may actually not know the answer to this question as 
opposed to the probability that they skipped it for other reasons. In this case, it 
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could be an indication that most of the participants do not understand the 
threats that could influence the independence of accident investigations.  
On the other hand, the number one reason given by most respondents in 
answer to this question is that they believe budget influences the independence 
of investigations. It is interesting that budget comes before the consideration of 
separation from government. In fact, “separation from government” comes third 
after “budget” and “external pressure”, which also has elements of financial 
influence. 
So, can money simply solve the problem of investigation independence? 
Nigeria has been spending a great deal of money recently to recover from the 
setback in its economy caused by the weak safety record of its aviation 
industry. On 3rd June 2012, DANA Air Flight 992, registration 5N-RAM, a 
Boeing MD-83 aircraft, crashed into a densely populated area during a forced 
landing following a total loss of power in both engines while on approach to 
Murtala Muhammed Airport of Lagos, Nigeria. 153 people on board died as a 
result of the crash in addition to ten more deaths on the ground. Weather 
conditions were poor at the time. The airplane was destroyed as a result of the 
crash and the post-crash fire (AIB of Nigeria, 2012). 
(CBSNEWS, 3 June 2012; DailyMail, 3 June 2012) reported that the Nigerian 
authorities could not prevent thousands of people from gathering at the crash 
site of Dana Air aircraft, which crashed into a densely populated site in the 
largest city in Nigeria. People were trying to help rescue any survivors, but they 
were all over the landing gear, wings and evidence of the crash site.  
Witnesses reported that the fire-fighters could not put out the fire for many 
hours and if it was not for the help of volunteers, the fire would have spread to 
the immediate neighbourhood and caused other disasters (Ezeobi and 
Akintunde, 2012). The Nigerian Aircraft Investigation Bureau (AIB) disclosed 
that the FDR of the Dana Air crashed aircraft was damaged because of the post 
crash fire. Usman Mukhtar, the AIB Commissioner explained that the FDR’s 
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solid component was retrieved but the data were lost (The Street Journal, 
December 2012).  
In December, 2012 Mukhtar reported that the Nigerian Air Investigation Bureau 
(AIB) was close to inaugurating its CVR/FDR laboratory, which cost $5.5 million 
(Ateba, Dec 2012). However, there can be no benefit from FDR reading 
facilities that cost a great deal of money if the FDR itself is damaged.  
Financial issues are discussed again in the analysis of the answers to the 
financial dimension’s questions.  
Table ‎7-38 Qualitative analysis for Q48 
Categories (Q48) Number of 
responses 
Don’t know or Missing 32 
Budget 14 
External pressure 12 
Separation from Government 11 
Staff quality and experience 7 
Public expectation/ Attitude/ Culture 6 
Legislation/ Law 6 
Chief Inspector integrity/ Strength /Independence 4 
Agency tradition 1 
Loss of focus 1 
Lack of participation, other than of the Manufacturers 1 
Shortage of resources (Staff) 1 
Understanding Int’l constraints 1 
Cooperation and Communication 1 
Industry size 1 
As shown in Table 8-2, many of the participants mentioned lack of resources 
(budget/staff) as factors that could influence the independence of aircraft 
accident investigations. ICAO has addressed this problem by proposing a 
solution to share resources between States in the same region, as will be 
discussed next. 
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7.5.1 Regional Accident and Incident Investigation Organisations 
(RAIO) as a Solution 
Costa, the Chief of Accident Investigation and Prevention Section in ICAO, 
reported that ICAO USOAP audits found “in many regions a number of states 
have not been able to implement an effective accident and incident investigation 
system”, which means that these States are not complying with Article 26 of the 
Chicago Convention. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention obligates the State 
of occurrence, i.e. in which an aircraft accident occurs, to launch an 
investigation into the circumstances of the accident. The State cannot meet its 
mandate unless it has a proper organisation in place when it faces such a 
scenario. This lack of effective implementation has been linked to the 
insufficient human and financial resources, according to Costa. Other 
contributing factors to this problem have been identified as: lack of appropriate 
legislation and regulation; lack of training system for investigators; and lack of 
equipment to conduct investigations (Costa, 2011). 
Costa suggested forming a regional investigation system as a solution to this 
problem. A regional investigation system would allow sharing of resources, 
which in turn would help States in meeting their obligations.  
ICAO published a Regional Accident and Incident Investigation Organization 
(RAIO) (Doc. 9946) manual to help States in the establishment of such a 
system. This is the first time that ICAO has done this. The RAIO manual is 
aimed at high-level government decision makers.  
Costa discussed the importance of the independence of RAIO. He explained 
that “independence” means functionally independent from other organisations, 
especially the CAA. He also mentioned that RAIO independence is necessary 
for the credibility of investigations and to avoid real or perceived conflicts of 
interest. 
Costa (2011) listed the following reasons to support the need for establishing an 
RAIO: 
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 To share human, technical, and financial resources and eliminate 
duplication of efforts 
 To improve effectiveness and efficiency by achieving economies of scale 
 To enable investigators to gain experience more quickly 
 To help achieve the independence of investigations 
Two examples of RAIOs that have already been established are: the Inter-state 
Aviation Committee representing 12 states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan); and the Banjul 
Accord Group Accident Investigation Agency (BAGAIA) in Africa consisting of 
seven states (Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra 
Leone). 
RAIO objectives are summarised as (Costa, 2011): 
 Enhance cooperation and collaboration in aircraft accidents and incidents 
investigation between its Member States 
 Ensure the establishment of an independent, impartial, professionally 
trained, and adequately funded RAIO 
 Enhance accidents and incidents information sharing between its 
members and the rest of the international community 
 Ensure that all aircraft accidents and incidents that occur in its Member 
States are investigated in compliance with ICAO Annex 13 SARPs 
7.5.1.1 RAIO Investigation Effectiveness and Independence 
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), the RAIO mentioned above, 
investigated one of the most controversial and high profile air accidents in the 
recent history, namely the Polish Tu-154M crash in Russia occurred on 10 April 
2010. 
A Tupolev Tu-154M Polish aircraft, carrying Polish president Lech Kaczynski 
and his wife, 18 Polish parliament members, Poland’s deputy foreign minister, 
and other senior polish officials, crashed near the city of Smolensk, Russia on 
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10 April 2010 killing 96 people on board. The pilots attempted landing in 
reduced visibility. The aircraft approached the runway too low, hit trees that 
were not visible because of the fog, and crashed (IAC, 2011; Committee for 
Investigation of National Aviation Accidents, 2011). 
According to ICAO-Annex13, the State of Occurrence (Russia in this case) is 
responsible for investigating the accident, which it did. In addition, Poland 
started its own investigation. Moreover, prosecutors from both countries 
launched criminal investigations. 
Russian Prime Minister Valdimir Putin said “everything must be done to 
establish the reasons for this tragedy in the shortest possible time…”, and 
announced that he would personally oversee the investigation into the crash 
(BBC News, 2010). 
This statement from the Russian Prime Minister can be taken as an indication of 
political pressure and interference with the safety investigation. The 
investigation may not be considered independent, and certainly is not perceived 
by the public as being independent. 
Soon after the crash, the President of Russia established a special commission 
for the investigation of the accident with the Russian Prime Minister as the 
Investigator-In-Charge (Lenta.RU, 2010). 
The IAC and Polish final reports blamed the accident on pilots for descending 
too low. Poland’s special aviation and its leaders are strongly criticised in the 
Polish report. Also, the Polish report criticized the lack in performance of the 
Russian ATC and airport’s lighting. In general, and despite the initial suspicions 
of political influence, Poland stated that the investigation was conducted in an 
open and fair manner (IAC, 2011; Committee for Investigation of National 
Aviation Accidents, 2011). 
The public, however, felt differently. A website has been created by the 2010 
Katyn Families Association (set up and run by family members of the victims) 
protesting against the findings of the reports and the whole investigation 
 205 
 
process. Initially, however, the website was created for the promotion of the 
public hearing organised by The European Conservatives and Reformists 
Group and the 2010 Katyn Families Association and held in the European 
Parliament in Brussels on March 28th 2012. According to the website, the public 
hearing was an “opportunity for the international public at large to find out how 
inadequate the investigation and evidence examination has been to date.” (The 
2010 Katyn Families Association, 2010) 
The website claims that both the Russian and Polish reports are “unavoidably 
political”, biased, and has inherent conflict of interest. The website indicated that 
the people who were responsible for organising the Tu-154 flight are the ones 
who prepared the final Polish government report. Moreover, they claim that 
most of the findings in both reports have been proven to be false and 
unfounded. In addition, the Polish final report has no legal basis because the 
committee investigated the crash was created and operated in accordance to 
provisions that are contradictory to aviation law, according to the website. 
The objective of this website is to (The 2010 Katyn Families Association, 2010): 
 abolish false, hasty judgments and verdicts made; 
 bring awareness and inform the general public at large of new findings; 
 bring to light the true nature of events and circumstances behind the 
tragedy of April 10th 2010; 
 lobby for the establishment of an independent body of international 
experts, to carry out the investigation of the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-
154M crash transparently in accordance with international standards and 
supervision, free from any potential conflict of interests. 
It is obvious how the political influence has demolished public trust in the 
investigations and reduced the effectiveness of the RAIO. The IAC and Polish 
investigations are not being perceived as independent, regardless of the 
investigations’ final results. 
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As a result of people’s perception of the investigation, more conspiracy erupted. 
For example, some believe that (Piasta, 2010): 
 The claim of the plane's collision with a tree is not backed by evidence in 
the Russian IAC’s official report. 
 Crucial evidence was tampered with and even destroyed. 
 The reported readings from the FDRs were altered to misrepresent the 
situation in the cockpit during the final stage of the flight. 
 The autopsies data provided by Russians have been proven to be false. 
 Independent investigators proved that the disintegration of the aircraft 
started 26 meters above the ground, as a result of two successive 
disturbances of unknown nature, which shook the aircraft. 
 The Polish Parliamentary Group for the Investigation of the Polish 
President Plane Crash was formed by opposition MP's to investigate this 
case; however, they have a very limited access to crucial pieces of 
evidence which are being withheld by Russia as well as by Polish 
Authorities. 
There are many benefits in establishing RAIOs. RAIOs are designed in such a 
way that they are a means of sharing valuable resources between RAIO 
members and a way to reduce duplication in efforts. In addition, RAIOs allow 
involved investigators in that region to gain experience quickly. However these 
benefits are faced with challenges specific to such setups.  
The main challenges for the establishment of RAIOs are (ICAO-RASG, 2008): 
• lack of a solid regional framework;  
• resistance to the change “regional dimension”;  
• lack of resources (funds and expertise);  
• sovereignty;  
• self-sufficiency; and  
• lack of coordination of the initiatives:  
o within the region; and  
o with the int’l partners and donors. 
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It is not clear if ICAO audit RAIOs in the same way as they audit ICAO Member 
States, however, the independence of the RAIO must be ensured to realise the 
benefits of such setup. The IAC, and the Polish, investigations discussed above 
did not demonstrate adequate investigation independence and because of that 
lost the trust and confidence of the public.  
7.5.2 Correlation between ICAO USOAP Results and 4DMI Results 
The SPSS software was used to perform a correlation analysis between the 
published results from ICAO USOAP audits (level of implementation) that are 
related to accident investigations, and the results from the 4DMI model 
introduced in this research. The results from the 4DMI model are expected to 
have some level of correlation with the results from the “level of implementation” 
published by ICAO, but strong correlation is not expected because, while the 
4DMI is a measure of investigation independence, the USOAP is a measure of 
compliance. Correlation is expected, however, because the analysis of Annex 
13 done in Chapter 6 of this thesis shows that Annex 13 is based on the 
principle of investigation independence and, therefore, States that score high in 
their compliance with the Annex should score high in their 4DMI scores. 
ICAO reports the level of implementation in a different way from the reported 
results from the 4DMI. ICAO reports results between 0 and 10, where “0” 
means “not implemented” and “10” means “fully implemented”, as shown in the 
Safety Audit Information page in the ICAO website (ICAO, 2013). The 4DMI 
Total scores are treated to prepare them for the correlation analysis. All Total 
scores were approximated to the nearest integer and divided by 10 to match the 
ICAO system. For example, a score of 77.30 is approximated to 80 and divided 
by 10 to give a result of 8 to match the ICAO scale. The results of the 
correlation analysis are shown in Table ‎7-39. 
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Table ‎7-39 Correlations between 4DMI and ICAO USOAP results 
 Rank from 
ICAO Level of 
implementation 
Approximate 
Total Score to 
compare with 
ICAO rank 
Rank from ICAO Level of 
implementation 
Pearson Correlation 1 .548** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 45 45 
Approximate Total Score 
to compare with ICAO 
rank 
Pearson Correlation .548** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 45 45 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
In conclusion, as expected, there is a moderate positive correlation between the 
two variables (ICAO USOAP level of implementation and 4DMI independence 
score) with 99% confidence level. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
(r=0.548) and the correlation is statistically significant (sig<0.01) as shown in 
Table ‎7-39. 
The results suggest that States that score high in the 4DMI are expected, in 
general, to score high in the ICAO USOAP level of implementation index. 
7.6 Key Findings and Conclusions 
The research identifies the following seven common characteristics that are 
mostly found in, or practised by, accident investigation authorities in the States 
that have higher levels of investigation independence:  
1. They are separated functionally, structurally and physically (in different 
buildings) from the Operation authorities. 
2. They do not have on-loan or part-time employees from the industry 
working for them. 
3. The head of the investigation authority reports to the Minister of 
Transportation or equal level. 
4. Safety investigators have immediate and unrestricted access to all 
relevant evidence without prior consent from anybody. 
5. The accident investigation procedures are specified in the National 
Legislation and Regulations. 
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6. The acceptance rate for the safety recommendations is measured. 
7. The investigation authority has sufficient budgetary resources. 
In addition, the research identified the following six common characteristics that 
are mostly found in, or practised by accident investigation authorities in the 
States that have the lowest levels of investigation independence: 
1. The investigation authority is specific to aviation. 
2. The investigation authority is not physically separate from the regulator. 
3. There is no law or regulation to prevent the use of safety findings in a 
judicial inquiry. 
4. The investigation authority requires the approval of another government 
body to release a report. 
5. The regulation does not clearly state that safety investigators are 
precluded from testifying in courts in litigation processes emanating from 
safety investigation reports. 
6. The safety recommendations acceptance rate is not measured. 
Additionally, the data show that States in this category (Low-independence) 
have single-mode, aviation-specific accident investigation authorities in general 
(8 out of 10 States, 80%). However, there is no evidence that changing to a 
multi-modal setup will help the independence of the investigation authority. 
Other categories do not seem to have any agreement on this point. 
Also, the data suggest that the physical separation between the accident 
investigation authority and the regulator is a clear characteristic of the States 
within the Low-Independence category. 10 out of 10 States (100%) within this 
category indicated that the accident investigation authorities in their States are 
not physically separate from the regulator. On the other hand, all other 
categories indicated that the two are physically separate in their States (see 
Figure ‎7-23). 
ICAO document Doc 9756 titled “Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation” indicates how important is both impartiality and the perception of 
being impartial. Nevertheless, the data collected in this research suggest that 
many ICAO States still do not know how to “sense” or “measure” this 
perception. In general, the results may suggest that there is no agreement 
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about how to “measure” this public perception of the level of credibility and 
impartiality of the agency’s investigations. Additionally, there is no clear 
guidance available to describe how to go about this. The results also suggest 
that different countries do this in different ways. Some States use a proactive 
approach by seeking feedback using questionnaires or similar tools, and other 
States use a reactive approach by relying on feedback from the media and 
press. 
In addition, the results show that the focus of many ICAO Member States is on 
the separation from the CAA. Moreover, this separation is focused on 
“functional” and “structural” separation; however, less emphasis is given to 
physical separation. This may suggest that the focus is centred on compliance 
with ICAO Annex 13 requirements. 
Also, data show that most of the participants in the survey (73.53% out of 68 
replies) indicated that the accident investigation authority in their States is 
structured in a way that allows it to speak freely to the media through its own 
spokesperson in the event of an accident. 
Out of 68 respondents, 51.5% said their States do not have FDR readout 
facilities. When the frequency analysis was regenerated for 45 cases, where 
each State has one entry only, the results indicated that 66% (30 States out of 
45) do not have these facilities. This situation may suggest dependency on 
outside facilities, their integrity, and the integrity of their employees, and 
therefore may suggest a lack of functional independence of these accident 
investigation authorities. 
Only 42.6% (out of 68 participants) said that the accident investigation authority 
in their States has a “voluntary accident reporting system”. Although having a 
voluntary reporting system within the accident investigation authority is not a 
requirement, it can highly enhance the independence and perception of 
independence of the accident investigation authority. 
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Surprisingly, 78% (out of 68 replies) thought of ICAO Annex 13 as a regulation; 
13.2% out of the 78% have Annex 13 as their only source of regulation for 
accident investigation procedures. This may suggest that there is a widespread, 
false belief that ICAO Annex 13 contains directly applicable regulations at the 
State’s national legislation or regulation level.  
Moreover, the results from the analysis of ICAO Annex 13 show that there are 
12 elements that can be considered as indicators of Annex 13 SARPs “spirit” 
with regard to the independence of aircraft accident investigation. Their benefits 
can be achieved by any aircraft accident investigation authority if they are 
understood and implemented correctly. ICAO provides guidance on how to 
implement Annex 13 correctly. However, out of 68 participants, 60% of the 
participants in this research indicated that ICAO guidance “could be improved.”  
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Achievement of Research Objectives and Answering the 
Research Question 
The objectives of this research, as stated in Chapter 1, have been achieved as 
follows:  
1. The current measures of independence that exist in aviation and other 
disciplines such as the Economy, Legal, and Political Science were 
studied and, where possible, utilised. 
2. A methodology to measure the formal and informal (de jure and de facto) 
independence of air accident investigation in ICAO Member States was 
developed. 
3. The developed methodology was used to expose the gaps that need to 
be filled to bring an ICAO Member State’s accident investigation to the 
desired level of independence. 
4. The results from applying the developed measuring index to a sample of 
ICAO Member States were analysed and presented. 
Moreover, the main research question was answered: 
Is it possible to measure the independence of air accident investigation in ICAO 
Member States? 
The answer to the question is “Yes it can be measured.” This research proves 
the possibility of measuring the independence of air accident investigations in 
ICAO Member States. 
8.2 Originality 
The research benefits from extensively modifying and applying measuring 
techniques from different disciplines such as Political Science, Judicial 
Systems, and Banking Systems. 
The research also establishes the bases for new research in improving aviation 
safety by proactively measuring the current situation to clearly establish where 
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valuable resources can be utilised to improve the independence of aircraft 
accident investigation authorities. 
In addition, the research introduces a four dimensional measuring index (4DMI) 
which bridges some of the existing research gaps in the area of investigation 
independence in the field of Air Transport. 
Moreover, the research provides analysis for ICAO Annex 13 to extract the 
most important elements that are related to investigation independence, and 
shows that it is based on the concept of independent accident investigation. 
Finally, this study analyses and presents data from accident investigation 
authorities from 45 different countries. 
8.3 Contributions 
The independence of air accident investigations is a required characteristic that 
ensures the credibility of investigation authorities and allows stakeholders to 
trust them and voluntarily provide sensitive and valuable information that could 
ensure greater safety of air transport. Although a fundamental principle, very 
few studies have attempted to understand and/or measure the concept of 
independence, such as the studies concerned with the independence of Central 
Banks, independence in transportation in general, and the independence of 
Regulatory Agencies. However, there are no in-depth studies in this area 
specific to aircraft accident investigations. In addition, the development of a 
comprehensive measuring index for the independence of aircraft accident 
investigations in ICAO Member States has not been done before. This research 
fills this gap by introducing a comprehensive four dimensional measuring index 
(4DMI) that is specifically developed for measuring the independence of aircraft 
accident investigation authorities in ICAO Member States. This research also 
presents the analysis and the results of applying the 4DMI index to 45 ICAO 
Member States.  
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8.4 Summary of Research 
This research investigates safety and air accident investigations focusing on the 
concept of independence. The literature was consulted for previous, related 
research in the field of air transport and other fields in order to understand this 
concept. Also, ICAO Annex 13 was analysed to extract the main elements 
within the Annex SARPs that are related to the concept of independence. 
Moreover, several interviews were conducted with experts from the field of air 
transport to understand more about this concept. Finally, an electronic survey 
was created and sent to air accident investigation authorities around the world 
to collect data and learn from their experiences.  
The argument in this research deals with the possibility of measuring the 
independence of air accident investigations in ICAO Member States. But the 
attempt to measure brought other questions: Why do we want to measure? How 
do we measure? What is the “investigation independence” that we want to 
measure?  
This research claims that “investigation independence” can be understood and 
measured using several indicators that give indications about the “benefits” or 
“goals” of investigation independence. Experts’ understandings, ICAO 
documents, and other related studies were the source of the indicators used in 
the survey and in the 4DMI measuring index. 
ICAO Annex 13 was analysed to extract the elements related to the concept of 
investigation independence. Moreover, published articles, reports, experts’ 
interviews, and experts’ talks were used where possible to extract what they 
consider to be important indicators of good investigation independence or a lack 
of independence. 
A survey was created using these indicators and piloted. The refined survey 
was sent electronically to accident investigation authorities around the world, 
with a covering letter from an expert in the field to encourage them to respond 
for the purpose of research. All this was done in accordance with the guidelines 
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from the Ethics Committee of Cranfield University. An ethics proposal was 
submitted to the Committee highlighting the research plan with a copy of the 
survey and was later approved by the Committee. 
After receiving the responses, the scoring scheme was discussed with two 
experts in the field of Air Transport to make sure that the researcher understood 
what factors would benefit the independence of the investigations and what 
would not. The necessary changes were made to the measuring index to reflect 
experts’ remarks.  
Because this is exploratory research, most of the questions have “Other” 
options to allow respondents to add new thoughts to their responses. The 
responses under this option were analysed and, where possible, assigned to 
one of the predefined options. To increase the reliability of this process, a 
sample from the responses was given to another expert in the field of safety of 
air transport to match the answers in “Other” options with the predefined options 
where possible. The results from the researcher and the results from the expert 
were compared and found to match more than 86% of the time and therefore, 
the researcher’s analyses were accepted. 
The researcher did not find any previous studies similar to this research and 
therefore there are no pre-existing views to challenge. However, at the 
beginning of this research, the researcher found it strange and considered it 
inadequate that ICAO require something and yet refrain from defining it. Why 
did ICAO leave the required investigation independence without a clear 
definition? 
After analysing the responses to the survey, it becomes clearer now that the 
question should not be “Why” but “Is it possible for ICAO to publish a single 
clear definition for accident investigation independence?” In reality, ICAO is 
made up of its Member States around the world. If these States do not, or 
cannot, fully agree on how to ensure the independence of their investigations, 
as shown from the results in this research, then ICAO will not be able to define 
one acceptable setup and ignore the rest. ICAO, therefore, indicated only what 
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it considered necessary to establish an independent accident investigation, 
namely: functional and structural (in the 10th edition) independence, and the 
protection of records. 
8.5 Changing the Way We Think About Investigation 
Independence 
Almost all initiatives for improving investigation independence are based on 
conformity (see chapter 2 of this thesis) while the results from this research 
suggest that they should be based on diversity. Because of these diversities, 
there is a need for more research to look deeper into the systems and how they 
interrelate, and learn what works, how and why it works, and what does not 
work.  
Research and training should not only focus on the basic characteristics of 
independence such as the separation from regulators and operators (airlines, 
ground support, traffic control, etc.), rather they should cover the wide span of 
factors that affect investigation independence. 
The results from this research show that although a few countries (six) do not 
have permanent accident investigation authorities, there are other countries 
with permanent accident investigation authorities that performed, in general, at 
the same level. This suggests that there are countries which are involved in the 
activity of building an independent accident investigation authority but not 
accomplishing the goals. It could simply be because these goals are not clear to 
them or it could be because of other complex reasons that prevent the 
realisation of these goals.  
Part of the problem is that the focus is on successfully passing ICAO USOAP 
audits even if there are no real achievements with regard to independence. This 
is not to say USOAP audits are not important. They have their own merits and 
their benefits are well documented. However, audits should not be the dominant 
and only measure when it comes to a very important and complex concept such 
as investigation independence. 
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The ICAO approach to USOAP audits using clearly defined indicators may not 
be suitable to promote and actually achieve the benefits of independent 
accident investigations. The current approach, although far from being rigid, 
does not acknowledge the inherent diversity in achieving the goals of 
investigation independence, which does not help in preventing the drawbacks of 
a lack of independence in accident investigation authorities.  
RAIO is one way that acknowledges the diversity of ICAO Member States when 
it comes to resources. ICAO has realised that not all States have the necessary 
resources to be in full compliance with Annex 13 SARPs. ICAO’s answer to the 
diversity in resources is to ask the States concerned to form an RAIO that fits 
ICAO’s “compliance” approach. 
ICAO keeps modifying Annex 13 hoping to achieve enough SARPs to make the 
independence of accident investigation achievable through “compliance”. This 
will not work because investigation independence is an activity that involves 
human interaction, perception, understanding, and implementation and 
therefore needs to account for all of these. 
Unlike the mechanical systems of licensing and certification, achieving 
adequate accident investigation independence is a system of human factors 
and should be dealt with as such. 
Although there are trends in the survey results, each case is indeed unique. 
Each practice that relates to accident investigation has a reason that can be 
grossly misunderstood if removed from its context. The level of independence 
changes with a change in circumstances, which means the levels of accident 
investigation independence are as diverse as the circumstances of the 
accidents themselves. 
ICAO and similar international bodies will not be able to accommodate for all 
the variations in accident investigation authorities when it comes to ensuring 
their independence. The diversities should be acknowledged and only 
guidelines with specific goals should be set for all States to achieve. This is not 
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to say States should be left unaccountable for the lack of investigation 
independence, but the right conditions when they exist will bring opportunities 
and make it possible for countries with few resources and little known 
circumstances to achieve the goals and benefits of investigation independence. 
8.6 Limitations 
Although the research has reached its aims, there were some unavoidable 
limitations. First, the sample size is relatively small due to the sensitive nature of 
the data needed. In addition, the participating States are audited by ICAO which 
makes it difficult for them to release sensitive information. Nevertheless, enough 
data were collected to provide insights into this issue of investigation 
independence. 
Second, the sample is skewed to European States because most of the replies 
came from that area of the world. 
Another limitation is that the data are a self-reporting type of data which must be 
taken at face value because they cannot be independently verified. However, 
the survey targeted heads of accident investigation authorities and the 
professionals in this field in order to collect reliable data. 
8.7 Recommendations 
This research recommends that aircraft accident investigation authorities should 
consider implementing the seven practices/characteristics that are commonly 
found in the States that have a high level of investigation independence (High-
Independence category), as identified in the results. 
This research also recommends that States identified in the research as being 
part of the “Low-Independence” category should consider resolving the six 
common practices identified in this category, with the exception of the common 
practice of a single-mode setup, in order to improve their overall level of 
investigation independence. 
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Additionally, ICAO Member States should consider using the developed 
measuring index to measure their current position and plan for improvement, 
knowing where to effectively spend their resources. Moreover, using the results 
from the analysis of the measuring index, ICAO Member States that wish to 
establish new air accident investigation authorities can make informed decisions 
on what features they need to implement to ensure the adequate independence 
of the newly established authorities. 
Moreover, ICAO Member States should consider sharing information about the 
independence of accident investigation authorities. There are systems available 
to share sensitive data that are found from accident investigations or provided 
through voluntary information systems, but the success and failure of the 
independence of the investigation authorities that are part of the system, on 
which this whole system depends, are not reported. Knowing the integrity and 
credibility of the system will at least, if it does not improve the system, ensure 
the system does not degrade. This proactive approach will also uncover and 
prevent any hidden “confidence crisis” in the aviation system that could 
suddenly erupt, similarly to the sudden financial crisis that was discussed earlier 
in this thesis. 
8.8 Future Research 
Although this study helps bridge some of the gaps, there is still a lack of 
research in this area. There is a need for more research to further our 
understanding of the concept of independence in the context of air accident 
investigations. The following are some recommendations for future research. 
This study revealed certain characteristics that are common to ICAO Member 
States that scored the highest in the 4DMI (High-Independence category), and 
revealed other characteristics that are common to the States that scored the 
lowest in the 4DMI (Low-Independence category). It might be sensible to 
replicate the work done here with a different sample and check if these findings 
can be verified. 
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Additionally, the current study is a “snapshot” analysis of the independence of 
aircraft accident investigation authorities, which effectively represents a detailed 
picture frozen in time. It may be helpful to implement the developed measuring 
index (4DMI) in such a way that it becomes dynamic, where it could be used as 
a self-assessment tool for accident investigation authorities in ICAO Member 
States. 
Additional development could be to integrate the 4DMI measuring index 
presented in this research, or a modified version of it, with ICAO’s USOAP 
programme. ICAO could recommend using the measuring index developed in 
this research for self-assessment to States prior to the ICAO audit. This may 
allow States to see the goals that ICAO aim to achieve and allow the ICAO 
auditing team to probe deeper into the State’s accident investigation authority’s 
setup to better understand the situation.  
Moreover, the measuring techniques introduced in this research were applied to 
each ICAO Member State separately. It may be worthwhile checking the 
possibility of applying, and modifying if required, the developed model to 
regional accident investigation organisations (RAIOs). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Analysis of ICAO Annex 13-9
th
 Edition 
ICAO Annex 13 (9th edition) has been analysed to extract the most important 
elements of accident investigation independence.  
A.1 Independence Elements 
ICAO Annex 13 9th edition was analysed to extract the elements that are related 
to the independence of aircraft accidents and incidents investigation. Table ‎A-1 
shows the analysis and its results. Only the paragraphs most related to the 
independence of investigation were analysed. 
The columns in the table represent the following: 
Annex 13 Item: SARP paragraph from Annex 13 9th Ed. 
Affect by level of Independence: Check if the SARP can be affected by the 
level of independence of the investigation. 
Can it be done without independence: Can the SARP be complied with 
without being independent? 
Can it be used to Measure Independence?: Can it be used as an indicator to 
measure investigation independence? 
Notes: Notes. 
Classification: The attribute(s) of independence impeded in Annex 13 SARPs. 
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Table ‎A-1 ICAO Annex 13 9th Ed. Analysis 
# Annex 13 Item Affected 
by level 
of 
Indepen-
dence? 
Can it be 
done 
without 
indepen-
dence? 
Can it be 
used to 
Measure 
Indepen-
dence? 
Notes Classification 
1 OBJECTIVE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
3.1 The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or 
incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It 
is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or 
liability. 
Yes Yes Yes Even without 
independent 
investigation body it 
is still possible to 
have a good 
investigation that 
does not apportion 
blame or liability. 
Blame or 
liability 
2 Responsibility for instituting and conducting the investigation 
ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS IN THE TERRITORY OF A 
CONTRACTING STATE 
5.1 The State of Occurrence shall institute an investigation 
into the circumstances of the accident and be responsible for 
the conduct of the investigation, but it may delegate the whole 
or any part of the conducting of such investigation to another 
State by mutual arrangement and consent. In any event the 
State of Occurrence shall use every means to facilitate the 
investigation. 
Yes Yes Maybe Investigation could 
be safety or judicial 
investigation. 
Investigation body 
could be 
independent body or 
not. 
Delegation could be 
a problem if it is 
delegated to, for 
example, the State 
of manufacture 
(NTSB and Boeing). 
Independence may 
still work fine in this 
Conduct of 
investigation 
(Article 26 to 
the 
Convention, 
no deviation) 
 
 
 Delegation 
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example. This 
happened in 
Indonesia. 
3 5.1.1 Recommendation.— The State of Occurrence should 
institute an investigation into the circumstances of a serious 
incident. Such a State may delegate the whole or any part of 
the conducting of such investigation to another State by 
mutual arrangement and consent. In any event the State of 
Occurrence should use every means to facilitate the 
investigation. 
Yes Yes Yes Same as above but 
for serious incident 
(not accident) 
Delegation 
4 ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS IN THE TERRITORY OF A 
NON-CONTRACTING STATE 
State of Registry 
5.2 Recommendation.— When the accident or the serious 
incident has occurred in the territory of a non-Contracting 
State which does not intend to conduct an investigation in 
accordance with Annex 13, the State of Registry or, failing 
that, the State of the Operator, the State of Design or the 
State of Manufacture should endeavour to institute and 
conduct an investigation in cooperation with the State of 
Occurrence but, failing such cooperation, should itself 
conduct an investigation with such information as is available. 
Yes Yes Maybe Not a standard Conduct of 
investigation 
5 ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING THE 
INVESTIGATION 
5.4 The accident investigation authority shall have 
independence in the conduct of the investigation and have 
unrestricted authority over its conduct, consistent with the 
provisions of this Annex. The investigation shall include: 
a) the gathering, recording and analysis of all available 
information on that accident or incident; 
Yes No Yes  Legal 
Framework 
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b) if appropriate, the issuance of safety recommendations; 
c) if possible, the determination of the causes; and 
d) the completion of the final report. 
When possible, the scene of the accident shall be visited, the 
wreckage examined and statements taken from witnesses. 
6 5.4.1 Recommendation.— Any judicial or administrative 
proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be separate 
from any investigation conducted under the provisions of this 
Annex. 
Yes No Yes Separation: 
financially, in effort, 
in time 
(Who goes first?) 
Separation of 
investigation 
7 Investigator-in-charge — Designation 
5.5 The State conducting the investigation shall designate the 
investigator-in-charge of the investigation and shall initiate the 
investigation immediately. 
Yes Yes Yes Initiating the 
investigation should 
be the choice of the 
indep body. 
Designating the 
investigator-in-
charge should be 
done without 
pressure. 
Conduct of 
investigation 
8 Investigator-in-charge — Access and control 
5.6 The investigator-in-charge shall have unhampered access 
to the wreckage and all relevant material, including flight 
recorders and ATS records, and shall have unrestricted 
control over it to ensure that a detailed examination can be 
made without delay by authorized personnel participating in 
the investigation. 
Yes Yes Yes Judicial investigation 
wants to have 
access also. 
Investigator in 
charge should have 
the access first. 
Access and 
control 
 
Legal 
framework 
9 Flight recorders — Accidents and incidents 
5.7 Effective use shall be made of flight recorders in the 
investigation of an accident or an incident. The State 
conducting the investigation shall arrange for the read-out of 
Yes Yes Yes Flight recorders 
should be in the 
custody of the safety 
investigation. Where 
Access and 
control 
 
Evidence 
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the flight recorders without delay. it is read and who is 
there is important for 
indep. 
10 5.8 Recommendation.— In the event that the State 
conducting the investigation of an accident or an incident 
does not have adequate facilities to read out the flight 
recorders, it should use the facilities made available to it by 
other States, giving consideration to the following: 
a) the capabilities of the read-out facility; 
b) the timeliness of the read-out; and 
c) the location of the read-out facility. 
Yes Yes Yes  Evidence 
11 Medical examinations 
5.9.1 Recommendation.— When appropriate, the State 
conducting the investigation should arrange for medical 
examination of the crew, passengers and involved aviation 
personnel, by a physician, preferably experienced in accident 
investigation. These examinations should be expeditious. 
Yes Yes Yes The crew 
intoxication could be 
perishable evidence. 
Influence from 
outside can cause 
delay. 
Independence here 
is important. 
Evidence 
 
Legal 
framework 
12 Coordination — Judicial authorities 
5.10 The State conducting the investigation shall recognize 
the need for coordination between the investigator-in-charge 
and the judicial authorities. Particular attention shall be given 
to evidence which requires prompt recording and analysis for 
the investigation to be successful, such as the examination 
and identification of victims and read-outs of flight recorder 
recordings. 
Note 1.— The responsibility of the State of Occurrence for 
such coordination is set out in 5.1. 
Note 2.— Possible conflicts between investigating and judicial 
Yes No Yes Independent safety 
investigation should 
have access to 
evidence and 
witnesses first. 
Coordination 
 
Evidence 
 
Legal 
framework 
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authorities regarding the custody of flight recorders and their 
recordings may be resolved by an official of the judicial 
authority carrying the recordings to the place of readout, thus 
maintaining custody. 
13 Informing aviation security authorities 
5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known, or 
it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference was 
involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately initiate 
action to ensure that the aviation security authorities of the 
State(s) concerned are so informed. 
Yes No Yes Just culture. Safety 
investigation (indep) 
will not apportion 
blame; however, will 
not cover up 
unlawful acts. 
Coordination 
 
Legal 
framework 
14 Non-disclosure of records 
5.12 The State conducting the investigation of an accident or 
incident shall not make the following records available for 
purposes other than accident or incident investigation, unless 
the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in 
that State determines that their disclosure outweighs the 
adverse domestic and international impact such action may 
have on that or any future investigations: 
a) all statements taken from persons by the investigation 
authorities in the course of their investigation; 
b) all communications between persons having been involved 
in the operation of the aircraft; 
c) medical or private information regarding persons involved 
in the accident or incident; 
d) cockpit voice recordings and transcripts from such 
recordings; and 
e) opinions expressed in the analysis of information, including 
flight recorder information. 
Yes No Yes if the appropriate 
authority always ask 
for the records to be 
disclosed, then it is 
not a measure for 
independence. They 
have the right 
according to 5.12 
Blame or 
liability 
 
Legal 
framework 
15 5.12.1 These records shall be included in the final report or its 
appendices only when pertinent to the analysis of the 
accident or incident. Parts of the records not relevant to the 
Yes No Yes If such information is 
distributed, it may, in 
the future, no longer 
Blame or 
liability 
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analysis shall not be disclosed. 
Note.— Information contained in the records listed above, 
which includes information given voluntarily by persons 
interviewed during the investigation of an accident or incident, 
could be utilised inappropriately for subsequent disciplinary, 
civil, administrative and criminal proceedings. If such 
information is distributed, it may, in the future, no longer be 
openly disclosed to investigators. Lack of access to such 
information would impede the investigation process and 
seriously affect flight safety. 
be openly disclosed 
to investigators. 
Lack of access to 
such information 
would impede the 
investigation 
process and 
seriously affect flight 
safety. 
 
Legal 
framework 
16 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE OF REGISTRY AND THE 
STATE OF THE OPERATOR 
Flight recorders — Accidents and serious incidents 
5.16 When an aircraft involved in an accident or a serious 
incident lands in a State other than the State of Occurrence, 
the State of Registry or the State of the Operator shall, on 
request from the State conducting the investigation, furnish 
the latter State with the flight recorder records and, if 
necessary, the associated flight recorders. 
Note.— In implementing 5.16, the State of Registry or the 
State of the Operator may request the cooperation of any 
other State in the retrieval of the flight recorder records. 
Yes Yes Maybe For good 
investigation 
independence 
practice, the State of 
Operator & State of 
Registry should not 
be involved in 
collecting evidence. 
Evidence 
 
Cooperation 
17 Organisational information 
5.17 The State of Registry and the State of the Operator, on 
request from the State conducting the investigation, shall 
provide pertinent information on any organization whose 
activities may have directly or indirectly influenced the 
operation of the aircraft. 
Yes Yes Maybe There is a better 
chance of 
"openness" when 
the investigation 
body is known to be 
independent. 
Cooperation 
18 PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION 
Note.— Nothing in this Annex is intended to imply that the 
accredited representative and advisers of a State have to be 
Yes Yes Maybe Opposite of 
independence! 
Participation of 
Participation : 
required by 
Article 26 to 
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always present in the State in which the investigation is 
conducted. 
PARTICIPATION OF THE STATE OF REGISTRY, THE 
STATE OF THE OPERATOR, THE STATE OF DESIGN AND 
THE STATE OF MANUFACTURE 
Rights 
5.18 The State of Registry, the State of the Operator, the 
State of Design and the State of Manufacture shall each be 
entitled to appoint an accredited representative to participate 
in the investigation. 
Note.— Nothing in this Standard is intended to preclude the 
State that designed or manufactured the powerplant or major 
components of the aircraft from requesting participation in the 
investigation of an accident. 
parties that have 
direct interest in the 
accident may 
influence the 
investigation.  
 
It can also be looked 
at as the 
"transparent" part of 
the independent 
investigation. 
the Chicago 
Convention 
(Cannot 
deviate from 
it) 
19 5.19 The State of Registry or the State of the Operator shall 
appoint one or more advisers, proposed by the operator, to 
assist its accredited representative. 
5.19.1 Recommendation.— When neither the State of 
Registry, nor the State of the Operator appoint an accredited 
representative, the State conducting the investigation should 
invite the operator to participate, subject to the procedures of 
the State conducting the investigation. 
5.20 The State of Design and the State of Manufacture shall 
be entitled to appoint one or more advisers, proposed by the 
organizations responsible for the type design and the final 
assembly of the aircraft, to assist their accredited 
representatives. 
5.21 Recommendation.— When neither the State of Design 
nor the State of Manufacture appoint an accredited 
representative, the State conducting the investigation should 
invite the organizations responsible for the type design and 
the final assembly of the aircraft to participate, subject to the 
Yes Yes Maybe Now the States are 
also involved in the 
investigation. 
Not good for 
independence, 
however, it keeps 
the investigators 
informed and gives 
them easier access 
to information 
needed. 
Participation : 
required by 
Article 26 to 
the Chicago 
Convention 
(Cannot 
deviate from 
it) 
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procedures of the State conducting the investigation. 
20 Obligations 
5.22 When the State conducting an investigation of an 
accident to an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 2 250 kg 
specifically requests participation by the State of Registry, the 
State of the Operator, the State of Design or the State of 
Manufacture, the State(s) concerned shall each appoint an 
accredited representative. 
Note 1.— Nothing in 5.22 is intended to preclude the State 
conducting an investigation from requesting the State that 
designed or manufactured the powerplant or major 
components of the aircraft to appoint an accredited 
representative whenever the former State believes that a 
useful contribution can be made to the investigation or when 
such participation might result in increased safety. 
Note 2.— Nothing in 5.22 is intended to preclude the State 
conducting an investigation from requesting the State of 
Design and the State of Manufacture to give assistance in the 
investigation of accidents other than those in 5.22. 
Yes Yes Maybe This is an obligation 
that must be 
complied with. The 
States concerned 
would be more 
willing to send their 
accredited 
representatives 
before being 
requested, if the 
investigation body is 
known to be 
independent. 
Participation  
21 PARTICIPATION OF OTHER STATES 
Rights 
5.23 Any State which on request provides information, 
facilities or experts to the State conducting the investigation 
shall be entitled to appoint an accredited representative to 
participate in the investigation. 
Note.— Any State that provides an operational base for field 
investigations or is involved in search and rescue or 
wreckage recovery operations may also be entitled to appoint 
an accredited representative to participate in the 
investigation. 
Yes Yes Maybe Why? (see note 
below) 
 
To ensure the 
accuracy of the 
information 
contained in the final 
report, and to 
ensure full 
cooperation and 
best coordination in 
the investigation. 
Participation 
Cooperation 
Coordination 
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22 ENTITLEMENT OF ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES 
Advisers 
5.24 A State entitled to appoint an accredited representative 
shall also be entitled to appoint one or more advisers to assist 
the accredited representative in the investigation. 
Note 1.— Nothing in the above provisions is intended to 
preclude a State participating in an investigation from calling 
upon the best technical experts from any source and 
appointing such experts as advisers to its accredited 
representative. 
5.24.1 Advisers assisting accredited representatives shall be 
permitted, under the accredited representatives’ supervision, 
to participate in the investigation to the extent necessary to 
enable the accredited representatives to make their 
participation effective. 
Yes Yes Maybe If everybody is 
involved, how can it 
be an independent 
investigation? 
Participation 
23 Participation 
5.25 Participation in the investigation shall confer entitlement 
to participate in all aspects of the investigation, under the 
control of the investigator-in-change, in particular to: 
a) visit the scene of the accident; 
b) examine the wreckage; 
c) obtain witness information and suggest areas of 
questioning; 
d) have full access to all relevant evidence as soon as 
possible; 
e) receive copies of all pertinent documents; 
f) participate in read-outs of recorded media; 
g) participate in off-scene investigative activities such as 
component examinations, technical briefings, tests and 
simulations; 
h) participate in investigation progress meetings including 
Yes Yes Maybe There are still many 
States involved in 
the investigation. 
Opposite of 
independence. 
Participation 
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deliberations related to analysis, findings, causes and safety 
recommendations; and 
i) make submissions in respect of the various elements of the 
investigation. 
However, participation of States other than the State of 
Registry, the State of the Operator, the State of Design and 
the State of Manufacture may be limited to those matters 
which entitled such States to participation under 5.23. 
24 Notes to 5.25 above 
Note 1.— It is recognized that the form of participation would 
be subject to the procedures of the State in which the 
investigation, or part thereof, is being conducted. 
Note 2.— The collection and recording of information need 
not be delayed to await the arrival of an accredited 
representative. 
Note 3.— Nothing in this Standard precludes the State 
conducting the investigation from extending participation 
beyond the entitlement enumerated. 
Note 4.— The pertinent documents referred to in 
subparagraph e) also include documents such as the reports 
on examinations of components or studies performed within 
the framework of the investigation. 
Yes Yes Maybe Here are some 
controls to limit the 
involvement of 
others in the 
investigation. 
Participation 
 
Legal 
framework 
25 Obligations 
5.26 Accredited representatives and their advisers: 
a) shall provide the State conducting the investigation with all 
relevant information available to them; and 
b) shall not divulge information on the progress and the 
findings of the investigation without the express consent of 
the State conducting the investigation. 
Note.— Nothing in this Standard precludes prompt release of 
facts when authorized by the State conducting the 
Yes Yes Maybe More controls to 
ensure 
independence, but 
do they work? 
Cooperation 
 
Coordination 
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investigation, nor does this Standard preclude accredited 
representatives from reporting to their respective States in 
order to facilitate appropriate safety actions. 
26 PARTICIPATION OF STATES HAVING SUFFERED 
FATALITIES OR SERIOUS INJURIES TO ITS CITIZENS 
Rights and entitlement 
5.27 A State which has a special interest in an accident by 
virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens shall, upon 
making a request to do so, be permitted by the State 
conducting the investigation to appoint an expert who shall be 
entitled to: 
a) visit the scene of the accident; 
b) have access to the relevant factual information; 
c) participate in the identification of the victims; 
d) assist in questioning surviving passengers who are citizens 
of the expert’s State; and 
e) receive a copy of the Final Report. 
Yes Yes Maybe The participation of 
this "expert" should 
not affect the 
independence of the 
investigation. The 
participation is 
limited to ensure the 
investigation is fair, 
transparent, 
independent, clear, 
...etc. 
 
 
Participation 
27 RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY STATE 
Release of information — Consent 
6.2 States shall not circulate, publish or give access to a draft 
report or any part thereof, or any documents obtained during 
an investigation of an accident or incident, without the 
express consent of the State which conducted the 
investigation, unless such reports or documents have already 
been published or released by that latter State. 
No Yes No Whether the 
investigation is 
independent or not, 
the States will still 
receive a draft report 
but they are still not 
allowed to circulate 
it. 
Cooperation 
 
Coordination 
28 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING THE  
NVESTIGATION 
Consultation 
6.3 The State conducting the investigation shall send a copy 
of the draft Final Report to the State that instituted the 
Yes Yes Maybe Opposite of 
independence! 
 
Cannot release 
Consultation 
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investigation and to all States that participated in the 
investigation, inviting their significant and substantiated 
comments on the report as soon as possible. The draft Final 
Report of the investigation shall be sent for comments to: 
a) the State of Registry;  
b) the State of the Operator;  
c) the State of Design; and 
d) the State of Manufacture. 
If the State conducting the investigation receives comments 
within sixty days of the date of the transmittal letter, it shall 
either amend the draft Final Report to include the substance 
of the comments received or, if desired by the State that 
provided comments, append the comments to the Final 
Report. If the State conducting the investigation receives no 
comments within sixty days of the date of the first transmittal 
letter, it shall issue the Final Report in accordance with 6.4, 
unless an extension of that period has been agreed by the 
States concerned. 
Note 1.— Nothing in this Standard is intended to preclude the 
State conducting the investigation from consulting other 
States, such as those States which provided relevant 
information, significant facilities, or experts who participated 
in the investigation under 5.27. 
Note 2.— Comments to be appended to the Final Report are 
restricted to non-editorial-specific technical aspects of the 
Final Report upon which no agreement could be reached. 
Note 3.— When sending the draft Final Report to recipient 
States, the State conducting the investigation may consider 
using the most suitable and quickest means available, such 
as facsimile, e-mail, courier service or express mail. 
6.3.1 Recommendation.— The State conducting the 
investigation should send, through the State of the Operator, 
report without 
consulting other 
States involved. 
 
However, it could be 
an advantage, if it 
does not influence 
the final results. It 
could be looked at 
as transparency. 
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a copy of the draft Final Report to the operator to enable the 
operator to submit comments on the draft Final Report. 
6.3.2 Recommendation.— The State conducting the 
investigation should send, through the State of Design and 
the State of Manufacture, a copy of the draft Final Report to 
the organizations responsible for the type design and the final 
assembly of the aircraft to enable them to submit comments 
on the draft Final Report. 
29 Release of the Final Report 
6.5 In the interest of accident prevention, the State 
conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall 
release the Final Report as soon as possible. 
Yes Yes Maybe Release to public? 
Or to specified 
states only? 
(transparency) 
Transparency 
30 Safety recommendations 
6.8 At any stage of the investigation of an accident or 
incident, the accident or incident investigation authority of the 
State conducting the investigation shall recommend to the 
appropriate authorities, including those in other States, any 
preventive action that it considers necessary to be taken 
promptly to enhance aviation safety. 
6.9 A State conducting investigations of accidents or 
incidents shall address, when appropriate, any safety 
recommendations arising out of its investigations to the 
accident investigation authorities of other State(s) concerned 
and, when ICAO documents are involved, to ICAO. 
Yes Yes Yes Independent 
investigations 
should be able to 
issue any safety 
recommendations at 
any time without 
being influenced. 
Impartiality 
 
Cooperation 
 
Coordination 
 
Separation 
 
Transparency 
31 RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE RECEIVING SAFETY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Action on safety recommendations 
6.10 A State that receives safety recommendations shall 
inform the proposing State of the preventive action taken or 
under consideration, or the reasons why no action will be 
taken. 
Yes Yes Yes "Other than safety 
recommendations", 
like what? Changing 
regulations? Blame? 
Proposal for new 
systems? 
Cooperation 
(with States) 
 
Transparency 
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Note.— Nothing in this Standard is intended to preclude the 
State conducting the investigation from making proposals for 
preventive action other than safety recommendations. 
--------- 
Independent 
investigation must 
not have the 
authority to force 
changes. It can only 
recommend. 
32 ADREP REPORTING 
PRELIMINARY REPORT  
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING THE 
INVESTIGATION 
Accidents to aircraft over 2 250 kg 
7.1 When the aircraft involved in an accident is of a maximum 
mass of over 2 250 kg, the State conducting the investigation 
shall send the Preliminary Report to: 
a) the State of Registry or the State of Occurrence, as 
appropriate; 
b) the State of the Operator; 
c) the State of Design; 
d) the State of Manufacture; 
e) any State that provided relevant information, significant 
facilities or experts; and 
f) the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
 
No Yes No Independent or not, 
a preliminary report 
will go out to all 
specified States. 
 
 
N/A 
33 ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATA REPORT 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING THE 
INVESTIGATION 
Accidents to aircraft over 2 250 kg 
7.5 When the aircraft involved in an accident is of a maximum 
Yes Yes Maybe If it is not an 
independent body 
that is conducting 
the investigation; will 
it send any data that 
Impartiality 
 
Cooperation 
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mass of over 2 250 kg, the State conducting the investigation 
shall send, as soon as practicable after the investigation, the 
Accident Data Report to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 
Additional information 
7.6 Recommendation.— The State conducting the 
investigation should, upon request, provide other States with 
pertinent information additional to that made available in the 
Accident/Incident Data Report. 
 
"may" show the 
possibility of the 
regulator 
involvement? 
Is the data trusted? 
Coordination 
 
Separation 
 
Transparency 
34 ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES 
Note.— The objective of these specifications is to promote 
accident prevention by analysis of accident and incident data 
and by a prompt exchange of information. 
Incident reporting systems 
8.1 A State shall establish a mandatory incident reporting 
system to facilitate collection of information on actual or 
potential safety deficiencies. 
8.2 Recommendation.— A State should establish a voluntary 
incident reporting system to facilitate the collection of 
information that may not be captured by a mandatory incident 
reporting system. 
Yes Yes Yes Specifically the 
voluntary incident 
reporting system will 
not work if the 
investigation body is 
not an independent 
one. 
The reports should 
only be used for the 
purpose of 
advancing safety 
and not to apportion 
blame and that can 
only be assured 
through the 
independence of the 
investigation body, 
which will invite the 
trust of the public 
and the industry, 
and their 
Legal 
framework 
 
Impartiality 
 
Cooperation 
 
Blame and 
liability 
 253 
 
confidence. 
35 8.3 A voluntary incident reporting system shall be non-
punitive and afford protection to the sources of the 
information. 
Note 1.— A non-punitive environment is fundamental to 
voluntary reporting. 
Note 2.— States are encouraged to facilitate and promote the 
voluntary reporting of events that could affect aviation safety 
by adjusting their applicable laws, regulations and policies, as 
necessary. 
Note 3.— Guidance related to both mandatory and voluntary 
incident reporting systems is contained in the Accident 
Prevention Manual (Doc 9422). 
Yes Yes Yes See above Legal 
framework 
 
Blame and 
liability 
 
Cooperation 
(with industry) 
36 Database systems 
8.4 Recommendation.— A State should establish an accident 
and incident database to facilitate the effective analysis of 
information obtained, including that from its incident reporting 
systems. 
8.5 Recommendation.— The database systems should use 
standardized formats to facilitate data exchange. 
Yes Yes Yes When the aim is 
advancing safety 
only, the information 
can easily be shared 
and all related data 
can be transparent. 
Cooperation 
(with States) 
 
Transparency 
37 Analysis of data — Preventive actions 
8.6 A State having established an accident and incident 
database and an incident reporting system shall analyse the 
information contained in its accident/incident reports and the 
database to determine any preventive actions required. 
Note.— Additional information on which to base preventive 
actions may be contained in the Final Reports on investigated 
accidents and incidents. 
8.7 Recommendation.— If a State, in the analysis of the 
information contained in its database, identifies safety matters 
considered to be of interest to other States, that State should 
Yes Yes Maybe Independent setup 
can look at all 
possible causes, 
including the 
regulations, and be 
transparent about it. 
If the regulations 
need to be fixed, the 
independent setup 
can show this 
clearly. It is doubtful 
Cooperation 
(with States) 
 
Transparency 
 
Impartiality 
 
Depth of 
analysis (?) 
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forward such safety information to them as soon as possible. 
8.8 Recommendation.— In addition to safety 
recommendations arising from accident and incident 
investigations, safety recommendations may result from 
diverse sources, including safety studies. If safety 
recommendations are addressed to an organization in 
another State, they should also be transmitted to that State’s 
investigation authority. 
that the regulator 
would criticise its 
own work. 
38 Exchange of safety information 
8.9 Recommendation.— States should promote the 
establishment of safety information sharing networks among 
all users of the aviation system and should facilitate the free 
exchange of information on actual and potential safety 
deficiencies. 
Note.— Standardized definitions, classifications and formats 
are needed to facilitate data exchange. Guidance material on 
the specifications for such information-sharing networks will 
be provided by ICAO upon request. 
Yes Yes Maybe Independent 
investigation setup 
would want to 
promote safety and 
would want to be 
part of such 
network. 
Cooperation 
(with States) 
 
Transparency  
39 FORMAT OF THE FINAL REPORT 
2. ANALYSIS 
Analyse, as appropriate, only the information documented in 
1. — Factual information and which is relevant to the 
determination of conclusions and causes. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
List the findings and causes established in the investigation. 
The list of causes should include both the immediate and the 
deeper systemic causes. 
4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As appropriate, briefly state any recommendations made for 
the purpose of accident prevention and any resultant 
corrective action. 
Yes No Yes *cover up 
*blame 
*"..and the deeper 
systemic  causes" 
this is the advantage 
of independence. 
*criticise regulator if 
need to. 
------------------- 
List of deeper 
systemic causes is a 
direct result of 
Blame and 
liability 
 
Transparency 
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independence in 
investigation. 
40 These Attachments do not constitute a part of Annex 13 
GUIDELINES FOR FLIGHT RECORDER READ-OUT AND 
ANALYSIS 
Participation by the State of Manufacture (or Design) and 
the State of the Operator 
The State of Manufacture (or Design) has airworthiness 
responsibilities and the expertise normally required to 
read out and analyse flight recorder information. Since 
flight recorder information can often reveal airworthiness 
problems, the State of Manufacture (or Design) should 
have a representative present when the flight recorder 
read-out and analysis are being conducted in a State 
other than the State of Manufacture (or Design). 
The State of the Operator has regulatory responsibilities 
regarding the flight operation and can provide insights 
into operational issues which may be specific to the 
operator. Since flight recorder information can reveal 
operational problems, the State of the Operator should 
also have a representative present when the flight 
recorder read-out and analysis are being conducted. 
Recommended procedures 
The facility at which the flight recorders are read out for 
another State should be given an opportunity to 
comment on the Final Report in order to ensure that the 
characteristics of the flight recorder analysis have been 
taken into account. 
Yes Yes No  
This is not a 
requirement or 
recommendation. It 
is as stated not 
part of Annex 13.  
 
Participants are 
there to clarify 
things and help 
understand what 
happened. They 
must not influence 
the results of the 
investigation. 
 
Independent 
investigation can 
ensure this. 
Coordination 
 
Cooperation 
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From Table ‎A-1, the following are ICAO Annex 13 Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) items that can be described as the 
"Elements" of independent accidents and incidents investigations that are 
impeded within the SARPs: 
Apportion blame or liability - Conduct of investigation - Delegation - Legal 
Framework - Separation of investigations - Access and control (accident site, 
evidence, wreckage, etc.) - Evidence - Participation (States, Reps, etc.) - 
Consultation - Transparency - Cooperation - Coordination 
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Appendix B Ethics Proposal 
 
Measuring Accident Investigation Independence - Ethics Committee 
Proposal 
 
Researcher:   Sami Alsrisari 
Thesis Supervisor: Graham Braithwaite 
Date of proposal:  24 Sept 2011 
Research period:  Sept – Dec 2011 
 
1. Background to the Research 
This research explores the principle of independence and its effect on accident 
investigation. Many have discussed the benefits and the need for the 
independence of aircraft accident investigations; however, no tool has been 
introduced to evaluate it. This study proposes a methodology for the first time to 
measure the independence of aircraft accident investigation in the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Member States. The proposed method 
brings together valuable insights from different disciplines about the meaning of 
independence and how to measure it. These insights are scattered in the 
literature of economic, legal, political science, and other disciplines. 
Although ICAO imposes requirements to ensure investigation independence, it 
does not clearly define what independence is. The requirements for 
independence have been emphasised even more in the new 10th edition of 
ICAO Annex 13 published in July 2010. In order to come up with reasonable 
measures, a definition to clarify the meaning of independence in the context of 
accident investigation must be either introduced by this research or selected 
from the different definitions in the existing literature.  
The overall objective of this research is to find a method to effectively measure 
the independence of aircraft accident investigation authorities in ICAO Member 
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States. Moreover, this research will provide information about these authorities’ 
current positions and allow ICAO Member States to avoid future mistakes, and 
raise the level of the independence of their investigations for the sake of the 
ultimate goal – improving aviation safety. 
2. Methodology for Data Collection and Analysis 
Because no other research has been done before with the proposed details to 
gather information about aircraft accident investigation authorities in ICAO 
Member States, the data this research attempts to gather are considered 
exploratory in nature and will form a good base and provide a better 
understanding for future researches. For this reason it has been decided that a 
detailed questionnaire is the best way to collect the needed data about aircraft 
accident investigation authorities. 
3. Target Participants 
The target participants are those who are involved in aircraft accident 
investigations. The ideal participants would be the Heads of aircraft accident 
investigations because they are likely to be the most knowledgeable about their 
organisations. However, information from other investigators, operators, 
insurers, service providers, and others who are involved in aircraft accident 
investigations is also valuable, but has less credibility. For this reason, the 
questionnaire requires participants to provide their job titles or current positions, 
so that if there are different views for the same question they can be prioritised 
and guesswork can be removed. However, participation is voluntary and 
confidentiality guaranteed. 
4. Information Being Sought from Participants 
This is an exploratory type of research. Participants, therefore, are asked to 
reply to questions about the current situation of the aircraft accident 
investigation authority in their own country. The questionnaire explores and 
attempts to collect data about different dimensions defining the independence of 
the civil aircraft accident investigation authorities around the world. The 
researcher realises that each country has its own legal system, financial 
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system, government structure, and its own understanding of the words 
“investigation independence.” This questionnaire attempts to capture the views 
of the participants with regard to these issues. 
5. Addressing Ethics Issues 
There is no deception involved in this research; however, the idea of 
“measuring” independence was not made clear to the participants because the 
researcher thinks it may affect the responses of the participants. It is human 
nature to want to measure “better” when compared to others. Therefore, the 
general idea of the research was explained but not the attempt to establish a 
tool to measure the independence of each accident investigation authority in 
each ICAO Member State. 
Participants are invited to participate in this questionnaire through faxes, emails, 
and personal contacts. Their participation is voluntary and there are no 
incentives or compensations given for participation in this research. 
Information about the participants’ job titles are being collected, therefore, there 
is a slight potential of professional harm, especially for those who are in the 
chief inspectors’ or heads of the accident investigation authorities’ positions, 
who can easily be identified from their job titles when combined with names of 
their countries. The harm can be caused if the participants answer some of the 
difficult questions, such as those asking how satisfied the participants are with 
the budget of the authority, or if there are pressures from the political parties in 
their countries, or if politicians are trying to influence their decisions, ...etc.  
To protect participants from any potential professional harm, the job title 
information will not be published and will be kept confidential. Moreover, the 
researcher will seek data from different participants about the same country’s 
aircraft accident investigation authority which will make it even more difficult to 
identify participants from the data collected.  
After the completion of each questionnaire, the participants will be thanked for 
their assistance with the research and will be given the opportunity to print their 
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responses. The participants will be reminded of their right to withdraw their 
responses within two weeks from the date of submitting their information. The 
participants will also be reminded that their data will be held confidentially and 
anonymously.  
The participants will be given the researcher’s Cranfield University email 
address should they need to contact him after finishing the questionnaire for 
any reason.  
The data provided by participants will not be shared with any person other than 
academic personnel directly involved with this project.  
The procedures for handling, storage and use of the data will ensure the 
confidentiality of all information disclosed by participants. Completed forms will 
be stored in a locked secure location and will be de-identified and given random 
numbers when the data analysis phase begins (about two months from the end 
of the data collection phase).  
There is no potential for perceived conflict of interest for this project.  
After careful consideration, the researcher decided that there is no need for an 
“informed consent” form for this research.  However, the following statements 
have been introduced as the cover page for the electronic questionnaire: 
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Figure ‎B-1 A snapshot of the cover page for the survey 
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6. Acknowledgment 
I confirm that as part of the research activity described above: 
 I will ensure that no-one is coerced or compelled to participate in the 
research 
 I will not use any inducements or incentives to secure participation 
 I will not use any form of deception as part of the research method 
 I will explain to participants the level of confidentiality which they can 
expect and will aim to maintain participant confidentiality wherever 
practicable 
 I will design and execute the research in a way which protects 
participants from harm 
 I will, prior to any data gathering activity, brief participants about the 
project and their rights 
 I will, following any data collection activity, debrief participants by 
allowing them to print their responses at the end of the survey 
 I will store any data I obtain in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
I also confirm that: 
 The information I have provided on this form is accurate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief 
 I have read the advice on research ethics contained in the document 
‘Basic Principles of Research Ethics for Studies Involving Human 
Subjects’ 
 The project described above will abide by the University’s Ethics Policy 
 There is no potential material interest that may, or may appear to, impair 
the independence and objectivity of researchers conducting this project 
 Subject to research being approved, I undertake to adhere to the project 
description and statements provided above 
 I undertake to inform SEREC of any significant changes to the research 
activity which might invalidate the statements made above 
 I understand that the project, including research records and data, may 
be subject to inspection for audit purposes, if required in future 
 I understand that personal data about me as a researcher in this form will 
be held by those involved in the ethics review procedure and that this will 
be managed according to Data Protection Act principles 
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Appendix C Survey Questionnaire 
 
Dear Participant, 
This survey is part of my PhD research and the results will be used for the final 
thesis. It is an attempt to describe a current situation in accident investigation 
authorities in ICAO Member States to inform future practice. The questionnaire 
explores and attempts to collect data about different dimensions defining 
current practices, methodologies, and level of resources available to the civil 
aircraft accident investigation authorities around the world. 
I would be grateful if you could respond to as many questions as you can. Even 
if you must miss some out, the information that you do provide will contribute to 
a greater understanding of the current situation as well as providing a base-line 
for potential future studies, so do provide considered responses. Your individual 
contribution will not be divulged and will be treated in the strictest confidence.  
There is no right or wrong answer. Please provide your “OWN VIEW” of the 
“CURRENT” situation in ”YOUR COUNTRY”, not necessarily the situation you think 
is best. For the purpose of this research the accident investigation “agency” 
and the accident investigation “authority” mean the same thing and that is the 
body responsible for carrying out aircraft accident investigations in your State. 
Any information you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous but 
will contribute to general statistics on the topic. Participants can stop 
participating in the survey at any time before submitting the questionnaire. 
However, once the questionnaire is submitted they can withdraw their 
responses from this survey within two weeks from the date of submission of 
their response by contacting the researcher. If you wish to withdraw your 
responses from this survey, please contact me on this email 
s.m.alsrisari@cranfield.ac.uk 
 264 
 
Any personal information that you provide (e.g. job title) will not be published 
without your consent and approval. 
This survey has 6 pages as follows: 
Page 1 : This page  
Pages 2-5 : Questionnaire  
Page 6 : Submission of your responses, "thank you" note and reminder of the 
researcher’s contact email. 
It is “not possible” to return to a page once it has been completed. When you 
arrive at the final 'thank you' page, you will know that your responses have been 
recorded on our database. The surveys that are left incomplete until the end of 
this project will be deleted and will not be used in the project. Please note that: 
- Your participation is entirely voluntary 
- Your participation is fully confidential and your anonymity is assured 
- The survey records will be stored securely by the researcher where no other 
person can access them, and the information that you provide during the survey 
will not be shared with any party other than those directly involved in the 
research, i.e. the researcher and Cranfield University academic supervisors. 
You will have the chance to print your responses when you finish this survey. If 
you need to, you can finish this survey in several sessions by clicking the 
"'Finish Later'" button. 
By clicking "'Continue>'" you are consenting to participate in this survey. 
 
************************ 
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All questions about the civil aviation accident investigation authority in your 
country: 
1. Please choose your country from the list 
2. Please specify your Organization: 
a. Accident investigation authority 
b. Civil aviation authority 
c. Insurance company 
d. Manufacturer 
e. Operator 
f. Air traffic control 
g. Ground support 
h. Airport operator/authority 
i. Other 
1. Job title 
2. Email 
3. Contact number (optional) 
3. Does your State have a permanent accident investigation 
authority/body/agency? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
1. When was it established 
(several options, less than 1 to more than 12 
years) 
4. The aircraft accident investigation authority in your State is: 
a. Specific to aviation 
b. Multimodal 
c. Multisector 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other 
5. How many air accident investigators does the accident 
investigation agency in your State have? 
(Optional questions about the number of full- and part-
time investigators) 
 
6. Is the accident investigation authority physically separate from 
the Civil Aviation Authority (Regulator)? 
a. No, they are located in the same building 
b. Yes, they are separated in different buildings 
c. Don’t know 
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7. Is the accident investigation authority separate from the 
operation authority/authorities (airport, air navigation, air traffic 
controller)? 
a. They are currently in the process of being separated 
b. No, they are not separate 
c. Yes, they are separated 
d. Don’t know 
If yes, select all that apply: 
1. Functionally separated (the accident investigation 
authority doing its own function only) 
2. Structurally separated (they are not in the same 
organisational structure) 
3. Physically separated (located in separate buildings) 
4. Physically separated (located in the same building but 
different floors) 
5. other 
 
8. Are there any employees from the industry (e.g. manufacturers, 
operators, or others) on loan or who work part-time for the 
accident investigation authority? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
Please specify which of the following employees currently work 
for the accident investigation authority (select all that apply): 
1. Full-time employees that only work for the accident 
investigation authority 
2. Part-time employees that only work for the accident 
investigation authority 
3. Part-time employees work for the authority and others 
4. On loan employees from the industry (part-time or full-
time) 
5. Other (specify) 
 
9. Who decides on the agency’s internal organisation (# of staff, 
levels of employees, etc)? 
a. The agency only 
b. Both the agency and government 
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c. Government only 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state) 
 
10. Who is responsible for the agency’s personnel policy 
(hiring/firing staff, deciding on its allocation and composition)? 
a. The agency only 
b. Both the agency and government 
c. Government only 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state) 
  
11. Where do the agency’s full-time safety investigators come from? 
Please choose all that are applicable: 
a. The industry (airlines, manufacturer, etc.) 
b. Regulator 
c. University graduates 
d. Experts from other countries 
e. ICAO 
f. Don’t know 
g. Other (please state) 
 
12. Does the State have a law or regulation to prevent the use of 
safety findings in a judicial inquiry? 
a. Yes 
b. No  
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
13. What is the head of the accident investigation agency’s term in 
office? 
a. Fixed term same as term of minister 
b. Fixed term greater than term of minister 
c. Fixed term less than term of minister 
d. Permanent appointment or term not specified  
e. Don’t know 
f. Other (please state) 
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If term not permanent, is the head of the accident 
investigation agency’s appointment renewable? 
a. Yes, once only 
b. Yes, several times 
c. No, not renewable 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other  
 
14. Who appoints the head of the accident investigation agency? 
a. Head of State (President/King/etc.) 
b. One or two ministers 
c. Members of safety board 
d. Mix of parliament and government 
e. Don’t know 
f. Other (please state) 
 
15. To whom does the head of the accident investigation agency 
report? 
a. Minister of Transportation or equal level 
b. Congress/Prime Minister or equal level 
c. Head of civil aviation authority 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state) 
 
16. Is the independence of the agency formally stated (in the 
regulations or legislation)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
17. Does the accident investigation authority in your State have a 
board? 
a. Yes  
b. No  
c. Other  
If yes, please choose all applicable statements that describe 
the Board members: 
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a. Must be from different political parties 
b. Can be from the same political party 
c. Are appointed by Head of State 
d. Have office terms longer than the government (ministers) 
e. Have office terms same as or shorter than government 
(ministers) 
f. Their appointment is renewable more than once 
g. Their appointment is renewable once only 
h. Their appointment is not renewable 
i. Their appointment is permanent or there is no provision for 
office term 
j. At least some of the board members are chosen based on 
their expertise in aviation (regulation, investigation, etc.) 
 
18. Can Politicians (government) decide which accidents are 
investigated by the accident investigation authority? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
19. Can Politicians (government) stop an ongoing investigation? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other  
 
20. Does the accident investigation agency have flight recorder 
read-out facilities? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
21. Does the agency have material failure analysis facilities? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
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22. Does the agency have a voluntary incident reporting system? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
23. Does the agency have a safety database (reports, safety studies, 
recommendations, etc.)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
If yes, are the data in this database available to others (e.g. 
independent investigation bodies, research institutes, 
manufacturers, etc.)? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
4. Other  
  
Who pays for data collection for the safety database? 
____________________________________________________
____________ 
 
24. Does the agency’s investigation authority require the approval of 
another government official, body or agency to release a report? 
a. Yes 
b. No, no approval needed 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
25. Can the agency launch investigations without prior permission 
from anybody outside the agency? 
a. Yes, always 
b. Sometimes 
c. No, it needs a permission 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state) 
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26. How do you know if the agency’ investigations are perceived by 
the public as being credible and impartial? 
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
__________________________________ 
 
27. Do the agency’ safety investigators have immediate and 
unrestricted access to all relevant evidence WITHOUT prior 
consent from judicial bodies or other authorities? 
a. Yes, always 
b. Yes, most of the times but not always 
c. No, always need consent 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other 
 
28. Where are the agency’ accident investigation procedures 
specified? (select all that apply) 
a. Annex 13 
b. National legislation 
c. Regulations 
d. Currently not specified anywhere 
e. Don’t know 
f. Other  
 
29. In general, would you say that the salaries offered by the 
accident investigation agency in your State are: 
a. The best in the aviation industry and very attractive to experts 
b. Around the average of the aviation industry 
c. Below the average salaries in the industry 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state) 
 
30. According to the regulations in your State, determination of 
causation is the: 
a. “main” purpose of the investigation 
b. “sole” purpose of the investigation 
c. Don’t know 
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d. Other (please state) 
 
31. Are potential plaintiffs (e.g. family representatives, claimants’ 
representatives) allowed to participate in the investigation and 
have the same level of access as the potential defendants (e.g. 
air operator, manufacturer)? 
a. Yes, always  
b. Allowed only on certain cases 
c. Plaintiffs are not allowed to participate 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other  
 
32. Is it clearly stated in the regulations that the agency 
investigators are precluded from testifying in courts in litigation 
processes growing from the agency’s investigation reports? 
a. Yes, clearly stated 
b. No, not stated 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
33. Is the acceptance rate for the safety recommendations of the 
accident investigation authority in your State measured? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other  
 
What is the acceptance rate for the safety recommendations of 
the accident investigation authority in your State? 
a. 90% or more 
b. 80% to 90% 
c. 60% to 80% 
d. 40% to 60% 
e. 20% to 40% 
f. 20% ore below 
g. Don’t know 
h. Other (please state) 
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34. Please put an  ‘X’ only in the scale against each statement to 
give your opinion:  
Statement 
S
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g
ly
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re
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tr
a
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n
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n
o
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a. The agency has ready 
access to sufficient funds to 
properly investigate accidents 
and serious incidents that fall 
within its area of 
responsibility 
 
     
b. Funding for the agency’s 
investigations is independent 
of political pressure 
 
     
c. Funding for the agency’s 
investigations is independent 
of other influences 
 
     
(35.a) The greater the 
independence of the accident 
investigation agency, the 
greater the credibility of the 
agency 
 
     
(35.b) The greater the 
independence of the accident 
investigation agency, the 
greater the quality of the 
investigation 
 
     
(35.c) Without investigation 
independence, there is no 
investigation quality at all 
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(35.d) Without investigation 
independence, the 
investigation quality is 
affected for sure 
 
     
(35.e) Investigation 
independence is a good 
thing, however, it is separate 
from the investigation quality  
 
     
 
 
35. See above. 
36. Is there a law in place which forces the accident investigation 
agency to release its documents to the public? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
 
37. Does the regulation specify the types of accidents and incidents 
that the investigation agency must investigate? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
 
38. Can the investigation agency decide to investigate occurrences 
that it is not obligated to investigate? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
 
39. Who determines the scope of the investigation? 
____________________________________________________
____________ 
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40. Who determines the method of the investigation? 
____________________________________________________
____________ 
 
41. Who has the first access to witnesses? 
a. The agency’s safety investigators always have first access to 
witnesses by State law 
b. The agency’s safety investigators usually have first access to 
witnesses but not always 
c. The judicial (police) investigators always have first access to 
witnesses by State law 
d. The judicial (police) investigators usually have first access to 
witnesses but not always 
e. Don’t know 
f. Other (please state): 
________________________________________________ 
 
42. Does your State have regulations to protect the confidentiality of 
the witnesses? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state): 
________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________
_______________ 
__________________________________________________
_______________ 
 
43. In the event of an accident, who speaks to the media on behalf of 
the accident investigation agency?  
a. A spokesperson who works for the agency and speaks on 
behalf of the agency only 
b. A spokesperson who works for another agency (e.g. the 
legislator, regulator, operator, or other) and speaks on behalf 
of both 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state) 
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44. Who controls/reviews the accident investigation agency’s 
budget? 
a. The executive (government/ministers) alone 
b. The agency alone 
c. Both executive and agency 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state) 
 
45. What is the source(s) of the accident investigation agency’s 
budget? (list all) 
__________________________________________________
_______________ 
 
46. Is the investigation agency dependent on financial support from 
outside the agency to conduct its investigations? 
a. Yes, there is always a need for financial support from outside 
the agency (the budget does not cover investigations) 
b. Sometimes there is a need 
c. No, the agency has enough budget and does not use any 
outside financial support 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (please state): 
________________________________________________ 
 
47. Do you consider budgetary resources of the agency as: 
a. Sufficient  
b. Insufficient 
c. Don’t know 
d. Other (please state): 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
48. In your opinion, what factors influence the independence of the 
accident investigation agency/authority? 
____________________________________________________
_________________ 
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49. With regard to the requirements for the independence of aircraft 
accident investigations, would you say that ICAO documents 
are: 
a. Very clear 
b. Clear but could be improved 
c. Not clear 
d. Confusing 
e. Don’t know 
f. Other  
 
50. If you have anything else you want to add that might benefit this 
research, please add it here:  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire.  
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Appendix D Results of Applying 4DMI Measuring Tool 
Questions and replies pertaining to the four dimensions are gathered together in 
a single datasheet shown in Figure ‎D-1. The datasheet also shows “Total 
Score” and “RANK” for each of the total 68 participations. 
The datasheet shows five major columns in the first row: 
1. # : is the sequence number of the question 
2. Question: the text or abbreviation of the text of the question 
3. Possible Responses & Notes: these are the options available for 
respondents to select from, or a note when the question is an open-
ended question. It also contains notes about some of the answers from 
the “Other” option. 
4. Score: shows the number of points rewarded for that answer 
5. ID numbers: these are the unique ID numbers for each participant 
The rows are divided into a question, possible answers, and the points awarded 
to each answer. Under the ID number columns (68 participants), the score is 
shown for each answer. For example, if the participant answered option (b) for a 
question and the score for that answer is (0), a “zero” will be shown in the cell 
where that participant’s ID number intercepts with the selected answer. If the 
score for that answer is (1), then a “one” will be shown, and so on. 
The bottom four rows show the results for each participant: 
 Don’t Know or missing data: The total number of Don’t Know (or 
missing) answers.  
 Don’t Know (or missing) %: The percentage of the total number of 
Don’t Know or missing answers. 
 Total Score (sum of all points) %: The percentage of the sum of all 
points from each answer. 
 RANK according to Total Score (1 is highest independence): Rank in 
comparison to the rest of the participants’ scores where 1 represents the 
best score. 
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Note the following: 
1- Apart from the first question, each participant can score up to one point 
maximum per question. The first question has a weight of five points. The 
reason for this is explained in the discussion section. 
2- Q32 “Does the agency have a Board” has a negative scoring scheme. All 
answers other than “yes” are given one point to make sure that no 
country is penalised for not having a Board because this is not a 
measure of independence in itself. If the participant answers “yes” then 
he is directed to answer the question about “Board Members”, which 
describes/measures their independence.  
The above is to make sure that when the percentage of Total Score is 
calculated (dividing by the number of questions), participants who said 
they do not have a Board will not lose a full point because of this answer. 
At the same time, participants who said they do have a Board will get the 
correct score from describing the Board Members. 
3- Q3 “Agency (generally) separated from operation authorities”: if a 
participant answers “yes” to this question, he is directed to give more 
details about this separation. The points are given based on his 
selection. This is why the score cell shows the word “below”. 
4- Q15 “Agency’s investigation procedures specified in”: the * beside the 
scores indicates that the participants can select more than one answer to 
this question. The participants who select any one of the answers that 
have a *, or more than one of them, will be given one score only (1). 
Also, the “other” option in this question is divided into two scores: a score 
of (1) for answers that says EU Regulations, and a score of (0) for 
others. This is based on discussions with an expert in this field of aviation 
accident investigations. When the scoring technique was verified by this 
expert he explained that EU Regulation should have the same score as 
the score given for national regulation (1). 
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# Question Possible Responses & Notes Score
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Yes 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes, different buildings 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No, same building 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Yes (see next question for scoring)
below
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0
Agency (functionally) separate from operation
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Agency (structurally) separate from operation 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Agency (physically- different buildings) separate 
from operation
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Agency (physically- same buildings different 
floors) separate from operation
0.14
other 0 0 0
Agency only 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Both Agency & Gov 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Government only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0
Other (no agency) (part of CAA) 0 0 0
Agency only 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Both Agency & Gov 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Government only 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes, there is 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No, there is not 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0
Other (poor provisions in aviation act)
0 0
Head of State (King, President, ..etc) 1 1
One or two minister 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Members of Safety Board 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Mix of Parliament & Government 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Head of CAA 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (selected by interview(?)) 0
Minister of Transport or equal level 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Congress/Prime Minister or equal level 1 1 1 1
Head of CAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 0 0 0 0
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No, no approval needed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0
Other 0
Yes, always 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sometimes 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
No, it needs permission 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Other 0
Yes, always 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Yes, most of the times but not always 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
No, always need consent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Annex 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
National legislation 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regulations 1* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Currently not specified 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0
Other EU Reg (1), other 
(0)
1 0 0
Agree or Strongly agree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Disagree or Strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0 0 0
Agree or Strongly agree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Disagree or Strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0 0 0
Agree or Strongly agree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Disagree or Strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know
0 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agency, IIC, Head of office, Board, commissioner
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CAA or Minister of Trans. 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
other 0 0
Agency, IIC, Head of office, Board, commissioner
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
other 0
Agency’s investigators ALWAYS 1
st
 by State’s law
1 1 1 1
Agency’s investigators USUALLY 1st but not always
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Police ALWAYS 1st by State’s law 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Police USUALLY 1st but not always 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (Whoever is first to) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spokesperson works for agency & speaks on its 
behalf only
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spokesperson works for another agency and 
speaks on behalf of both
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (agency not interested to communicate 
with media)(from CAA)(Minister of DOT)
0 0 0 0
Executive (Gov/minister) alone 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Agency alone 1 1
Both Gov and Agency 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (no agency) 0 0
Yes, always (budget does not cover investigations)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sometimes there is a need 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
No, Agency does not use outside support 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufficient 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Insufficient 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (no special budgetary) 0 0
No data (missing)
0 0
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed term same as minister in Government 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fixed term longer than minister in Gov 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Fixed term shorter than minister in Gov 0.25 0.25
Permanent appointment OR not specified 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0
28 Agency is dependent on outside support to conduct 
its investigations?
29 Budgetary resources of Agency considered:
30 Are there employees (from industry) on loan or 
work part time for the Agency?
31 Head of Agency term in office?
25 State has regulations to protect witnesses’ 
confidentiality?
26 Who speaks to media in behalf of Agency?
27 Who controls/reviews Agency’s budget?
22 Who determines the scope of investigation?
23 Who determines the method of investigation
24 Who has 1
st
 access to witnesses?
19 Is there a law in place forcing Agency to release 
documents to public?
20 Regs specify types of accidents & incidents that 
must be investigated?
21 Can Agency decide to investigate occurrences 
outside its mandate?
18 Independent of other influences?
13 Can Agency launch investigation without prior 
permission?
14 Investigators have immediate/unrestricted access to 
evidence WITHOUT prior consent?
15 Agency’s investigation procedures specified in:
16 Agency has ready access to sufficient funds for 
proper investigations (within responsibilities of 
agency)?
17 Funding for Agency’s investigation is:
Independent of political pressure?
10 Can politicians decide which accident to investigate?
11 Can politicians stop on-going investigation?
12 Does the Agency require approval to release report?
7 Who appoints head of Agency?
8 Whom he reports to?
9 Independence of Agency formally stated?
4 Internal organization decided by: 
5 Personnel policy (hire,fire,etc) decided by:
6 Is there a Law or Reg to prevent use of safety 
findings in judicial inquiry?
1 State has permanent acc. Inv. agency?
2 Agency (physically) separate from regulator
3 Agency (generally) separated from operation 
authorities
Specific separations from Operation authorities
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Yes below
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 1 1 1
other 1 1 1 1
Must be from different political parties 0.2 0.2
Can be from same political party 0 0 0
Are appointed by Head of State 0.2 0.2
Have office terms longer than government 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Have office terms same as Government 0 0
Have office terms shorter than government 0
Renewable > once 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Renewable once only 0
Not renewable 0
Permanent/no provision 0.2 0.2 0.2
At least some of members chosen based on 
expertise in aviation
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0
Other (CAA has)(compulsory)(poorly managed)(at 
State level)(within airlines)
0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (partially) 0.5
The Agency 1 1 1 1 1
CAA 0 0 0
Government 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No data (missing) 0 0 0 0
39 How do you know if Agency’s investigations are 
perceived by public as credible and impartial?
Open question
Feedback (1), 
Other (0)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Best in industry/attractive 1 1
Around average 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Below average 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other (no permanent employees)(Assigned 
person by DOT/same salary)
0 0 0 0
“main” purpose of investigations
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
“sole” purpose of investigations 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0 0
other 0 0
Yes, clearly stated 1 1 1 1 1 1
No, not stated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other
0 0 0
1 8 2 14 1 4 0 6 3 7 9 8 24 3 19 7 14 0 0 2 0 0 3 5 13 0 2 10 3 1 0 6 0 0
2.33% 18.60% 4.65% 32.56% 2.33% 9.30% 0.00% 13.95% 6.98% 16.28% 20.93% 18.60% 55.81% 6.98% 44.19% 16.28% 32.56% 0.00% 0.00% 4.65% 0.00% 0.00% 6.98% 11.63% 30.23% 0.00% 4.65% 23.26% 6.98% 2.33% 0.00% 13.95% 0.00% 0.00%
15.96% 15.96% 26.60% 30.85% 31.91% 33.19% 33.51% 34.21% 40.94% 42.02% 42.89% 43.62% 46.81% 53.70% 55.66% 56.91% 57.51% 58.15% 59.00% 59.74% 60.64% 61.87% 62.74% 63.53% 63.81% 64.53% 65.43% 65.49% 65.91% 67.19% 67.72% 67.77% 68.60% 68.91%
68 67 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35
Dont Know or missing data
 Don't know (or missing) %
Total (sum of all points)
RANK according to the above Total
41 According to regulations in your State, 
determination of causation is:
42 Regulations clearly state that investigators are not 
to testify in courts...?
43 Agency recommendations acceptance rate 
measured? 
37 Is data in this Database available to others?
38 Who pays for data collection for Database?
40 Salaries of investigators are
34 Material failure analysis facilities?
35 Voluntary incident reporting system?
36 Safety Database?
33 Dose Agency have:
Flight Recorder readout facilities?
32 Does the agency have a Board?
Board Members:
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Yes 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
No
0
Yes, different buildings 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No, same building 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0
Yes (see next question for scoring)
below
No 0
Don’t know 0
Agency (functionally) separate from operation
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Agency (structurally) separate from operation 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Agency (physically- different buildings) separate 
from operation
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Agency (physically- same buildings different 
floors) separate from operation
0.14
other 0 0
Agency only 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Both Agency & Gov 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Government only 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other (no agency) (part of CAA) 0
Agency only 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Both Agency & Gov 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Government only 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Yes, there is 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No, there is not 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other (poor provisions in aviation act)
0
Head of State (King, President, ..etc) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
One or two minister 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Members of Safety Board 0.5 0.5 0.5
Mix of Parliament & Government 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Head of CAA 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other (selected by interview(?)) 0 0
Minister of Transport or equal level 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Congress/Prime Minister or equal level 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Head of CAA 0 0
Don’t know 0
Other 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0
Don’t know 0
Yes 0 0 0
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0
Other 0 0 0
Yes 0
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0
Yes 0
No, no approval needed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0
Other 0
Yes, always 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sometimes 0.5
No, it needs permission 0
Don’t know 0
Other 0
Yes, always 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Yes, most of the times but not always 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
No, always need consent 0
Annex 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
National legislation 1* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regulations 1* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Currently not specified 0
Don’t know 0
Other EU Reg (1), other 
(0)
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Agree or Strongly agree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Disagree or Strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0
Agree or Strongly agree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Disagree or Strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0
Agree or Strongly agree 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Disagree or Strongly disagree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0
Don’t know
0 0
Agency, IIC, Head of office, Board, commissioner
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CAA or Minister of Trans. 0
Don’t know 0
other 0 0
Agency, IIC, Head of office, Board, commissioner
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
other 0
Agency’s investigators ALWAYS 1
st
 by State’s law
1 1 1 1 1
Agency’s investigators USUALLY 1st but not always
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Police ALWAYS 1st by State’s law 0
Police USUALLY 1st but not always 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Don’t know 0
Other (Whoever is first to) 0.25 0.25
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Spokesperson works for agency & speaks on its 
behalf only
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spokesperson works for another agency and 
speaks on behalf of both
0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other (agency not interested to communicate 
with media)(from CAA)(Minister of DOT)
0
Executive (Gov/minister) alone 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Agency alone 1 1
Both Gov and Agency 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0 0
Other (no agency) 0
Yes, always (budget does not cover investigations)
0 0
Sometimes there is a need 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
No, Agency does not use outside support 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0
Sufficient 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Insufficient 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other (no special budgetary) 0
No data (missing)
0 0
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know
0 0 0
Fixed term same as minister in Government 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fixed term longer than minister in Gov 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Fixed term shorter than minister in Gov 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Permanent appointment OR not specified 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0 0 0
Other 0
30 Are there employees (from industry) on loan or 
work part time for the Agency?
31 Head of Agency term in office?
27 Who controls/reviews Agency’s budget?
28 Agency is dependent on outside support to conduct 
its investigations?
29 Budgetary resources of Agency considered:
24 Who has 1
st
 access to witnesses?
25 State has regulations to protect witnesses’ 
confidentiality?
26 Who speaks to media in behalf of Agency?
21 Can Agency decide to investigate occurrences 
outside its mandate?
22 Who determines the scope of investigation?
23 Who determines the method of investigation
18 Independent of other influences?
19 Is there a law in place forcing Agency to release 
documents to public?
20 Regs specify types of accidents & incidents that 
must be investigated?
16 Agency has ready access to sufficient funds for 
proper investigations (within responsibilities of 
agency)?
17 Funding for Agency’s investigation is:
Independent of political pressure?
13 Can Agency launch investigation without prior 
permission?
14 Investigators have immediate/unrestricted access to 
evidence WITHOUT prior consent?
15 Agency’s investigation procedures specified in:
10 Can politicians decide which accident to investigate?
11 Can politicians stop on-going investigation?
12 Does the Agency require approval to release report?
7 Who appoints head of Agency?
8 Whom he reports to?
9 Independence of Agency formally stated?
4 Internal organization decided by: 
5 Personnel policy (hire,fire,etc) decided by:
6 Is there a Law or Reg to prevent use of safety 
findings in judicial inquiry?
1 State has permanent acc. Inv. agency?
2 Agency (physically) separate from regulator
3 Agency (generally) separated from operation 
authorities
Specific separations from Operation authorities
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Figure ‎D-1 Datasheet for 4DMI showing scores and RANKs (the figure is divided into four pages) 
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Yes below
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 1
other 1
Must be from different political parties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Can be from same political party 0 0 0 0 0
Are appointed by Head of State 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Have office terms longer than government 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Have office terms same as Government 0 0 0 0 0
Have office terms shorter than government 0
Renewable > once 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Renewable once only 0 0 0 0
Not renewable 0
Permanent/no provision 0.2 0.2
At least some of members chosen based on 
expertise in aviation
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0
Other (CAA has)(compulsory)(poorly managed)(at 
State level)(within airlines)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0
Don’t know 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Other (partially) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
The Agency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CAA 0
Government 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0
No data (missing) 0 0
39 How do you know if Agency’s investigations are 
perceived by public as credible and impartial?
Open question
Feedback (1), 
Other (0)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
Best in industry/attractive 1 1 1 1 1 1
Around average 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Below average 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0 0
Other (no permanent employees)(Assigned 
person by DOT/same salary)
0
“main” purpose of investigations
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
“sole” purpose of investigations 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Don’t know 0
other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes, clearly stated 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No, not stated 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know
0 0
Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Don’t know 0 0
Other
0
1 2 1 0 2 2 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0
2.33% 4.65% 2.33% 0.00% 4.65% 4.65% 9.30% 2.33% 2.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.65% 2.33% 0.00% 2.33% 0.00% 2.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.33% 0.00% 2.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.30% 2.33% 2.33% 0.00%
69.66% 70.28% 70.64% 71.79% 72.21% 72.85% 72.85% 73.17% 73.81% 74.11% 74.11% 74.45% 74.53% 74.66% 74.85% 75.30% 75.38% 75.51% 75.62% 76.57% 76.57% 77.83% 78.28% 78.36% 78.70% 78.70% 79.77% 79.77% 79.77% 81.89% 82.43% 84.55% 85.38% 87.74%
34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
32 Does the agency have a Board?
Board Members:
35 Voluntary incident reporting system?
36 Safety Database?
37 Is data in this Database available to others?
33 Dose Agency have:
Flight Recorder readout facilities?
34 Material failure analysis facilities?
 Don't know (or missing) %
Total (sum of all points)
RANK according to the above Total
42 Regulations clearly state that investigators are not 
to testify in courts...?
43 Agency recommendations acceptance rate 
measured? 
Dont Know or missing data
38 Who pays for data collection for Database?
40 Salaries of investigators are
41 According to regulations in your State, 
determination of causation is:
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